A Pierringer Release Is Not a Discount Off the Verdict. It Is the Sale of a Slice of the Cause of Action, and That Distinction Decides Who Eats the Uncollectible Share.

A plaintiff with three defendants settles with one of them for $200,000. The case goes to trial. The jury returns $268,241.67 and assigns the settling defendant ten percent of the fault. The nonsettling defendant moves to credit the full $200,000 against the judgment. It is an obvious motion: the plaintiff has been paid, and Minnesota’s comparative fault statute says in so many words that “All settlements and payments made under subdivisions 2 and 3 shall be credited against any final settlement or judgment.”

The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the credit is $26,824.17 — ten percent — and that the plaintiff keeps the rest.

Those are the facts of Rambaum v. Swisher, 435 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1989), and the result is the whole of what a Pierringer release is. The plaintiff has not been paid $200,000 toward a judgment. The plaintiff has sold ten percent of the cause of action for $200,000. Everything that follows — the offset arithmetic, the jury instruction, the indemnity clause, the reallocation trap that surfaces two years later — is a consequence of that one idea, and every mistake practitioners make with these releases comes from thinking of them as a discount instead.

This article covers the Minnesota law of Pierringer releases: what Frey v. Snelgrove actually held, how the offset works, how the release differs from the other three settlement devices Minnesota recognizes, what the 2003 rewrite of § 604.02 changed, and the three traps that show up in real files.

What did Frey v. Snelgrove actually hold?

Frey ex rel. Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1978) (No. 47620, decided August 18, 1978), is the anchor. It is usually described as the case that “adopted” the Pierringer release in Minnesota. That is not quite what the opinion says, and the difference matters when you are arguing about a nonstandard release.

The court wrote that “The use of a so-called Pierringer release is in accord with Minnesota practice and our law of comparative negligence in tort actions,” and that “The bar and trial bench of this state have recently been following the procedures set forth in Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis.2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1963).” Frey, 269 N.W.2d at 921. The device was already in use. What Frey supplied was validation and a procedure.

The court took the elements from a law review article by John E. Simonett — later a justice of the same court — and set them out in footnote 1:

The basic elements of a Pierringer release are: (1) The release of the settling defendants from the action and the discharge of a part of the cause of action equal to that part attributable to the settling defendants’ causal negligence; (2) the reservation of the remainder of plaintiff’s causes of action against the nonsettling defendants; and (3) plaintiff’s agreement to indemnify the settling defendants from any claims of contribution made by the nonsettling parties and to satisfy any judgment obtained from the nonsettling defendants to the extent the settling defendants have been released.

Frey, 269 N.W.2d at 920–21 n.1.

Element (1) is the one that does the work. The release does not merely dismiss a defendant. It discharges a part of the cause of action — the part that later turns out to be attributable to that defendant’s causal fault. The plaintiff no longer owns that slice and cannot recover it from anyone.

The holding follows from that:

We therefore hold that where the plaintiff has entered into a Pierringer-type release, settling his claims with some defendants and agreeing to pay any cross-claims of the nonsettling defendants, the settling defendants usually should be dismissed, but their negligence should nevertheless be submitted to the jury. If the release so provides, the indemnity cross-claims between all defendants should also be dismissed.

Frey, 269 N.W.2d at 922.

Note what the court did not hold. Firestone, the nonsettling defendant in Frey, had argued the settling defendants should have been thrown out of the trial entirely. The court refused, “due largely to Firestone’s refusal to dismiss its own cross-claims with prejudice.” Id. at 921. A nonsettling defendant that keeps live cross-claims against a settling defendant is the reason the settling defendant stays in the courtroom.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals has since restated the elements in the form most often quoted in briefs today. A Pierringer release

(1) releases the settling defendant from the lawsuit and discharges a part of the cause of action equal to the part attributable to the settling joint tortfeasor’s causal negligence, (2) reserves “the balance of the whole cause of action” against the non-settling joint tortfeasors, and (3) contains an agreement whereby the plaintiff indemnifies the settling defendant from any claims of contribution made by the non-settling parties and agrees to satisfy any judgment he obtains from the non-settling tortfeasors to the extent the settling tortfeasor has been released.

