The Minnesota Cartway: How a Landlocked Owner Forces a Road Under § 164.08

Minnesota is one of the few states where a landlocked owner can compel a unit of local government to lay a road across an unwilling neighbor’s land. The tool is the cartway petition, Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2, and its operative word is shall. The Minnesota Supreme Court has said the word means what it says and that mandamus will issue to enforce it.

What surprises petitioners is everything that word does not decide. It does not decide where the road goes — the town board picks the route, and a court reviewing that choice gives it the deference owed to a legislative act. It does not make the road free — the petitioner pays the neighbor’s compensation, the town’s professional and hearing and recording costs, and usually the grading and maintenance too. And what the petitioner receives at the end is not a private driveway. It is a public road, and it stays one unless the affected landowner consents in writing to something else.

Who qualifies for a mandatory cartway?

The statute has two mandatory tracks, both in subdivision 2, paragraph (a). Here is the first, in full:

(a) Upon petition presented to the town board by the owner of a tract of land containing at least five acres, who has no access thereto except over a navigable waterway or over the lands of others, or whose access thereto is less than two rods in width, the town board by resolution shall establish a cartway at least two rods wide connecting the petitioner’s land with a public road.

Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(a).

Three points that get missed:

Two rods is thirty-three feet. The Supreme Court said so in a footnote: “One rod equals 16.5 feet.” In re Daniel, 656 N.W.2d 543, 546 n.1 (Minn. 2003). And the statute says “at least two rods wide” — a floor, not a ceiling. The 1941 predecessor statute said “not more than two rods wide,” quoted in State ex rel. Rose v. Town of Greenwood, 220 Minn. 508, 509 (1945). That reversal of the modifier is the difference between a maximum and a minimum, and it is worth noticing when someone tells you a cartway “is” a thirty-three-foot road.

Narrow access counts as no access. The second trigger — access “less than two rods in width” — is independent. An owner with a genuine but ten-foot easement can petition.

In unorganized territory, the county board sits as the town board. § 164.08, subd. 2(b). That is how In re Daniel reached the St. Louis County Board of Commissioners.

Is there a path for a parcel smaller than five acres?

Yes — and it is mandatory, not discretionary. This is the part of the statute most often described wrongly. The second sentence of paragraph (a) reads:

A town board shall establish a cartway upon a petition of an owner of a tract of land that, as of January 1, 1998, was on record as a separate parcel, contained at least two but less than five acres, and has no access thereto except over a navigable waterway or over the lands of others.

Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(a). The verb is the same “shall” the Supreme Court enforced by mandamus in Rose. But the gate is much narrower, and three limits matter:

1. The parcel must have been on record as a separate parcel as of January 1, 1998. A parcel split off in 2004 does not qualify, no matter its size. This is a closed class that gets smaller as parcels are combined, not larger.
2. Two acres is the floor. A parcel under two acres has no mandatory track at all.
3. There is no narrow-access trigger. The five-acre sentence covers an owner “whose access thereto is less than two rods in width.” The two-to-five-acre sentence does not. An owner of a three-acre parcel with a ten-foot easement is outside the mandatory provision.

Does access by water defeat a cartway petition?

Not anymore — and the story behind that answer is the single most useful thing to know about this statute.

In 2003, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided In re Daniel, 656 N.W.2d 543 (Minn. 2003). Thomas Daniel owned a Lake Vermilion parcel reachable only by water and petitioned for a cartway across his neighbor’s land after a windstorm dropped timber he wanted to remove. The county board granted the cartway and awarded the neighbor $18,022, payable by Daniel. The Supreme Court reversed. Interpreting the then-current “no access . . . except over the lands of others,” it held that lake access is access:

Minnesota has a long-established tradition of accessing lake properties via navigable waterways. The language from the statute requiring that a cartway be granted to owners with “no access” to their property except over the lands of others was enacted in 1913. . . . Therefore, in interpreting the word access under this statute, it would be improper to exclude from consideration access via navigable waterway.

656 N.W.2d at 545. The omitted sentence explains the reasoning: when the provision was enacted, “travel over navigable waterways was more commonplace than it is today and was often the best mode of transportation.” Id. The court concluded that the board’s finding of “no access” “simply cannot be reconciled with our interpretation of Minn.Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(a),” and ordered judgment for the objecting neighbor. Id. at 546.

