Minnesota Statutes section 604.06 is captioned “FIREMAN’S RULE.” Nearly everyone I talk to who hasn’t read it assumes that means the Legislature enacted the fireman’s rule.
It means the opposite. The statute is one sentence long, and what it does is switch the doctrine off:
The common law doctrine known as the fireman’s rule shall not operate to deny any peace officer, as defined in section 626.84, subdivision 1, paragraph (c), or public safety officer, as defined in section 299A.41, subdivision 4, a recovery in any action at law or authorized by statute.
That’s the whole section. It isn’t a codification, a limit on liability, or a defense. It’s an abrogation, a targeted one, defined entirely by two cross-references. And one of those cross-references was amended on May 18, 2026 in a way that enlarged the protected class and made the enlargement retroactive to February 1, 2020.
What does the sentence actually do?
Three moves, in order.
It names a common law doctrine without defining it. “The common law doctrine known as the fireman’s rule.” The Legislature didn’t restate the rule, didn’t codify its elements, and didn’t abolish it. The doctrine is still whatever the courts made it. The statute only speaks to what it may do.
It shuts off the doctrine’s effect for two classes. The rule “shall not operate to deny” recovery. That phrasing is careful, and it fits the doctrine’s actual shape. As you’ll see below, the Minnesota version is a no-duty rule, not an affirmative defense, so a statute aimed at it has to speak to its effect rather than to how it’s pleaded.
It reaches every kind of claim. “[A] recovery in any action at law or authorized by statute.” Not just premises claims. Not just negligence. Any action at law, plus any action authorized by statute.
What the section doesn’t contain matters just as much. There’s no definition of the doctrine, no exception, no carve-out for particular defendants, no reference to the on-duty/off-duty distinction, no reference to comparative fault, and no cause of action. It’s one sentence, and all it holds is a scope.
What is the doctrine the statute switches off?
The Minnesota Supreme Court laid out the modern version in Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343 (Minn. 1979), a wrongful death case brought after three West St. Paul firefighters were killed when a liquefied petroleum tank exploded at an apartment complex. The court held:
We hold, therefore, that landowners owe firemen a duty of reasonable care, except to the extent firemen primarily assume the risk when entering upon the land. Firemen assume, in a primary sense, all risks reasonably apparent to them that are part of firefighting. However, they do not assume, in a primary sense, risks that are hidden from or unanticipated by the firemen. Thus, a fireman may not recover damages from a landowner if his injury is caused by a reasonably apparent risk. But, he may recover if his injury is caused by a hidden or unanticipated risk attributable to the landowner’s negligence and such negligence is the proximate cause of the injury.
Id. at 350. To my eye, two features of that holding explain why the Legislature bothered.
The rule is a no-duty doctrine, not a defense. The court was explicit: “The doctrine of primary assumption of the risk technically is not a defense, but rather a legal theory which relieves a defendant of a duty which he might otherwise owe to the plaintiff with respect to particular risks.” Id. at 351. A no-duty rule isn’t pleaded, isn’t compared, and isn’t reduced. It ends the claim.
It isn’t limited to landowners. Armstrong said so directly. Recasting the doctrine as primary assumption of risk, rather than as an entrant classification, “facilitates application of the fireman’s rule to defendants other than owners and possessors of land.” Id. at 350. Then the court applied it across the board: “In the context of the instant case, the firemen’s primary assumption of the risk may be invoked to relieve these other defendants of their duties, if any, with respect to reasonably apparent risks that are a part of firefighting. Even assuming the firemen can otherwise establish the elements of negligence per se, strict products liability, or strict liability for an abnormally dangerous activity, recovery on the basis of these theories is not available unless the injury was caused by a hidden or unanticipated risk.” Id. at 352. That’s why the claims in Armstrong against the tank supplier, the gas company, and the delivery contractor all failed. The court held the firemen “cannot, therefore, recover damages from any of the defendants,” and affirmed summary judgment for every one of them. Id. at 353.
