A Minnesota employee fired for a discriminatory reason usually has more than one statute available. So does a Minnesota tenant, a customer refused service, or a person mistreated by a government agency. The Minnesota Human Rights Act, chapter 363A, sits alongside Title VII, the ADA, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the same facts can support claims under several of them.
The deadlines are the most common way these claims are lost, and they are mapped separately in our article on chapter 363A’s timing machinery. Read that first. This article is about the other decision — not when to file but what to file, and what each option gives up.
Six variables actually drive the answer.
1. Who can be sued at all
The MHRA defines “employer” at Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 16, in one line: “‘Employer’ means a person who has one or more employees.”
Title VII defines “employer” at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person,” subject to exclusions.
For anyone who worked at a small Minnesota business — a dental office, a restaurant, a two-person shop — that difference is not a tradeoff. It is the difference between having a claim and not having one. The federal statute simply does not reach the employer.
The MHRA also defines “person” broadly, at § 363A.03, subd. 30, to include “the state and its departments, agencies, and political subdivisions.” Under § 1983, by contrast, who counts as a suable “person” is a threshold problem with its own doctrine, discussed in who can be sued under § 1983 in Minnesota.
2. Damages, and the caps
This is where the statutes diverge most sharply.
Title VII and ADA Title I are capped. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) provides that the sum of compensatory damages “for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses,” plus punitive damages, “shall not exceed, for each complaining party,” $50,000 for an employer with more than 14 and fewer than 101 employees; $100,000 for more than 100 and fewer than 201; $200,000 for more than 200 and fewer than 501; and $300,000 for more than 500 — each tier measured by employees “in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.” Back pay is not counted against the cap — § 1981a(b)(2) excludes it from “[c]ompensatory damages awarded under this section.” And under § 1981a(c)(2), the court “shall not inform the jury of the limitations,” so a jury can return a number that the judge then cuts.
Punitive damages under § 1981a are unavailable against a public employer at all: § 1981a(b)(1) authorizes them only “against a respondent (other than a government, government agency or political subdivision).”
The MHRA is not capped. Minn. Stat. § 363A.33, subd. 8(a), directs that where the court finds an unfair discriminatory practice, it “shall order the respondent to pay an aggrieved party who has suffered discrimination compensatory damages, including mental anguish or suffering, in an amount up to three times the actual damages sustained.” The same subdivision permits punitive damages under Minn. Stat. § 549.20 and requires a civil penalty payable to the state. The only express damages ceiling is in subdivision 8(b): where a political subdivision is the respondent, punitive damages “may not exceed $25,000.”
A caution on the punitive side: Minnesota does not allow a punitive claim to be pleaded at the outset. Minn. Stat. § 549.191 provides that “[u]pon commencement of a civil action, the complaint must not seek punitive damages,” and requires a motion, supported by affidavits, with the court granting leave only “if the court finds prima facie evidence in support of the motion.” That procedure is covered in our article on § 549.191.
Section 1983 has no statutory cap — but City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981), held “that a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1983,” 453 U.S. at 271. Punitive damages against an individual officer or official remain available.
3. Whether you get a jury
The MHRA gives an unqualified statutory jury right in district court. Section 363A.33, subd. 6, provides: “A person bringing a civil action seeking redress for an unfair discriminatory practice or a respondent is entitled to a jury trial.” Subdivision 8(a) adds that “[i]n any case under this chapter that is decided by a jury, the jury shall determine the amount of all damages to be awarded.”
That right belongs to the civil action, not to the administrative track. A charge that proceeds to a contested-case hearing under § 363A.29 is decided by an administrative law judge, whose report is “binding on all parties to the proceeding,” and whose damages authority under § 363A.29, subd. 4(a), includes a $25,000 punitive ceiling that does not appear in the district court provision. Choosing the agency hearing over district court is choosing a bench-style proceeding with a lower punitive ceiling.
Under Title VII and ADA Title I, the jury right is conditional: 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) provides that “[i]f a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive damages under this section . . . any party may demand a trial by jury.” A plaintiff seeking only back pay and reinstatement is not, by that provision, entitled to one.
Section 1983 contains no jury provision of its own; it makes the wrongdoer “liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress,” and a damages claim is the action at law.
4. Who pays the lawyer
Fee shifting is what makes a modest-damages discrimination case viable, and the statutes do not share one provision.
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) covers actions to enforce §§ 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986, along with Title IX, RFRA, RLUIPA, Title VI, and 34 U.S.C. § 12361. It does not cover Title VII, and it does not cover the ADA. Title VII has its own provision at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(k), and the ADA has its own at 42 U.S.C. § 12205. The mechanics of § 1988 — prevailing-party status, the lodestar, and the traps — are covered in our article on § 1988, and the broader Minnesota picture in the fee-shifting map.
The MHRA’s provision, § 363A.33, subd. 7, reads: “In any action or proceeding brought pursuant to this section the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” Note “prevailing party,” not “prevailing plaintiff.” On the face of the statute, the exposure runs both directions.
5. Exhaustion
Title VII requires a charge before a lawsuit. A private plaintiff sues under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1) after the EEOC notifies the aggrieved person, and “within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge.”