Lake Superior Ctr. Auth. v. Hammel, Green & Abrahamson, Inc., 715 N.W.2d 458, 477 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Kellen v. Mathias, 519 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994)).

And the supreme court’s most recent one-sentence summary: “The practical effect of a Pierringer release is to dismiss the settling tortfeasor from the lawsuit and to dismiss all cross-claims for contribution between the settling defendant and the remaining defendants.” In re Individual 35W Bridge Litig., 806 N.W.2d 820, 835 (Minn. 2011).

Why doesn’t the settlement money simply come off the verdict?

Because Minn. Stat. § 604.01, subd. 5 says it does, and the supreme court read the subdivision not to reach this kind of settlement.

The statute provides that “All settlements and payments made under subdivisions 2 and 3 shall be credited against any final settlement or judgment,” and that before entering judgment the court “shall reduce the amount of the damages so determined by the amount of the payments previously made to or on behalf of the person entitled to such damages.”

In Rambaum, the nonsettling defendant made exactly that argument, and the court conceded its surface force: “The statute seems to require that ‘all payments’ under any settlement, including a Pierringer settlement, must go to reduce plaintiff’s damages.” 435 N.W.2d at 22. The court then explained why it does not:

To apply the Pierringer payment pro tanto — in full, against the entire award — would, however, be contrary to the intent of the settling parties who agreed to deduct from the verdict award only that portion of the settlement payment attributable to the fault of the settling defendant. If a pro tanto reduction were required, the usefulness of the Pierringer release would be seriously impaired. Subdivision 5 of the statute was enacted in 1969, before the Pierringer was recognized, and it appears the legislature did not then have this kind of settlement in mind.

Id. at 22–23. The holding:

We hold, therefore, that the term “payments” as used in Minn.Stat. § 604.01, subd. 5, with respect to Pierringer settlements, refers only to payment for that portion of plaintiff’s damages representing the settling defendant’s share of the liability. The settlement payment does not extend to any further portion of plaintiff’s award.

Id. at 23.

The court also rejected the windfall objection on its own terms:

The time to judge the fairness of the Pierringer is at the time it is made; and if subsequent events sometimes result in a so-called “windfall” for plaintiff, that result is acceptable within the context of the law’s strong policy to encourage settlement of disputes.

Id. And it pointed out that the asymmetry runs both ways: “If the jury had determined the amount of the O’Neill’s Bar fair share at more than O’Neill paid for its release, the Croatian Club, as the nonsettling defendant, would have been relieved of the obligation of making up the difference.” Id.

The zero-percent case

The cleanest illustration is the one where the settling defendant turns out not to have been liable at all.

In Shantz v. Richview, Inc., 311 N.W.2d 155 (Minn. 1980), a wrongful death plaintiff took $9,000 on a Pierringer release from a third-party defendant. The jury found the settling party not negligent and returned total damages of $12,000. The trial court subtracted the $9,000. The supreme court reversed:

Reversing the reduction, we hold that when a plaintiff in a wrongful death action uses a Pierringer release to settle with one of two alleged tortfeasors and the jury, after having been properly instructed, later determines that the settling party was not negligent, the nonsettling party is not entitled to have the amount paid by the settling party subtracted from the damages he is required to pay the plaintiff.

Id. at 156. The court’s rationale is the sentence Minnesota courts have quoted ever since: “It should be no concern of the nonsettling defendant how much the plaintiff received from the settling defendant.” Id. All that concerns the nonsettling defendant “is that he not be required to pay more than his percentage share of the total damages which the jury determines the plaintiff sustained.” Id.

Zero percent of the fault means zero percent of the cause of action was discharged. The nonsettling defendant pays its own share in full and gets nothing.

How does the jury hear about it?