That’s the target. Armstrong came down in 1979. Section 604.06 was enacted in 1982 and last amended in 1991. A doctrine that had just been stretched to cover product manufacturers and statutory-violation claims, and that worked as a complete no-duty bar, got switched off three years later for the officers the Legislature chose to name. Anything decided since 1982 about a covered officer has to be read against the statute, and this article doesn’t attempt that survey.
Who is covered?
Two classes, each defined by cross-reference, and they don’t overlap perfectly.
Peace officers, as defined in Minn. Stat. § 626.84, subd. 1, paragraph (c). Paragraph (c) is the licensed, full-power-of-arrest definition: a licensed employee or elected or appointed official of a political subdivision or law enforcement agency “charged with the prevention and detection of crime and the enforcement of the general criminal laws of the state and who has the full power of arrest,” together with an enumerated set of state officers, plus a licensed peace officer employed by the law enforcement agency of a federally recognized tribe.
Public safety officers, as defined in Minn. Stat. § 299A.41, subd. 4. That’s not a definition of anything that looks like “police officer.” It’s a ten-clause list, and the words “firefighting” and “fire department” show up only inside it:
| Clause | Who |
|---|---|
| (1) | A peace officer defined in § 626.84, subd. 1, paragraph (c) or (d) |
| (2) | A correction officer at a correctional facility charged with inmate safety, security, discipline, and custody |
| (3) | A corrections staff person supervising offenders in the community |
| (4) | An individual employed by the state or a governmental fire department engaged in firefighting, emergency motor vehicle operation, fire cause-and-origin investigation, emergency medical services, or hazardous material response |
| (5) | A legally enrolled member of a volunteer fire department, or of an independent nonprofit firefighting corporation, “who is engaged in the hazards of firefighting” |
| (6) | “[A] good samaritan while complying with the request or direction of a public safety officer to assist the officer” |
| (7) | A reserve police officer or reserve deputy sheriff acting under the supervision and authority of a political subdivision |
| (8) | A driver or attendant with a licensed basic or advanced life-support transportation service engaged in providing emergency care |
| (9) | A certified first responder who is a member of an organized service recognized by a local political subdivision |
| (10) | A person other than a state trooper employed by the commissioner of public safety and assigned to the State Patrol whose primary duty is Capitol security or commercial motor vehicle enforcement |
Read clause (1) against the first half of § 604.06 and you’ll see a quirk in the structure. Section 604.06 picks up “peace officer” under paragraph (c) only. But it also picks up “public safety officer,” and that definition reaches a peace officer under paragraph (c) or (d). Paragraph (d) is the separate definition of a “part-time peace officer,” meaning an individual licensed by the board “whose services are utilized by law enforcement agencies no more than an average of 20 hours per week, not including time spent on call when no call to active duty is received, calculated on an annual basis, who has either full powers of arrest or authorization to carry a firearm while on active duty.” So a part-time peace officer is outside § 604.06’s first term and inside its second.
Clause (7) does the same work for reserve officers, who are defined in § 626.84, subd. 1, paragraph (e) and aren’t peace officers at all under that section.
And clause (6) is the one nobody expects. I have yet to meet a lawyer who knew it was there. A civilian bystander who steps in at an officer’s direction is a public safety officer for purposes of this definition, and so is within § 604.06.
What changed in May 2026?
The definition § 604.06 points at got amended. Laws 2026, ch. 97 (S.F. No. 4760), art. 12, § 8 amended Minn. Stat. § 299A.41, subd. 4 in three places:
- Clause (4), the fire department employment clause, changed from “employed on a full-time basis” to “employed on a full-time or part-time basis.”
- Clause (5), the volunteer firefighter clause, changed from “a legally enrolled member of a volunteer fire department” to “a legally enrolled member of a volunteer or paid on-call fire department.”
- A new clause (11) was added: “a person formerly employed as a public safety officer under clauses (1) to (5) or (7) to (10) if the person separated from service due to a duty disability, as defined in section 353.01, subdivision 41.”
The effective-date clause attached to that section reads: “This section is effective the day following final enactment and applies retroactively from February 1, 2020.” Chapter 97 was presented to the governor May 14, 2026 and signed May 18, 2026, which puts the effective date at May 19, 2026.
