Minnesota Banned Noncompetes and Left Employment NDAs Almost Entirely Alone. The Limits That Exist Are Federal, and Narrower Than People Think.

Minnesota abolished employee noncompete agreements in 2023. It is one of a small number of states to have done it outright, and the statute is short, blunt, and retroactively famous. It is reasonable to assume that a legislature willing to void every employee noncompete in the state also did something about the confidentiality and non-disparagement clauses that sit two paragraphs below the noncompete in the same severance agreement.

It did not.

Run a keyword search of the current Minnesota Statutes for “nondisparagement” and the Revisor’s search engine returns “No Documents Found.” Search for the phrase “nondisclosure agreement” and it appears in exactly four sections of the entire code — one about pharmacy benefit managers, one about campus sexual misconduct, and two in chapter 181. Neither of the chapter 181 sections prohibits anything. One of them exists to say that a nondisclosure agreement is not a noncompete. The other regulates how settlement money is characterized and takes the existence of the NDA for granted.

That is the whole of Minnesota’s statutory law on employment NDAs. The real constraints come from federal statutes, and each of them is narrower than its reputation. The most practically useful limit in a Minnesota severance negotiation is not an NDA statute at all — it is a fifteen-day rescission right buried in the Human Rights Act since 1984, and it applies only if the release was signed before a charge was filed.

Does Minnesota have a law banning NDAs in harassment settlements?

No. It has one sentence, and the sentence is about money rather than silence.

Minn. Stat. § 181.141, titled “SEXUAL HARASSMENT OR ABUSE SETTLEMENT; PAYMENT AS SEVERANCE OR WAGES PROHIBITED,” reads in full:

In a sexual harassment or abuse settlement between an employer and an employee, when there is a financial settlement provided, the financial settlement cannot be provided as wages or severance pay to the employee regardless of whether the settlement includes a nondisclosure agreement.

Read the operative clause twice. The statute does not prohibit the nondisclosure agreement. It assumes one may be there, brackets it as irrelevant, and prohibits something else entirely: paying the settlement out as wages or severance.

The provenance explains the drafting. Section 181.141 was enacted as section 11 of article 1 of Laws 2023, chapter 64 — H.F. No. 1938, the 2023 tax act — and article 1 of that act is captioned “INDIVIDUAL INCOME AND CORPORATE FRANCHISE TAXES.” The sections on either side of it amend the film production credit and the composite-return statute. The session law provides that “This section is effective the day following final enactment.”

So Minnesota’s only statute using the words “sexual harassment” and “nondisclosure agreement” in the same breath is a tax-article provision about payroll characterization. It has real consequences — a settlement characterized as wages is subject to withholding, feeds the employee’s wage record, and can affect unemployment and benefit calculations — but it is not an NDA restriction, and treating it as one in a negotiation will not survive the first response letter.

Then what does Minnesota law say about non-disparagement clauses?

Nothing at all. A keyword search of the current statutes returns no section containing the word “nondisparagement.” The related word “disparaging” appears twice, in a viatical settlement advertising statute and in a definition in the maltreatment-reporting chapter; “disparage” appears three times, none of them in an employment context.

A non-disparagement clause in a Minnesota employment agreement is therefore an ordinary contract term, enforced or not enforced under ordinary contract principles, with no statutory overlay directed at it.

The one place the legislature has legislated against NDAs is instructive precisely because of how narrow it is. Minn. Stat. § 135A.15, subd. 2, paragraphs (b) and (c), governing campus sexual misconduct policies at postsecondary institutions, provides:

(b) None of the rights given to a student by the policy required by subdivision 1 may be made contingent upon the victim entering into a nondisclosure agreement or other contract restricting the victim’s ability to discuss information in connection with a sexual misconduct complaint, investigation, or hearing.

(c) A nondisclosure agreement or other contract restricting the victim’s ability to discuss information in connection with a sexual misconduct complaint, investigation, or hearing may not be used as a condition of financial aid or remedial action.

That is a genuine, enforceable Minnesota limit on nondisclosure agreements. It protects students. It has no employment analogue.

Didn’t the 2023 noncompete ban sweep in NDAs?

The opposite. It carved them out by name.