That requirement is mandatory but not jurisdictional. In Fort Bend County v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541 (2019), the Supreme Court held: “Title VII’s charge-filing requirement is not jurisdictional.” 587 U.S. at 542. Practically, that means a defendant who does not raise the failure in time can forfeit it — and it means a plaintiff’s counsel should never assume the objection has been waived, because a timely-raised one will be enforced.
Section 1983 requires no exhaustion. In Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982), the Court concluded “that exhaustion of state administrative remedies should not be required as a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to § 1983,” and declined “to overturn our prior decisions holding that such exhaustion is not required.” 457 U.S. at 516. The significant statutory exception is for incarcerated plaintiffs: 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”
The MHRA requires no exhaustion either. Minn. Stat. § 363A.33, subd. 1, opens: “The commissioner or a person may bring a civil action seeking redress for an unfair discriminatory practice directly to district court.” An MDHR charge is an alternative to suit, not a precondition of it.
6. The election-of-remedies trap — stated exactly
This is described loosely more often than it is described correctly, and the loose version has cost people claims in both directions. Here is what the statutes actually say.
Minn. Stat. § 363A.28, subd. 3(a) gives three doors: a claim “must be brought as a civil action pursuant to section 363A.33, subdivision 1, filed in a charge with a local commission pursuant to section 363A.07, subdivision 3, or filed in a charge with the commissioner . . . .”
Minn. Stat. § 363A.07, subd. 3 makes the choice between the two agencies irreversible: “The charging party has the option of filing a charge either with a local commission or the department. . . . The exercise of such choice in filing a charge with one agency shall preclude the option of filing the same charge with the other agency.” If a charge goes to the Minneapolis or St. Paul civil rights office, it does not also go to the Department of Human Rights.
Minn. Stat. § 363A.04 supplies the exclusivity rule, and both halves of it matter: “Nothing contained in this chapter shall be deemed to repeal any of the provisions of the civil rights law or of any other law of this state relating to discrimination . . . but, as to acts declared unfair by sections 363A.08 to 363A.19, and 363A.28, subdivision 10, the administrative procedure herein provided shall, while pending, be exclusive. The rights and remedies herein provided are in addition to, and shall not preclude, those available at law or in equity.”
Read that carefully. The exclusivity is while pending — it is a rule about running two tracks simultaneously, not a permanent forfeiture. And the closing sentence says the chapter’s remedies are “in addition to,” and do “not preclude,” remedies otherwise available. That is close to the opposite of what “election of remedies” is often taken to mean.
Minn. Stat. § 363A.33, subd. 3 is the one-way door: “No charge shall be filed or reinstituted with the commissioner after a civil action relating to the same unfair discriminatory practice has been brought unless the civil action has been dismissed without prejudice.” You can leave the agency for court. You generally cannot go back.
Finally, note what chapter 363A does not say. Nothing in these provisions declares that filing an MDHR charge forfeits a federal claim. The chapter assumes the opposite: § 363A.29, subd. 2, tolls the commissioner’s determination deadline while a case “is being investigated by another enforcement agency under a work sharing agreement” — language that contemplates parallel state and federal processing. A plaintiff considering dual filing should confirm the current mechanics with the agencies rather than relying on a general description, but the statute does not itself extinguish the federal claim.
How the choice usually resolves
For a small Minnesota employer, the MHRA is often the only statute that reaches the defendant at all. For a large employer where the emotional-distress harm is serious, the MHRA’s uncapped, potentially trebled compensatory damages and its unconditional jury right are worth a great deal against § 1981a’s caps. Where the defendant is a government actor and the theory is constitutional rather than statutory, § 1983 brings punitive exposure against individuals that neither of the others provides. Frequently the right answer is more than one claim — which makes the sequencing rules above, and the timing rules in the deadlines article, the thing to get right before anything is filed anywhere.
Discrimination outside employment follows the same architecture. The Minnesota provisions for public accommodations run through the same remedies and procedures in § 363A.33.
Working with Madgett Law
Madgett Law, LLC handles civil rights and discrimination litigation in Minnesota state and federal court, alongside the firm’s personal injury and general civil litigation practice. Several of the choices described above are difficult or impossible to undo once a charge is filed — which is why they are worth working through before filing anywhere. If you believe you were discriminated against, you can send us a message or call 612-470-6529. No outcome is promised or implied.
Sources: Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subds. 16, 30; § 363A.04; § 363A.07, subd. 3; § 363A.28, subd. 3(a); § 363A.29, subds. 1, 2, 4(a); § 363A.33, subds. 1, 3, 6, 7, 8(a), 8(b); § 549.20; § 549.191 (revisor.mn.gov, pulled directly). 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (c); § 1983; § 1988(b); § 1997e(a); § 2000e(b); § 2000e–5(f)(1), (k); § 12205 (uscode.house.gov, current through Aug. 1, 2026). City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982). Fort Bend County v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 542 (2019).
This article is general information about Minnesota and federal law. It is not legal advice, it does not create an attorney–client relationship, and it does not promise or imply any particular outcome. Consult a lawyer about your own situation.