That has two consequences, and the second one is an open question, not an answer.
The class named in § 604.06 is now bigger. Section 604.06 incorporates the definition, not a frozen copy of it. Part-time municipal fire personnel, paid on-call firefighters, and former officers who separated on a duty disability are now inside § 299A.41, subd. 4 on its face.
The act doesn’t say whether the retroactivity clause carries into § 604.06. Article 12 of chapter 97 is titled “First Responders,” and the sections around § 8 deal with public safety officer death and disability benefits. The effective-date clause is attached to the section amending the definition, and the definition is what § 604.06 incorporates. But the act doesn’t address § 604.06, and I can’t tell you how a court would sort out the interaction. If I had a claim by a part-time or paid on-call firefighter, or by a duty-disability separee, arising after February 1, 2020, I’d brief that question rather than assume it.
Who is not covered?
Everyone the two definitions don’t reach. As to them, the common law doctrine is still standing, because the statute never abolished it. It said only that the doctrine “shall not operate to deny” recovery to the two named classes.
A few categories deserve a flag, because it’s easy to assume them into coverage:
- Private security personnel. Nothing in § 626.84, subd. 1(c) or in the ten clauses of § 299A.41, subd. 4 describes a private security guard.
- Firefighters employed by a private employer. Clause (4) requires employment “by the state or by a fire department of a governmental subdivision of the state.” Clause (5) requires legally enrolled membership in a volunteer or paid on-call fire department or an independent nonprofit firefighting corporation. An industrial fire brigade at a private plant doesn’t obviously fit either one.
- Health care personnel outside clauses (8) and (9). The definition reaches a driver or attendant with a licensed life-support transportation service engaged in providing emergency care, and a certified first responder in an organized service recognized by a local political subdivision. It doesn’t reach emergency department staff generally.
For anyone outside the statute, Armstrong is the starting point, and the question is the one the court framed there: was the risk reasonably apparent, or was it hidden or unanticipated?
What does § 604.06 not do?
It doesn’t create a cause of action. The officer still has to prove a duty, a breach, causation, and damages under whatever theory the case actually rests on: a premises claim, a product claim, a negligence claim against a third party.
It doesn’t address comparative fault. Minn. Stat. § 604.01, subd. 1a still defines “fault” to include “unreasonable assumption of risk not constituting an express consent or primary assumption of risk,” and still requires damages to be diminished in proportion to the claimant’s share under subdivision 1. Section 604.06 removes a no-duty bar. It says nothing about the percentage on the special verdict form.
It doesn’t touch the immunities and notice requirements that usually matter more in these cases. An injured officer’s claim often runs against a municipality, and the municipal tort statutes work on their own: the 180-day notice requirement and the damage caps we cover in against a Minnesota city, the deadline that ends your case is not the statute of limitations, and the snow-and-ice and parks immunities discussed in on a Minnesota sidewalk, who owns the building next to the ice decides the case. Where the injury happens on land opened for recreational use, the separate duty-stripping regime in Minnesota’s recreational land use statute may apply on its own terms.
And it doesn’t answer the workers’ compensation question, which in practice decides who the defendants are.
What to do
- Read the caption last. For a covered officer, § 604.06 isn’t an obstacle. It’s the answer to one.
- Run the definition, clause by clause. Ten clauses in § 299A.41, subd. 4, plus paragraph (c) of § 626.84, subd. 1. The question isn’t was the client a first responder. It’s which clause the client fits, and whether the employment status that clause requires was in place at the time.
- Check the date against the 2026 amendment. Part-time fire department employment, paid on-call membership, and duty-disability separation entered the definition on May 19, 2026, with a retroactivity clause reaching back to February 1, 2020.
- If the client is outside both definitions, brief Armstrong on its own terms, and focus on whether the specific risk that caused the injury was reasonably apparent. That’s where that case was actually decided.
- Don’t treat the abrogation as a substitute for the merits. The statute clears one doctrine out of the way. Everything else in the case stays the same.
- Calendar the municipal notice period first. In a case against a city or county it’s the shorter clock, and it doesn’t care what the fireman’s rule says.