Minn. Stat. § 181.988, subd. 1, paragraph (a), after defining “covenant not to compete,” adds:

A covenant not to compete does not include a nondisclosure agreement, or agreement designed to protect trade secrets or confidential information. A covenant not to compete does not include a nonsolicitation agreement, or agreement restricting the ability to use client or contact lists, or solicit customers of the employer.

That sentence is the reason employers rewrote their agreements rather than abandoned them. The mechanics of the ban itself, and what employers moved to in its place, are covered in the Minnesota noncompete ban guide and in what replaced the noncompete; there is no point restating them here.

One feature of § 181.988 does carry over to NDA fights and is regularly overread. Subdivision 3 prohibits an employer from requiring an employee who primarily resides and works in Minnesota to litigate outside Minnesota or to give up “the substantive protection of Minnesota law with respect to a controversy arising in Minnesota,” and makes an offending provision “voidable at any time by the employee.” But paragraph (e) of the same subdivision says: “This subdivision applies only to claims arising under this section.” A Delaware forum clause in a confidentiality agreement is not automatically voidable under § 181.988 merely because the signer works in Minneapolis. The subdivision reaches claims under § 181.988.

What does the federal Speak Out Act actually do?

Less than its name suggests, and the limit is structural rather than technical.

The Speak Out Act, Pub. L. 117-224, is codified at 42 U.S.C. ch. 164. The operative provision, 42 U.S.C. § 19403(a), reads:

With respect to a sexual assault dispute or sexual harassment dispute, no nondisclosure clause or nondisparagement clause agreed to before the dispute arises shall be judicially enforceable in instances in which conduct is alleged to have violated Federal, Tribal, or State law.

“Agreed to before the dispute arises.” The Act voids pre-dispute clauses — the confidentiality and non-disparagement language in an onboarding packet, an employee handbook acknowledgment, or an employment agreement signed on day one. It does not reach the NDA in a settlement agreement signed to resolve a harassment claim that has already arisen. That is the single most common misunderstanding of the statute, and it is the difference between the two documents a harassment claimant is most likely to be handed.

The definitions are broad within that limit. Under 42 U.S.C. § 19402(1), a “nondisclosure clause” is a provision “that requires the parties to the contract or agreement not to disclose or discuss conduct, the existence of a settlement involving conduct, or information covered by the terms and conditions of the contract or agreement.” Under § 19402(2), a “nondisparagement clause” is one requiring a party “not to make a negative statement about another party that relates to the contract, agreement, claim, or case.”

Three further provisions matter in practice:

• § 19403(d): “Nothing in this chapter shall prohibit an employer and an employee from protecting trade secrets or proprietary information.” The Act does not disarm a legitimate trade-secret clause.
• § 19403(b): states may enforce their own laws on these clauses so long as those laws are “at least as protective of the right of an individual to speak freely.” Minnesota has not legislated into that space, so in Minnesota the federal floor is also the ceiling.
• § 19404: the chapter “shall apply with respect to a claim that is filed under Federal, State, or Tribal law on or after December 7, 2022.” The trigger is the filing date of the claim, not the date the clause was signed.

The Speak Out Act has a companion enacted nine months earlier with the same pre-dispute architecture. The Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act, Pub. L. 117-90, codified at 9 U.S.C. ch. 4, provides in § 402(a) that “at the election of the person alleging” a sexual harassment or sexual assault dispute, “no predispute arbitration agreement or predispute joint-action waiver shall be valid or enforceable” as to such a case. A “predispute arbitration agreement” is defined in § 401(1) as “any agreement to arbitrate a dispute that had not yet arisen at the time of the making of the agreement.” Section 402(b) assigns the applicability question to a court “rather than an arbitrator,” “irrespective of whether the agreement purports to delegate such determinations to an arbitrator” — which forecloses the delegation-clause argument before it is made. The Act applies to any dispute or claim arising or accruing on or after March 3, 2022.

Together the two statutes describe a clean rule: in a sexual harassment or assault case, what the employee signed before anything happened is unenforceable; what the employee signs to settle is not.

Can an NDA stop me from talking to a government agency?

No, and there are at least three independent federal reasons — none of which works by voiding the clause. Each one operates by penalty, immunity, or a rule of nonenforcement, which is why the offending language stays in circulation.