The next year, the legislature rewrote the phrase. 2004 Minn. Laws ch. 262, art. 2, § 7 amended subdivision 2 to read “no access thereto except over a navigable waterway or over the lands of others” — in both the five-acre sentence and the two-to-five-acre sentence — and reorganized the subdivision into paragraphs (a) through (e). The amendment took effect July 1, 2004. 2004 Minn. Laws ch. 262, art. 2, § 16 (“Sections 1 to 5, 7 to 12, 14, and 15 are effective July 1, 2004.”).

The result is a clean inversion. Under the statute In re Daniel construed, waterway access defeated the petition. Under the statute as it now reads, waterway-only access is one of the qualifying conditions that establishes it. A lake-only cabin owner who was told in 2003 that the cartway statute was unavailable was told correctly at the time and incorrectly today.

Does the cartway have to reach the usable part of my land?

Yes. This is Kennedy v. Pepin Township of Wabasha County, 784 N.W.2d 378 (Minn. 2010), and it is the leading modern case.

Kennedy owned 26.6 acres along Highway 61. About five acres on top of a bluff were buildable; the other twenty ran steeply down to the highway. His easement across the neighboring apple orchard had been extinguished by court order in 2000. He petitioned for a cartway. The township chose the cheapest of three routes — one that connected the highway to the base of the bluff, from which, as the township conceded at oral argument, there was no way up. The district court affirmed, reasoning it could “find no authority . . . that states that the cartway must provide access to the entire parcel.” Id. at 381.

The Supreme Court rejected that framing:

If a selected route does not provide meaningful access to a tract of land, then it fails to satisfy the requirement that a cartway be provided. Whether a petitioner satisfies the test for access in the first place or whether a proposed route provides access under the statute are one and the same question.

784 N.W.2d at 383. The court grounded this in Rose, where a half-acre lot did touch a public road but was cut off from the petitioner’s 92-acre farm by a lake, so the farm had no access. Rose, 220 Minn. at 513. The township argued Rose was different because the inaccessible portion there was “the bulk” of the land. The court answered: “The statute does not require access to ‘the bulk of the tract of land’ nor does Rose interpret the statute with that limiting language.” 784 N.W.2d at 383.

One open question worth flagging. The Court of Appeals below had held: “We conclude that ‘tract of land’ as used in the cartway statute can reference less than the total quantity of contiguous land owned by one person.” Kennedy v. Pepin Twp., 767 N.W.2d 30, 33 (Minn. App. 2009). It reached that reading by rejecting the township’s attempt to import the tax code’s definition of “tract” from Minn. Stat. § 272.03, subd. 6(a), observing that the township “provides no authority for transporting this definition from the tax code to the cartway statute.” Id. The Supreme Court treated that interpretation as dicta and declined to reach it — it would not “analyze the plain meaning of ‘tract of land,’ or address the validity of the court of appeals’ interpretation . . . .” 784 N.W.2d at 384 n.4. A petitioner whose case turns on how a large holding is carved into “tracts” is litigating an undecided question.

Can the town pick a different route than the one I asked for?

It can, but only on two findings — and Kennedy held the requirement is conjunctive. The statute provides:

The town board may select an alternative route other than that petitioned for if the alternative is deemed by the town board to be less disruptive and damaging to the affected landowners and in the public’s best interest.

Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(a). The Supreme Court’s reading:

We read this language to require that a township establish the route requested by the petitioner unless the township determines both that an alternative route will be less disruptive and damaging to neighbors and that the alternative route is in the public’s best interest.

784 N.W.2d at 384. That is why the case went back. As to the one alternative route that would have reached the usable land, the Board had found only that it would be three times as long, cost three times as much, and cross “rough terrain with steep slopes.” On those findings the court held that “[t]he findings do not establish whether the alternative route is less disruptive and damaging to neighbors,” and that the Board made no findings or conclusions at all on the public’s best interest in selecting an alternative route. Id. at 385. The court added content to that second finding: “The public’s best interest contemplates, among other factors, meaningful and usable access that will encourage owners to put land to its best possible present use.” Id. (citing Target Stores, Inc. v. Twin Plaza Co., 277 Minn. 481, 495, 153 N.W.2d 832, 841 (1967)).