A caption is not a summary
Section 604.06 is the best example I know of why a caption isn’t a summary. A statute headed “FIREMAN’S RULE” that doesn’t contain the rule, doesn’t define it, doesn’t abolish it, and exists only to keep it from being applied to two groups of people is going to get misread. In this practice area, it gets misread in the direction that hurts the injured person.
The other thing I notice is where the real content lives. Nothing that decides the outcome under § 604.06 is in § 604.06. It’s in a ten-clause definitional list in chapter 299A, written for a death-benefits program, which the Legislature amended in May 2026 without any apparent reference to its tort consequences. And on its face, that list now brings paid on-call firefighters and duty-disability separees inside a statute about civil recovery.
A one-sentence statute that farms out its entire scope to a definition somewhere else moves whenever that definition moves. This one just did.
At Madgett Law, LLC, I represent injured people in Minnesota, including peace officers, firefighters, EMS personnel, and other public safety officers hurt in the line of duty by someone else’s negligence or by a defective product. If someone has raised a fireman’s rule argument against you, the first question I ask is whether the statute has already answered it. Send us a message or call 612-470-6529.
Sources: Minn. Stat. § 604.06 (fireman’s rule), quoted in full — the section consists of a single sentence, and the article reproduces it without omission; history line 1982 c 601 s 3; 1983 c 159 s 1; 1987 c 384 art 1 s 45; 1991 c 199 art 2 s 28. Minn. Stat. § 626.84, subd. 1, paragraph (c) (definition of “peace officer,” including the licensure, criminal-law-enforcement and full-power-of-arrest elements, the enumerated state officers, and the tribal law enforcement clause), paragraph (d) (definition of “part-time peace officer,” including the 20-hour average), and paragraph (e) (definition of “reserve officer”). Minn. Stat. § 299A.41, subd. 4 (definition of “public safety officer,” clauses (1) through (10)), together with subd. 1 (scope of the definitions). Minn. Stat. § 604.01, subd. 1 (proportionate diminution) and subd. 1a (definition of “fault,” including “unreasonable assumption of risk not constituting an express consent or primary assumption of risk”). All statutory text from the Minnesota Office of the Revisor of Statutes, 2025 Minnesota Statutes. Laws 2026, ch. 97 (S.F. No. 4760), art. 12 (“First Responders”), § 8 (amending Minn. Stat. § 299A.41, subd. 4: “full-time” to “full-time or part-time” in clause (4); “volunteer” to “volunteer or paid on-call” in clause (5); and new clause (11) for a person formerly employed as a public safety officer under clauses (1) to (5) or (7) to (10) who separated from service due to a duty disability as defined in § 353.01, subd. 41), including the struck and inserted language and the effective-date clause quoted above; the chapter was presented to the governor May 14, 2026 and signed by the governor May 18, 2026 — session law text from the Revisor’s published chapter. Laws 2026, ch. 92 (S.F. No. 856), art. 2, § 14 amends § 626.84, subd. 1 to add Office of the Inspector General Anti-Fraud and Waste Bureau officers to paragraph (c)(1), and by its own terms “is effective January 1, 2027,” so it is not reflected in the definition as it stands today. Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343 (Minn. 1979) (No. 48380, decided Feb. 9, 1979) — Caselaw Access Project (static.case.law), 284 N.W.2d 343–353; quoted at 350 (the holding on duty and primary assumption of risk, and the “defendants other than owners and possessors of land” passage), 351 (primary assumption of risk is “not a defense, but rather a legal theory which relieves a defendant of a duty”), 352 (application to the non-landowner defendants), and 353 (the firemen “cannot, therefore, recover damages from any of the defendants”; “Affirmed”); the case is cited for the pre-statute articulation of the doctrine, its character as a no-duty rule rather than an affirmative defense, and its extension to defendants other than landowners. This article does not survey decisions applying § 604.06 since its enactment; that body of law is not cited here. This article is general legal information about Minnesota law, not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney–client relationship. Whether any particular officer is within § 299A.41, subd. 4, and how the 2026 retroactivity clause interacts with § 604.06, depend on facts and on authority beyond the statutory text. No outcome is promised or implied.