The Defend Trade Secrets Act immunity. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(1), an individual “shall not be held criminally or civilly liable under any Federal or State trade secret law” for disclosing a trade secret that is made “(i) in confidence to a Federal, State, or local government official, either directly or indirectly, or to an attorney; and (ii) solely for the purpose of reporting or investigating a suspected violation of law,” or that “is made in a complaint or other document filed in a lawsuit or other proceeding, if such filing is made under seal.” Section 1833(b)(2) further allows an employee suing for retaliation to give the trade secret to their own attorney and use it in the case, provided the filing is under seal and the secret is not otherwise disclosed except by court order.

The part employers miss is § 1833(b)(3). Paragraph (A) requires that “An employer shall provide notice of the immunity set forth in this subsection in any contract or agreement with an employee that governs the use of a trade secret or other confidential information.” Paragraph (B) permits a cross-reference to a policy document instead. Paragraph (C) supplies the consequence:

If an employer does not comply with the notice requirement in subparagraph (A), the employer may not be awarded exemplary damages or attorney fees under subparagraph (C) or (D) of section 1836(b)(3) in an action against an employee to whom notice was not provided.

Note what that is and is not. Omitting the notice does not make the confidentiality agreement unenforceable. It strips the employer of exemplary damages and fees in a later trade-secret suit against that employee. And § 1833(b)(4) defines “employee” to include “any individual performing work as a contractor or consultant for an employer,” so contractor agreements are inside the requirement. The notice obligation applies to agreements “entered into or updated after” May 11, 2016. It is worth checking for in any confidentiality agreement signed since then, because the consequence of its absence runs against the employer.

The SEC whistleblower rule. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-17(a) provides:

No person may take any action to impede an individual from communicating directly with the Commission staff about a possible securities law violation, including enforcing, or threatening to enforce, a confidentiality agreement … with respect to such communications.

The prohibition reaches the act of enforcement, not merely the clause. Sending a demand letter invoking an NDA against someone who talked to the SEC is itself the violation.

The age-discrimination waiver rule. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(4), part of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act amendments to the ADEA, states: “No waiver agreement may affect the Commission’s rights and responsibilities to enforce this chapter. No waiver may be used to justify interfering with the protected right of an employee to file a charge or participate in an investigation or proceeding conducted by the Commission.”

What about the National Labor Relations Act?

The statutory text is stable; the agency law built on it is not, and the distinction matters when you are deciding what to argue.

29 U.S.C. § 157 gives employees “the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . .” (The section continues with a separate right to refrain from those activities, not at issue here.) Section 158(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title.”

Whether a particular confidentiality or non-disparagement clause in a severance agreement interferes with § 157 rights is decided by the National Labor Relations Board in the first instance, and the Board’s position on that question has changed with the Board’s composition more than once. This article does not state a Board holding, because the Board’s decisions were not retrievable from a primary source in preparing it. What can be stated from the statute is the coverage limit, which is decisive in a great many severance negotiations and is often overlooked: 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) defines “employee” to exclude, among others, “any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor.” A departing manager with hiring and firing authority is generally outside the Act. So is a contractor. Whatever the Board’s current doctrine, it does not reach them.

The fifteen-day window nobody uses

Here is the provision that does the most work in an actual Minnesota severance negotiation, and it has been on the books since 1984.

Minn. Stat. § 363A.31, subd. 2, “Rescission of waiver,” provides:

A waiver or release of rights or remedies secured by this chapter which purports to apply to claims arising out of acts or practices prior to, or concurrent with, the execution of the waiver or release may be rescinded within 15 calendar days of its execution, except that a waiver or release given in settlement of a claim filed with the department or with another administrative agency or judicial body is valid and final upon execution. A waiving or releasing party shall be informed in writing of the right to rescind the waiver or release. To be effective, the rescission must be in writing and delivered to the waived or released party by hand, electronically with the receiving party’s consent, or by mail within the 15-day period.

If delivery is by mail, the statute requires that the rescission be postmarked within the 15-day period, properly addressed to the waived or released party, and “sent by certified mail return receipt requested.”

Four things follow directly from the text.