Frey set procedural guidelines, and they are still the operative instructions. Stated in sequence:

1. Notify immediately. “When a settlement or release is entered into, the trial court and other parties should be immediately notified, and the terms of the agreement made a part of the record.” 269 N.W.2d at 923. The court had already said that “The courts should encourage settlements openly made with prompt and adequate notice to the trial judge and all interested parties.” Id. at 922.
2. Dismiss the settling defendant — usually. If the plaintiff has agreed to indemnify against all possible cross-claims, “the trial court should ordinarily dismiss the settling defendant from the case,” and the settling defendant “is deemed also to have relinquished any cross-claims against the remaining defendants.” Id. at 923.
3. Unless a cross-claim survives. “[I]f a nonsettling party has cross-claims for both contribution and indemnity, either of which is not covered by the terms of the release, then the settling defendant should continue as a party for the limited purpose of defending against the surviving cross-claim.” Id.
4. Submit the settling defendant’s fault anyway. “In almost every case the trial court should submit to the jury the fault of all parties, including the settling defendants, even though they have been dismissed from the lawsuit.” Id.
5. Explain the empty chair. Where the settlement is executed during trial, the court should usually tell the jury there has been a settlement “if for no other reason than to explain the settling tortfeasor’s conspicuous absence from the court room.” Id. (quoting Simonett).
6. Never the number. A release is admissible under Minn. R. Evid. 408 when offered for a purpose such as proving bias — the rule provides that it “does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness” — but “as a general rule the amount paid in settlement should never be submitted.” Id. The court explained why: the figure “may have little relation to the actual damages of a plaintiff, since it may reflect a compromise, the evaluation of a defendant’s potential liability, and many other factors not relevant to a jury’s consideration of actual monetary damages.” Id.
7. Bias, when the settling party testifies. “When such a defendant is called to testify by one of the remaining parties, the trial court should inform the jury of the effect of the release, so that they might consider any bias of the witness.” Id.

Frey also said these are guidelines: “A trial court’s deviation would not constitute error if those modifications substantially protect the rights of all parties and preserve the adversary process.” Id. And the extent of disclosure “will vary from case to case and must rest in the sound discretion of the trial court.” Id. at 922. That discretion is the reason two judges in the same courthouse can handle the same release differently without either being reversed.

Minn. Stat. § 604.01, subd. 4 sits behind all of this: “Except in an action in which settlement and release has been pleaded as a defense, any settlement or payment referred to in subdivisions 2 and 3 shall be inadmissible in evidence on the trial of any legal action.”

Pierringer, Naig, Miller-Shugart, and Loy — four devices, four different problems

Minnesota recognizes four partial-settlement structures. They are not interchangeable, and the supreme court has listed three of them side by side in one paragraph. In Drake v. Ryan, 514 N.W.2d 785, 788 (Minn. 1994), the court catalogued the “other types of releases that have dissected a defendant’s liability”: Miller v. Shugart, 316 N.W.2d 729 (Minn. 1982), where a plaintiff and an insured tortfeasor stipulate to a judgment collectible only from a disputed policy; Shantz, where a Pierringer lets a plaintiff settle with one of two tortfeasors and reserve the claim against the other; and Naig v. Bloomington Sanitation, 258 N.W.2d 891 (Minn. 1977), where an injured employee settles the tort damages the compensation carrier has no subrogation interest in.

Drake itself is the Loy case: the court held that a defendant released as to his primary insurer’s limits, with the claim reserved against his excess carrier, “is not entitled to dismissal from the lawsuit because the agreement did not fully and finally release him from all liability and because he remains a real party in interest in a justiciable controversy.” 514 N.W.2d at 788. The paragraph 9 of the agreement in Drake is worth reading for the drafting lesson alone: the parties wrote in that the document “should not be construed as a Pierringer Release, and hereby acknowledge and agree that this document shall not have the legal effect of a Pierringer Release or a general release.” Id. at 787. If you are not writing a Pierringer, say so on the face of the document.

The Naig and Miller-Shugart mechanics are treated in the linked articles and are not repeated here.

What the 2003 rewrite of § 604.02 changed

Most of the leading Pierringer cases were decided under a version of the apportionment statute that no longer exists, and the difference is not cosmetic.

The current statute, Minn. Stat. § 604.02, subd. 1, provides that “When two or more persons are severally liable, contributions to awards shall be in proportion to the percentage of fault attributable to each,” subject to four enumerated exceptions in which persons are “jointly and severally liable for the whole award” — fault greater than 50 percent, a common scheme or plan, an intentional tort, and liability arising under the listed environmental and public health chapters. The subdivision closes: “This section applies to claims arising from events that occur on or after August 1, 2003.”