An older limit runs in the same direction. Rose described the settled construction of the predecessor statute this way: the board’s duty is mandatory where the conditions exist and the route named is proper, “but the town board may exercise a reasonable discretion in varying the route proposed as the public interest may require, provided it adheres to the termini and general course stated in the petition.” 220 Minn. at 514–15.

The flip side of all this is that the court cannot choose the route either. The Court of Appeals in Kennedy had ordered the township to build the petitioner’s requested route. The Supreme Court reversed that part: “It is not within an appellate court’s power to substitute its judgment for that of the Township in selecting a route that provides access to the usable portion of petitioner’s land.” 784 N.W.2d at 384. The relief a successful appellant gets is a remand, not a road.

That deference is old and it is heavy. A town board acting on a road petition “acts in a legislative capacity,” and its determination “is final and will be set aside by the court on statutory appeal only when it appears that the evidence is practically conclusive against it, or that the local board proceeded on an erroneous theory of law, or that it acted arbitrarily and capriciously against the best interests of the public.” Lieser v. Town of St. Martin, 255 Minn. 153, 158–59, 96 N.W.2d 1, 5–6 (1959); applied to cartway route selection in Kennedy, 784 N.W.2d at 381. Note which of the three prongs actually wins cases: erroneous theory of law. That is how Kennedy was won. Arguing that a board weighed the facts badly is close to hopeless; arguing that it applied the wrong legal standard is not.

What if the town board just does nothing?

Then mandamus. That is exactly what happened in Rose: the petition was filed, “[t]he town board took no action on the petition,” and “[a]fter the lapse of more than 30 days relator began this proceeding.” 220 Minn. at 510.

The Supreme Court held the writ available:

The language of the statute is that a town board “shall * * * establish” a cartway upon the petition of the owner of a tract of land not less than five acres in area who has no access to his land except over the lands of others. The word “shall” is mandatory and is so used in the statute, as its history clearly shows.

220 Minn. at 514. Mandamus “may be issued to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station,” and it “may require an inferior tribunal to exercise its judgment or proceed to the discharge of any of its functions, but it cannot control judicial discretion.” Minn. Stat. § 586.01. It issues “on the information of the party beneficially interested, but it shall not issue in any case where there is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” Minn. Stat. § 586.02.

Two boundaries on the writ, both drawn in Rose:

• It compels establishment, not construction. The trial court had ordered the town to build the cartway at town expense. Reversed: expending town funds on a cartway is discretionary, and “[m]andamus does not lie to compel the manner in which official discretion should be exercised.” 220 Minn. at 516.
• It does not fix the route. “The only discretion left in the board under the circumstances was laying out the road under the rule stated.” 220 Minn. at 515.

The thirty days in Rose were not arbitrary. Because § 164.08, subd. 2(b) directs that “[t]he proceedings of the town board shall be in accordance with section 164.07,” the timetable in the town-road statute governs: the petition is filed with the town clerk, who “shall forthwith present it to the town board,” and “[t]he town board within 30 days thereafter shall make an order” describing the road and the tracts and “fixing a time and place when and where it will meet and act upon the petition.” Minn. Stat. § 164.07, subd. 2(a). That order must also notify affected landowners of the right to judicial review of “damages, need, and purpose” under subdivision 7. Id.

And there is a clock on losing. “The determination of a town board refusing to establish, alter, or vacate any road shall be final, unless appealed from, for one year from the filing of its order; and no petition for establishing, altering, or vacating such road shall be acted upon within that time.” Minn. Stat. § 164.07, subd. 12. A denied petitioner who does not appeal waits a year.

What does a cartway actually cost the petitioner?

More than most people expect, because “damages” in this statute is a defined term and it is not limited to what the neighbor gets. Subdivision 2(c):

The amount of damages shall be paid by the petitioner to the town before such cartway is opened. For the purposes of this subdivision damages shall mean the compensation, if any, awarded to the owner of the land upon which the cartway is established together with the cost of professional and other services, hearing costs, administrative costs, recording costs, and other costs and expenses which the town may incur in connection with the proceedings for the establishment of the cartway.

Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(c). The board may also “require the petitioner to post a bond or other security acceptable to the board for the total estimated damages before the board takes action on the petition.” Id. That is a front-end cash requirement, decided by the body you are petitioning, before it rules.

Then construction. Under subdivision 2(d), town road and bridge funds “shall not be expended on the cartway” unless the board adopts a resolution finding the expenditure is in the public interest. “If no resolution is adopted to that effect, the grading or other construction work and the maintenance of the cartway is the responsibility of the petitioner, subject to the provisions of section 164.10.” § 164.08, subd. 2(d).

Section 164.10 is the escape hatch, and it is a political one rather than a judicial one. A town board “may expend town road and bridge funds upon a legally established cartway the same as on town roads if, in the judgment of the board the public interests require it.” If the board refuses, “upon the petition of ten taxpayers of the town, the town board shall present for the approval of the voters, after due notice, at the annual town meeting the petition for allocation of funds,” and if a majority approves, “the town board shall expend road and bridge funds on the cartway.” Minn. Stat. § 164.10. Ten taxpayers and a town meeting — not a lawsuit.

Rose is the cautionary case on this point. The petitioner won his cartway and lost the part of the judgment ordering the town to build it. 220 Minn. at 516–17.

Who maintains it after it is built?

Subdivision 3 answers this, and it is the provision that generates the next round of litigation between the same neighbors.

Where the town does not maintain the cartway, any adjacent owner, or any owner with no access except by the cartway, may maintain it. “The cost of maintenance shall be equitably divided among all of the private property owners who own land adjacent to the cartway and all of the private property owners who have no access to their land except by way of the cartway.” § 164.08, subd. 3. The statute lists the factors that “may be taken into consideration”: “the frequency of use, the type and weight of the vehicles or equipment, and the distance traveled on the cartway to the individual’s property.” Id.

Two enforcement routes follow. If the owners cannot agree on the split, “[t]he town board may determine the maintenance costs to be apportioned to each private property owner,” and that decision “may be appealed within 30 days to the district court of the county in which the cartway is located.” And an owner who pays “shall have a civil cause of action against any of the private property owners who refuse to pay their share of the maintenance cost.” Id. Note who is on the hook: adjacency alone is enough. A neighbor whose land merely touches the cartway can be assessed a share even if the cartway was established for someone else.

A cartway is a public road, not your driveway

This is the consequence petitioners least expect, and it is written into the definitions chapter. “‘Road’ or ‘highway’ includes, unless otherwise specified, the several kinds of highways as defined in this section, including roads designated as minimum-maintenance roads, and also cartways, together with all bridges or other structures thereon which form a part of the same.” Minn. Stat. § 160.02, subd. 26. And: “‘Town roads’ includes those roads and cartways which have heretofore been or which hereafter may be established, constructed, or improved under the authority of the several town boards . . . .” § 160.02, subd. 28.

Section 164.10’s authorization to spend town road and bridge funds on “a legally established cartway the same as on town roads” points the same way.

There is one route to a private character, and it requires the neighbor’s cooperation: after construction, the board “may by resolution designate the cartway as a private driveway with the written consent of the affected landowner,” which cuts off town maintenance funds — “provided that the cartway shall not be vacated without following the vacation proceedings established under section 164.07.” § 164.08, subd. 2(e). A cartway is easier to create than to undo.

How do I appeal a cartway decision?

Through § 164.07, because subdivision 2(b) routes you there. The mechanics:

• The award is filed with the town clerk, who within seven days must notify each known owner and occupant in writing of the filing, the date, the amount, and any terms. That notice “must include a clear and coherent explanation, written in language using words with common and everyday meanings, of the requirements for appealing the award of damages under subdivision 7.” § 164.07, subd. 6.
• Forty days to appeal, by filing a notice of appeal with the court administrator of the district court in the county where the lands lie. § 164.07, subd. 7.
• Ten days if you want to stop the work. “However, the owner or occupant must file the notice of appeal within ten days in order to delay the opening, construction, alteration, change, or other improvement in or to the road pursuant to subdivision 10.” Id. And even then, the suspension only follows if the appeal “challenges the public purpose or necessity of the proposed road or condemnation”; an appeal that does not “shall not delay the prosecution of the proposed improvement.” § 164.07, subd. 10.
• A bond of not less than $250, with surety approved by the judge or the county auditor, conditioned to pay costs if the award is sustained. § 164.07, subd. 7.
• The notice must state grounds, and the grounds “may include a challenge to the public purpose or necessity of the proposed road or condemnation.” Id. That is the sentence that makes this an appeal about more than money.
• Trial is by eminent domain rules. The appeal is calendared “at the next general term of the court occurring more than 20 days after the appeal is perfected” and “shall be tried in the same manner as an appeal in eminent domain proceedings under chapter 117.” The prevailing party recovers costs and disbursements. § 164.07, subd. 8.

Because the appeal is tried on chapter 117 principles, the valuation framework for the burdened neighbor is the condemnation framework — see Minnesota eminent domain and minimum compensation under chapter 117.

One more provision worth knowing before the hearing: “For the purposes of this section and section 164.08, the town board, its employees or agents, may enter upon any property, public or private, to conduct property examinations and surveys,” though the subdivision “does not grant immunity to the town board, its employees, or agents for damage caused to public or private property as the result of an entry onto the property.” § 164.07, subd. 13.

Cartway or easement by necessity — which one do I have?

These are different animals, and a landlocked owner often has one and not the other.

An easement by necessity is a common-law creature that arises from a severance of commonly owned land. The Minnesota Court of Appeals put the rule this way: “Under long-established common law, when a landowner conveys a portion of land that has no access to a public road, the owner of the purchased portion has a right of access across the retained lands of the grantor unless the conveying document explicitly disclaims any right of access.” Bode v. Bode, 494 N.W.2d 301, 303–04 (Minn. App. 1992). The court added: “The grant of this easement is implied in the grant of the parcel, and no further writing is needed to make it effective.” Id. at 304.

The Minnesota Supreme Court authority Bode relied on is Pine Tree Lumber Co. v. McKinley, 83 Minn. 419, 86 N.W. 414 (1901), where a grant of standing pine on an inaccessible tract carried an implied way over the grantor’s adjoining land: “Therefore the grant of the timber and the right to enter and remove it carried with it by implication a way over tract 1 for that purpose; that is, a way of necessity.” 83 Minn. at 420. Note the limit the court imposed in the same breath — “such grant gave the plaintiff no right to use the way for removing timber from its lands other than tract 2.” Id. A way of necessity is scoped to the necessity that created it.

Bode also flagged the doctrinal soft spots. It observed that “[a]n easement by necessity lasts only as long as the necessity,” relying on out-of-state authority, and that “there is no Minnesota law concerning the location of an easement by necessity.” 494 N.W.2d at 304. In a footnote the court noted that Minnesota opinions have in dicta “used the terms ‘easements by necessity’ interchangeably with ‘easements by implication.’” Id. at 304 n.1. Those are not the same doctrine, and briefing that treats them as interchangeable invites trouble.

The practical sequencing follows from the table. If the parcel was severed from a larger holding that touched a public road, run the title first — an easement by necessity costs the neighbor nothing and costs you no cartway damages. If the chain shows no common grantor, or the necessity has been extinguished, the cartway is the remaining route. Title work of this kind is often the real project; see Minnesota quiet title actions under § 559.01 and, for registered land, Minnesota Torrens registered land, where an unregistered access right may not survive registration at all. For the broader map of access rights, see Minnesota easements and access disputes.

Where the landlocked parcel is jointly owned and the co-owners disagree about whether to petition, the access problem and the ownership problem are usually solved in the same proceeding — see Minnesota partition actions.

The other cartway nobody uses

Subdivision 1 is a separate, permissive path that has almost nothing in common with subdivision 2. It lets a town board “by resolution . . . establish a cartway two rods wide and not more than one-half mile in length upon petition presented to the town board signed by at least five voters, landowners of the town, requesting the cartway on a section line to serve a tract or tracts of land consisting of at least 150 acres of which at least 100 acres are tillable.” Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 1. Note the differences: may, not shall; five petitioning voters, not one owner; a section line; a half-mile cap; and an agricultural acreage test. Nothing in subdivision 1 requires that the land be landlocked. If your client is a landlocked owner, subdivision 2 is the provision; subdivision 1 is a farm-access tool.