1. The window runs from execution, not from delivery of the agreement. Fifteen calendar days, not business days.
2. It disappears once a charge or case is on file. A release “given in settlement of a claim filed with the department or with another administrative agency or judicial body is valid and final upon execution.” The severance agreement handed to an employee on their last day is squarely inside the rescission right. The settlement agreement resolving a filed Department of Human Rights charge is not.
3. The employer must tell the employee about it in writing. The statute states the obligation flatly and does not, in its own text, specify what happens if the employer fails to do so. That is an open question on the face of the section, and this article does not resolve it.
4. The delivery mechanics are formal. Hand delivery, electronic delivery with the recipient’s consent, or certified mail return receipt requested, postmarked inside the window. An email sent without consent to an address on the signature block is not what the statute describes.

Subdivision 1 of the same section is the companion rule and voids something else entirely:

Any provision, whether oral or written, of a lease, contract, or other agreement or instrument which purports to be a waiver by an individual of any right or remedy provided in this chapter is contrary to public policy and void if the waiver or release purports to waive claims arising out of acts or practices which occur after the execution of the waiver or release.

Prospective waivers of Human Rights Act claims are void; retrospective ones are valid but rescindable for fifteen days. The Revisor of Statutes appends an official note to the section recording that subdivision 1, formerly § 363.031, “was found preempted by federal law with regard to arbitration agreements in Johnson v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 1995).” That preemption ruling is specific to arbitration agreements and to the Federal Arbitration Act; it is not a general repeal of subdivision 1. The charge-filing deadlines that a rescission puts back in play are covered in Minnesota Human Rights Act deadlines.

Two clocks, and they do not line up

An employee over 40 signing a severance agreement in Minnesota is usually inside two separate statutory schemes at once, with different clocks and different consequences.

The ADEA scheme also prohibits waiving “rights or claims that may arise after the date the waiver is executed” (§ 626(f)(1)(C)) and requires consideration “in addition to anything of value to which the individual already is entitled” (§ 626(f)(1)(D)). A severance agreement that recycles accrued vacation as its consideration has a problem under the second of those.

Can a non-disparagement clause override the employer’s own disclosure duties?

Two Minnesota statutes impose affirmative obligations on employers that a mutual non-disparagement clause sits awkwardly beside.

Minn. Stat. § 181.933, subd. 1 provides that an employee who has been involuntarily terminated “may, within 15 working days following such termination, request in writing that the employer inform the employee of the reason for the termination,” and that “Within ten working days following receipt of such request, an employer shall inform the terminated employee in writing of the truthful reason for the termination.” Subdivision 2 then immunizes that statement: “No communication of the statement furnished by the employer to the employee under subdivision 1 may be made the subject of any action for libel, slander, or defamation by the employee against the employer.”

Two deadlines, both counted in working days, and both frequently missed: fifteen working days for the employee to ask, ten working days for the employer to answer.

Minn. Stat. § 181.967, subd. 2 limits reference-based claims. No action may be maintained against an employer for disclosing the categories of information listed in subdivisions 3 to 5 “unless the employee or former employee demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the information was false and defamatory; and (2) the employer knew or should have known the information was false and acted with malicious intent to injure the current or former employee.”

The protected categories are not unlimited. Under subdivision 3, paragraph (a), the protection attaches to dates of employment, compensation and wage history, job description and duties, training and education provided, and documented acts of violence, theft, harassment, or illegal conduct that resulted in discipline or resignation — with that last category requiring written disclosure and a contemporaneous copy mailed to the employee’s last known address. Paragraph (b) extends the protection to written evaluations, disciplinary warnings from the preceding five years, and written reasons for separation, but only “With the written authorization of the current or former employee,” and again with a copy to the employee. Paragraph (c) prohibits the receiving employer or agency from passing written information along without the employee’s written authorization.

The practical point for a negotiation: a neutral-reference clause is worth having, but it is a contract promise layered on top of a statutory scheme that already immunizes a good deal of what an employer is likely to say. The defamation exposure that survives § 181.967 is narrow, and a separate Minnesota theory operates outside it — see compelled self-publication defamation.

Wage talk is separately protected, and the protection has teeth

Minn. Stat. § 181.172, paragraph (a), prohibits an employer from requiring “nondisclosure by an employee of his or her wages as a condition of employment,” from requiring “an employee to sign a waiver or other document which purports to deny an employee the right to disclose the employee’s wages,” and from taking “any adverse employment action against an employee for disclosing the employee’s own wages or discussing another employee’s wages which have been disclosed voluntarily.”