The prior version said the opposite by default. As the supreme court described it, until 2003 the statute provided that tortfeasors’ “contributions to awards shall be in proportion to [their] percentage of fault” but “each is jointly and severally liable for the whole award,” and the 2003 amendments “eliminated the blanket exception … and substituted four specific exceptions,” “thus enabling an injured person to recover more than a tortfeasor’s comparative-responsibility share in only those four circumstances.” Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud, 813 N.W.2d 68, 77–78 (Minn. 2012).

Staab then held:

We hold that “persons” includes all “parties to the transaction,” and therefore section 604.02, subdivision 1, applies when a jury apportions fault between a sole defendant and a nonparty tortfeasor, and limits the amount collectible from the defendant to its percentage share of the fault assigned to it by the jury.

Id. at 80.

For a plaintiff deciding whether to take a Pierringer settlement today, that is the central change. Under the old statute, a plaintiff who settled with one of two defendants could still look to the remaining defendant for the whole award, subject to reallocation. Under the current statute, unless one of the four exceptions applies, the remaining defendant pays its own percentage and no more. The full architecture of the current section is covered in joint and several liability under § 604.02.

Read the older Pierringer cases with that in mind. Hosley v. Armstrong Cork Co., 383 N.W.2d 289, 292 (Minn. 1986), held “that the plaintiff’s settlement with some defendants through Pierringer releases does not waive joint liability between all defendants,” reasoning that “The retention of the doctrine of joint and several liability in the comparative fault statute demands such a result.” The doctrine is no longer retained in that form. Hosley’s Pierringer analysis — that “Joint liability among nonsettling defendants is not expressly waived” by the release itself, id. — survives the amendment. Its arithmetic does not.

Three traps

1. The indemnity clause can take money back out of the judgment

The plaintiff’s promise to indemnify the settling defendant is not a formality. It is an enforceable contract that operates after verdict, and Minnesota has enforced it against the plaintiff twice in the leading cases.

In Frederickson v. Alton M. Johnson Co., 402 N.W.2d 794 (Minn. 1987), a defendant’s share of the judgment proved uncollectible. Under Minn. Stat. § 604.02, subd. 2, “the court shall determine whether all or part of a party’s equitable share of the obligation is uncollectible from that party and shall reallocate any uncollectible amount among the other parties, including a claimant at fault, according to their respective percentages of fault.” The supreme court held the uncollectible share “should be reallocated to Hunt, Frederickson, and Michaud-Cooley” — Hunt being the settling Pierringer defendant and Frederickson being the plaintiff. 402 N.W.2d at 799.

Hosley is more explicit about who ultimately pays. The releases there contained a clause under which the plaintiff agreed to satisfy the percentage of the judgment that would otherwise be reallocated to the settling defendants. The court enforced it:

There appear to be no public policy considerations that would prevent us from enforcing the reallocation clause in the Pierringer releases. In bargaining for a settlement with some of the defendants, Hosley agreed to pay their share of any uncollectible obligations. … The reallocation statute establishes a fair method of distributing the risk of uncollectible obligations. This purpose, however, is not thwarted when parties agree to establish a different risk allocation scheme in a settlement agreement.

383 N.W.2d at 294. The court remanded to stay an additional $67,666.66 of the plaintiff’s judgment — the settling defendants’ share of a bankrupt defendant’s obligation, which the plaintiff had contracted to absorb.

The court of appeals in Hosley had put the point without cushioning: “It would be inequitable to deny the company [Pittsburgh Corning Corporation] contribution against the settling Defendants more-at-fault than Hosley merely because Hosley would ultimately pay the contribution claims. That is precisely what Hosley contracted to do. It is an expected consequence of the Pierringer settlements.” Id. at 291 (quoting the court of appeals).

Before signing, price the scenario in which the remaining defendant is judgment-proof.

2. The percentage reduction happens even when contribution is time-barred

A nonsettling defendant sometimes argues that because its contribution claim against the settling party is dead — barred by a limitations or repose period — the plaintiff’s recovery should not be reduced by the settling party’s share. Frederickson rejected that.