What to do before you file

1. Pull the chain of title before the petition. An easement by necessity, if one exists, is cheaper and does not create a public road across the neighbor.
2. Get the acreage and the recording history right. For a parcel between two and five acres, the January 1, 1998 separate-parcel status is an element, and it is proved from the record, not from the assessor’s current card.
3. Decide what “meaningful access” means for your parcel before the hearing, and put the engineering in the record. Kennedy was won because the township’s chosen route reached a place the owner could not use — and it was won on a record that showed exactly why.
4. Ask for findings on both alternative-route elements. A board that finds only cost and disruption has not satisfied the statute. 784 N.W.2d at 384.
5. Budget for the bond. The board can require security for total estimated damages before it acts. § 164.08, subd. 2(c).
6. Calendar ten days and forty days from the filing of the award, not from the hearing. § 164.07, subds. 6, 7.

Madgett Law, LLC

Madgett Law, LLC handles cartway petitions and cartway objections in Minnesota — preparing and presenting the petition to a town or county board, building the engineering and access record that a “meaningful access” argument requires, appealing an award or a route selection to district court under § 164.07, subd. 7, mandamus where a board refuses to act, and the title, easement-by-necessity, and quiet-title work that often resolves the access problem without a public road at all. We also represent the neighbor on the other side of the petition, where the fight is about route and compensation. Call 612-470-6529 or send us a message.