The carve-outs in paragraph (b) are real: nothing in the section creates a duty to disclose wages, permits disclosure of proprietary information, trade secret information, or privileged material without the employer’s written consent, diminishes existing NLRA rights, or permits an employee to disclose other employees’ wage information to a competitor.

Two enforcement features are easy to miss. Paragraph (c): “An employer that provides an employee handbook to its employees must include in the handbook notice of employee rights and remedies under this section.” Paragraph (e): “An employee may bring a civil action against an employer for a violation of paragraph (a) or (d),” and on a finding of violation “the court may order reinstatement, back pay, restoration of lost service credit, if appropriate, and the expungement of any related adverse records of an employee who was the subject of the violation.” Paragraph (d) separately prohibits retaliation.

A blanket confidentiality clause that sweeps in “compensation” is drafted against paragraph (a)(2).

Reading a Minnesota severance agreement

1. Date the dispute, not the document. The Speak Out Act and the arbitration statute both turn on whether the clause was agreed to before the dispute arose. Fix that date first.
2. Look for the § 1833(b)(3) immunity notice. If a confidentiality agreement governing trade secrets or confidential information does not contain it, and was entered into or updated after May 11, 2016, the employer has forfeited exemplary damages and fees against that employee under § 1833(b)(3)(C).
3. Find the rescission notice. Section 363A.31, subd. 2 requires the employee to “be informed in writing of the right to rescind.” If it is not in the packet, that is worth raising before signing rather than after.
4. Count both clocks. Fifteen calendar days to rescind Human Rights Act claims; at least seven days to revoke the ADEA waiver, and 21 or 45 days to consider it before signing.
5. Check what “confidential information” is defined to include. If it reaches wages, § 181.172(a)(2) is in play.
6. Check the carve-out language for agency communication. The federal rules do not require the clause to say so, but a clause that does not say so is a clause an employer may still try to enforce.
7. Decide whether § 181.933 has been triggered. Fifteen working days from termination to make the written request; ten working days for the employer to answer in writing.
8. Check whether a whistleblower claim is in the release. It is a separate statutory cause of action with its own elements and is routinely released by general language without anyone pricing it.

The observation

The gap here is not an accident of drafting. Minnesota banned noncompetes because a noncompete restricts where a person may work, and the legislature made a judgment about labor mobility. An NDA restricts what a person may say, and legislating in that direction runs into trade secrets, settlement finality, and the strong policy in favor of settling disputes. The federal statutes that do reach NDAs are built to respect the same boundary: the Speak Out Act voids the clause signed before anything happened and leaves the settlement clause alone; the DTSA immunizes the disclosure and penalizes the missing notice rather than voiding the contract; the SEC rule prohibits the act of enforcement rather than the existence of the term.

The practical consequence is that in Minnesota the leverage over an NDA is contractual, not statutory. It is exercised during the fifteen days after signature, or in the negotiation before it, or not at all.

Madgett Law, LLC reviews severance and settlement agreements for Minnesota employees, including the confidentiality, non-disparagement, and release terms, and represents employees in Human Rights Act, whistleblower, and wage claims. If you have been handed a severance agreement with a deadline on it, the clocks in it start running from signature. Send us a message or call 612-470-6529.