The cross-claims there were barred by Minn. Stat. § 541.051. The reduction stood anyway:

A Pierringer agreement does more than provide for indemnity or contribution; it also releases the settling defendant and a part of plaintiff’s cause of action, and reserves the balance of the plaintiff’s cause of action against the nonsettling defendants.

402 N.W.2d at 797. The court quoted then-Justice Simonett’s description of the indemnification provisions as “‘second-line protection’ for the releasees in the event that the provisions discharging the releasees and their share of the cause of action were found later to be ineffective.” Id. The discharge of the slice is the first line. Indemnity is the backup. Killing the backup does not restore the slice.

The court grounded the reduction in Frey’s own quotation of the Wisconsin rule: the plaintiff “is limited in recovery to the unsatisfied percentage of the damages — the percentage attributable to the nonsettling tort-feasor.” Id. (quoting Frey, 269 N.W.2d at 922).

3. A statute can turn the whole thing off

In re Individual 35W Bridge Litigation is the reminder that Pierringer principles are common law and yield to a contrary statute. The State had settled with survivor-claimants on releases the nonsettling engineering firm argued were Pierringer releases barring the State’s statutory reimbursement claim. The court held that the phrase “notwithstanding any statutory or common law to the contrary” in Minn. Stat. § 3.7394, subd. 5(a), “plainly means that the statutory reimbursement the State may seek is not subject to general common law principles, including the limitations of Pierringer releases and the voluntary payments doctrine.” 806 N.W.2d at 835. The State’s claim survived the releases.

Check for a statutory reimbursement, subrogation, or lien scheme before assuming the release controls what happens to the money.

Drafting and practice checklist

1. Write all three elements in. Discharge of the part of the cause of action attributable to the settling defendant’s causal fault; reservation of the balance against the nonsettling defendants; indemnity against contribution plus satisfaction of any judgment to the extent released. Frey, 269 N.W.2d at 920–21 n.1.
2. Decide, in writing, whether indemnity covers indemnity claims or only contribution claims. Frey treated the release before it as containing “two additional provisions not found in a typical Pierringer release,” one of which was that “The indemnity clause covered cross-claims for indemnity as well as contribution.” Id. at 921 n.1. If the coverage is partial, expect the settling defendant to stay in the case for the limited purpose of defending what survives. Id. at 923.
3. Address reallocation expressly. Whether the plaintiff absorbs a reallocated uncollectible share under § 604.02, subd. 2 is a term the parties can and should set. Hosley enforced such a clause; the absence of one leaves the question to the statute.
4. Notify the court and every party immediately, and put the terms on the record. Frey, 269 N.W.2d at 923.
5. Plan the special verdict. The settling defendant’s fault goes on the form. Id.
6. Keep the number out. Id.; Minn. R. Evid. 408; Minn. Stat. § 604.01, subd. 4.
7. Run the arithmetic under the current § 604.02, subd. 1, not under the pre-2003 rule the older opinions apply. Check whether any of the four exceptions puts the remaining defendant on the hook for the whole award.
8. Check the collateral source and comparative fault sequence before agreeing to any number — see comparative fault and collateral sources.
9. If a minor or an incapacitated person is a claimant, the release is not final until the court approves it. See court approval of a minor’s settlement.
10. Say what the document is not. The Drake parties recited that their agreement “shall not have the legal effect of a Pierringer Release or a general release.” 514 N.W.2d at 787. That recital cost one sentence and removed an entire argument.

The observation

The durable feature of the Pierringer release is that it makes a settlement final at the moment it is signed. That is the point of Rambaum’s refusal to reopen the bargain after the verdict — “The time to judge the fairness of the Pierringer is at the time it is made” — and it is why the device survived a comparative fault statute whose plain language pointed the other way.

The cost of that finality is that the plaintiff has sold something without knowing its size. If the jury later values the sold slice at zero, the plaintiff has made a good trade and, under Shantz, keeps every dollar. If the jury values it at half the case, the plaintiff has sold half the case for whatever was paid. Neither result is a mistake in the doctrine; both are the doctrine working.