Sources: Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 1 (permissive cartway: town board “may” establish, two rods wide, not more than one-half mile, petition of at least five voters who are landowners of the town, on a section line, serving tract or tracts of at least 150 acres of which at least 100 are tillable); subd. 2(a) (mandatory establishment: at least five acres, no access except over a navigable waterway or over the lands of others, or access less than two rods in width, town board “shall” establish a cartway at least two rods wide connecting to a public road; the January 1, 1998 separate-parcel provision for parcels of at least two but less than five acres; alternative-route discretion on the two deemed findings); subd. 2(b) (county board acts as town board in unorganized territory; proceedings in accordance with § 164.07); subd. 2(c) (damages paid by the petitioner to the town before the cartway is opened; definition of damages including compensation, professional and other services, hearing, administrative, and recording costs, and other costs and expenses the town may incur; bond or security for total estimated damages before the board acts); subd. 2(d) (no town road and bridge funds absent a public-interest resolution; otherwise grading, construction, and maintenance are the petitioner’s responsibility, subject to § 164.10); subd. 2(e) (post-construction designation as a private driveway with the affected landowner’s written consent; vacation only under § 164.07); subd. 3 (maintenance costs equitably divided among adjacent owners and owners with no other access; frequency-of-use, vehicle-type-and-weight, and distance factors; town board apportionment; 30-day appeal to district court; civil cause of action against a nonpaying owner). Minn. Stat. § 164.07, subd. 2(a) (petition filed with the town clerk, presented forthwith; town board’s order within 30 days; notice of the right to judicial review of damages, need, and purpose under subd. 7); subd. 6 (award filed with the town clerk; written notice within seven days; plain-language explanation of appeal requirements); subd. 7 (40 days to appeal to district court; 10 days to delay the opening; bond of not less than $250; grounds may include a challenge to public purpose or necessity); subd. 8 (calendared at the next general term more than 20 days after the appeal is perfected; tried in the same manner as an eminent domain appeal under chapter 117; costs to the prevailing party); subd. 10 (appeal does not delay the improvement unless a 10-day notice challenges public purpose or necessity); subd. 12 (refusal final for one year unless appealed; no new petition acted on within that time); subd. 13 (entry on property for examinations and surveys; no immunity for damage). Minn. Stat. § 164.10 (town board “may” expend town road and bridge funds on a legally established cartway the same as on town roads; petition of ten taxpayers forces the question to the voters at the annual town meeting; majority approval compels the expenditure). Minn. Stat. § 160.02, subd. 26 (“road” or “highway” includes cartways), subd. 28 (“town roads” includes cartways established under the authority of town boards). Minn. Stat. § 586.01 (mandamus to compel an act the law specially enjoins as a duty of office; may require an inferior tribunal to exercise its judgment; cannot control judicial discretion); § 586.02 (issues on the information of the party beneficially interested; not where there is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law). 2004 Minn. Laws ch. 262, art. 2, § 7 (adding “over a navigable waterway or” to both access triggers in § 164.08, subd. 2, and lettering the subdivision (a)–(e)); id. art. 2, § 16 (effective July 1, 2004). 1998 Minn. Laws ch. 296, § 1 (subd. 2 as it read with the January 1, 1998 two-to-five-acre provision and the alternative-route sentence, before the navigable-waterway amendment). State ex rel. Rose v. Town of Greenwood, 220 Minn. 508 (1945), at 509 (text of the 1941 predecessor, Minn. St. 1941, § 163.15, subd. 2, “not more than two rods wide”), 510 (board took no action; mandamus begun after 30 days), 513 (half-acre lot touching a public road gave no access to the 92-acre farm across the lake), 514 (“shall” is mandatory; mandamus available under § 586.01), 514–15 (discretion to vary the route limited to the termini and general course stated in the petition), 515 (only remaining discretion is laying out the road), 516 (mandamus does not lie to compel expenditure of town funds), 516–17 (error to order the cartway built at town expense). In re Daniel, 656 N.W.2d 543 (Minn. 2003), at 544 (procedural history; $18,022 award payable by the petitioner under subd. 2(c)), 545 (access via navigable waterway must be considered “access” under the pre-2004 statute), 546 (board’s “no access” finding could not be reconciled; judgment for the objecting neighbor), 546 n.1 (“One rod equals 16.5 feet.”). Kennedy v. Pepin Township of Wabasha County, 784 N.W.2d 378 (Minn. 2010), at 379–80 (facts and issue), 381 (three route alternatives; district court affirmance; Lieser standard of review applied to cartway route selection), 383 (meaningful-access holding; rejection of the “bulk of the tract” limitation; Rose parallel), 384 (alternative-route findings are conjunctive; appellate court may not substitute its judgment for the board’s route selection; “tract of land” interpretation below is dicta, n.4), 385 (findings did not establish that the alternative route was less disruptive and damaging, and no findings or conclusions on the public’s best interest; public’s best interest contemplates meaningful and usable access encouraging best possible present use, citing Target Stores, Inc. v. Twin Plaza Co., 277 Minn. 481, 495, 153 N.W.2d 832, 841 (1967); remand instruction). Kennedy v. Pepin Township of Wabasha County, 767 N.W.2d 30 (Minn. App. 2009), at 33 (holding that “tract of land” as used in the cartway statute can reference less than the total quantity of contiguous land owned by one person; rejecting importation of the Minn. Stat. § 272.03, subd. 6(a) tax-code definition; pin cite taken from the Supreme Court’s citation of the opinion at 784 N.W.2d 383-84). Lieser v. Town of St. Martin, 255 Minn. 153, 96 N.W.2d 1 (1959), at 158–59, 96 N.W.2d at 5–6 (town board acts in a legislative capacity; determination set aside on statutory appeal only where the evidence is practically conclusive against it, the board proceeded on an erroneous theory of law, or it acted arbitrarily and capriciously against the best interests of the public). Bode v. Bode, 494 N.W.2d 301 (Minn. App. 1992), at 303–04 (easement by necessity on conveyance of a landlocked portion absent an explicit disclaimer; grant implied, no further writing needed), 304 n.1 (dicta using “easement by necessity” and “easement by implication” interchangeably), 304 (easement by necessity lasts only as long as the necessity, on out-of-state authority; no Minnesota law on the location of such an easement). Pine Tree Lumber Co. v. McKinley, 83 Minn. 419, 86 N.W. 414 (1901), at 420 (grant of timber on an inaccessible tract carried by implication a way of necessity over the grantor’s other tract; no right to use the way for timber from other lands).

This article is general legal information about Minnesota law. It is not legal advice, it does not create an attorney–client relationship, and no particular outcome is promised or implied. Cartway rights depend on acreage, recorded parcel history, the route record before the board, and deadlines measured from the filing of an award; consult a lawyer about your own property.