Sources: Minn. Stat. § 181.141 (full text, quoted; the operative clause “the financial settlement cannot be provided as wages or severance pay to the employee regardless of whether the settlement includes a nondisclosure agreement”; history line “2023 c 64 art 1 s 11”). Minn. Stat. § 181.988, subd. 1, para. (a) (the sentence “A covenant not to compete does not include a nondisclosure agreement, or agreement designed to protect trade secrets or confidential information,” and the following nonsolicitation sentence); subd. 3, paras. (a), (b), and (e) (choice of law and venue; “This subdivision applies only to claims arising under this section”). Minn. Stat. § 181.172, paras. (a)(1)–(3), (b)(1)–(4), (c), (d), and (e) (wage disclosure protection, carve-outs, handbook notice, anti-retaliation, and civil action with reinstatement, back pay, service credit, and expungement). Minn. Stat. § 181.933, subds. 1 and 2 (15 working days to request, 10 working days to respond in writing with “the truthful reason for the termination”; bar on libel, slander, or defamation actions on that statement). Minn. Stat. § 181.967, subd. 2 (clear-and-convincing standard, falsity plus knowledge plus malicious intent) and subd. 3, paras. (a), (b), and (c) (the five categories disclosable without authorization, the three categories requiring written authorization, the contemporaneous-copy requirements, and the bar on redisclosure). Minn. Stat. § 363A.31, subd. 1 (prospective waivers “contrary to public policy and void”) and subd. 2 (15 calendar days to rescind; the filed-claim exception; the written-notice requirement; the hand, consented-electronic, and certified-mail-return-receipt delivery methods; the postmark requirement), together with the Revisor’s official note recording Johnson v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 1995). Minn. Stat. § 135A.15, subd. 2, paras. (b) and (c) (campus sexual misconduct nondisclosure limits). All Minnesota statutory text retrieved from the Minnesota Office of the Revisor of Statutes, revisor.mn.gov, on 2026-08-21, from the 2025 edition. The § 135A.15 page carries a 2026 currency banner; the banner and Laws 2026, chapter 88 identify the amended provision as subdivision 1, not subdivision 2. No 2026 currency banner appeared on §§ 181.141, 181.172, 181.933, 181.967, 181.988, or 363A.31.

Laws 2023, chapter 64 (H.F. No. 1938), article 1, section 11, read at revisor.mn.gov/laws/2023/0/Session+Law/Chapter/64/ — relied on for the enactment of § 181.141 within the article captioned “INDIVIDUAL INCOME AND CORPORATE FRANCHISE TAXES” and for the effective-date clause “This section is effective the day following final enactment.”

The statements that no section of the current Minnesota Statutes contains the word “nondisparagement,” and that the phrase “nondisclosure agreement” appears in only four sections (§§ 62W.06, 135A.15, 181.988, and 181.141), are the results of exact-phrase keyword searches of the 2025 statutes run against the Revisor’s document search at revisor.mn.gov/search/doc_result.php on 2026-08-21. The related searches for “disparage” (three sections: §§ 60A.9582, 326B.099, 333.19) and “disparaging” (two sections: §§ 60A.9582, 626.5572) were run the same way.

Federal: 42 U.S.C. §§ 19401–19404 (Speak Out Act, Pub. L. 117-224, Dec. 7, 2022) — § 19402(1) and (2) definitions quoted; § 19403(a) quoted; § 19403(b) and (d) quoted or paraphrased; § 19404 applicability quoted. 9 U.S.C. §§ 401–402 (Pub. L. 117-90, Mar. 3, 2022) — § 401(1) definition and § 402(a)–(b) quoted or paraphrased, with the effective-date note under § 401. 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(1)–(5) — immunity, anti-retaliation use, notice requirement, the § 1833(b)(3)(C) forfeiture of exemplary damages and attorney fees, the (b)(3)(D) applicability to agreements entered into or updated after enactment of Pub. L. 114-153 on May 11, 2016, and the (b)(4) definition of “employee” including contractors and consultants. 29 U.S.C. § 157 and § 158(a)(1) quoted; § 152(3) relied on for the exclusion of independent contractors and supervisors from the definition of “employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(C)–(H), (f)(2), (f)(3), and (f)(4) relied on and quoted in part. All federal statutory text retrieved from the Office of the Law Revision Counsel, uscode.house.gov, on 2026-08-21 (each page stating “Text contains those laws in effect on August 20, 2026”). 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-17(a) quoted, retrieved from the Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, ecfr.gov, on 2026-08-21.

No decision of the National Labor Relations Board is cited or relied on in this article; the Board’s decisions were not retrievable from a primary source in preparing it, and the NLRA discussion is limited to the statutory text. Johnson v. Piper Jaffray, Inc. is reported here only as it appears in the Revisor’s official note to § 363A.31; the opinion itself is not relied on for any proposition beyond the note’s description, and its current precedential status is not asserted. This is general legal information about Minnesota and federal law, not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney–client relationship. Every case depends on its own facts. No outcome is promised or implied.