What is a mistake is signing the indemnity clause without pricing the reallocation scenario. Frederickson and Hosley are twenty and forty years old, they are cited constantly for their Pierringer propositions, and the part of each that actually moved money — the plaintiff paying back a share of a bankrupt defendant’s obligation — is the part least often read.

Madgett Law, LLC handles Minnesota personal injury and multi-party civil litigation, including partial settlements with one of several defendants, the release language that decides the offset, and the special verdict and reallocation questions that follow. If you are being asked to sign a release that indemnifies a settling defendant, the indemnity clause is the term to read first. Send us a message or call 612-470-6529.

Sources: Minn. Stat. § 604.01 (subd. 1, comparative fault and the separate special verdict on damages and percentage of fault; subd. 4, settlements inadmissible “[e]xcept in an action in which settlement and release has been pleaded as a defense”; subd. 5, “All settlements and payments made under subdivisions 2 and 3 shall be credited against any final settlement or judgment” and the court’s duty to “reduce the amount of the damages so determined by the amount of the payments previously made”). Minn. Stat. § 604.02 (subd. 1, “When two or more persons are severally liable, contributions to awards shall be in proportion to the percentage of fault attributable to each,” the four enumerated joint-and-several exceptions, and the sentence “This section applies to claims arising from events that occur on or after August 1, 2003”; subd. 2, reallocation of an uncollectible equitable share on motion made not later than one year after judgment, “among the other parties, including a claimant at fault, according to their respective percentages of fault”; subd. 3, the separate product-liability reallocation rule). Statutory text retrieved from the Minnesota Office of the Revisor of Statutes, revisor.mn.gov, on 2026-08-21, 2025 edition; neither section displayed a 2026 amendment banner. Minn. R. Evid. 408 quoted from the Revisor’s court rules publication at revisor.mn.gov/court_rules/ev/id/408/, retrieved 2026-08-21.

Frey ex rel. Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1978) (No. 47620, decided August 18, 1978) — reporter citation, docket, court, and date from the Caselaw Access Project structured metadata at static.case.law/nw2d/269; opinion read in star-paginated form at static.case.law/nw2d/269/html/0918-01.html. Relied on for: the three basic elements of a Pierringer release and the two nonstandard provisions in the release before the court (920–21 n.1); “The use of a so-called Pierringer release is in accord with Minnesota practice and our law of comparative negligence in tort actions” and the statement that the bar and bench had been following Pierringer v. Hoger (921); the denial of Firestone’s motion “due largely to Firestone’s refusal to dismiss its own cross-claims with prejudice” (921); the holding that settling defendants “usually should be dismissed, but their negligence should nevertheless be submitted to the jury” (922); “The courts should encourage settlements openly made with prompt and adequate notice to the trial judge and all interested parties” and the discretion sentence on disclosure (922); the Peiffer quotation that plaintiff “is limited in recovery to the unsatisfied percentage of the damages” (922); and the guidelines at 923 — immediate notification and terms on the record, ordinary dismissal, the surviving-cross-claim exception, submission of the fault of all parties, explaining the settling tortfeasor’s “conspicuous absence from the court room,” the Rule 408 admissibility discussion and the rule that “the amount paid in settlement should never be submitted” with the court’s reasons, the bias instruction when a settling defendant testifies, and the statement that deviation is not error where modifications “substantially protect the rights of all parties and preserve the adversary process.”

Rambaum v. Swisher, 435 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1989) (No. CO-87-2192, decided January 13, 1989) — metadata from static.case.law/nw2d/435; opinion read at static.case.law/nw2d/435/html/0019-01.html. Relied on for: the $200,000 Pierringer settlement by O’Neill’s Bar, the 80/10/10 fault apportionment, the $432,035.52 verdict, the $268,241.67 net award, and O’Neill’s $26,824.17 ten-percent share (20); the description of the settling tortfeasor settling “for its fair share of plaintiff’s award as later determined by the trier of fact” (22); the concession that “The statute seems to require that ‘all payments’ … must go to reduce plaintiff’s damages” and the pro tanto reasoning including the observation that subdivision 5 “was enacted in 1969, before the Pierringer was recognized” (22–23); “The time to judge the fairness of the Pierringer is at the time it is made” and the reciprocal-risk observation (23); the reallocation discussion under § 604.02, subd. 2 (23); and the holding construing “payments” in § 604.01, subd. 5 (23).

Shantz v. Richview, Inc., 311 N.W.2d 155 (Minn. 1980) (No. 50441, decided April 25, 1980; order filed September 9, 1981) — metadata from static.case.law/nw2d/311; opinion read at static.case.law/nw2d/311/html/0155-01.html. Relied on for the $9,000 settlement, the jury’s finding that the settling third-party defendant was not negligent, the $12,000 damages figure, the holding that the nonsettling party gets no subtraction, and “It should be no concern of the nonsettling defendant how much the plaintiff received from the settling defendant” (156). Rambaum quotes that sentence in slightly different form; the text above is Shantz’s own.

Frederickson v. Alton M. Johnson Co., 402 N.W.2d 794 (Minn. 1987) (Nos. C1-85-2102, C3-85-2117, decided March 20, 1987) — metadata from static.case.law/nw2d/402; opinion read at static.case.law/nw2d/402/html/0794-01.html. Relied on for: “A Pierringer agreement does more than provide for indemnity or contribution …” and the Simonett “second-line protection” quotation (797); the propriety of the 40% reduction despite the cross-claims being barred by Minn. Stat. § 541.051, and the Frey/Peiffer “unsatisfied percentage” quotation (797); and the holding that the uncollectible share “should be reallocated to Hunt, Frederickson, and Michaud-Cooley pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 604.02, subd. 2 (1984)” (799). This opinion applies the pre-2003 text of § 604.02, subd. 1, which the article flags.

Hosley v. Armstrong Cork Co., 383 N.W.2d 289 (Minn. 1986) (No. C6-84-1209, decided March 14, 1986) — metadata from static.case.law/nw2d/383; opinion read at static.case.law/nw2d/383/html/0289-01.html. Relied on for: “Joint liability among nonsettling defendants is not expressly waived” and the holding that Pierringer releases do not waive joint liability between all defendants, resting on “[t]he retention of the doctrine of joint and several liability in the comparative fault statute” (292); the quoted court of appeals passage on contribution against settling defendants (291); the enforcement of the reallocation clause in the releases (294); and the remand to stay an additional $67,666.66 (294). Also decided under the pre-2003 statute.

Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud, 813 N.W.2d 68 (Minn. 2012) (No. A09-1335, decided April 18, 2012) — metadata from static.case.law/nw2d/813; opinion read at static.case.law/nw2d/813/html/0068-01.html. Relied on for the description of the pre-2003 text and the effect of the 2003 amendments in “enabling an injured person to recover more than a tortfeasor’s comparative-responsibility share in only those four circumstances” (77–78; the quoted pre-2003 statutory language begins on 77 and the amendment discussion runs on 78), and for the holding limiting “the amount collectible from the defendant to its percentage share of the fault assigned to it by the jury” (80).

Drake v. Ryan, 514 N.W.2d 785 (Minn. 1994) (No. C1-92-1762, decided April 8, 1994) — metadata from static.case.law/nw2d/514; opinion read at static.case.law/nw2d/514/html/0785-01.html. Relied on for paragraph 9 of the settlement agreement (“should not be construed as a Pierringer Release …”) (787), the catalogue of Miller v. Shugart, Shantz, and Naig as devices that “dissected a defendant’s liability” (788), and the holding that the defendant was not entitled to dismissal because the agreement did not fully release him and he remained a real party in interest (788).

In re Individual 35W Bridge Litigation, 806 N.W.2d 820 (Minn. 2011) (Nos. A10-0087, A10-0089, A10-0090, A10-0091, decided November 30, 2011) — metadata from static.case.law/nw2d/806; opinion read at static.case.law/nw2d/806/html/0820-01.html. Relied on for the one-sentence statement of the practical effect of a Pierringer release, citing Rambaum at 22, and for the holding that the “notwithstanding any statutory or common law to the contrary” clause of Minn. Stat. § 3.7394, subd. 5(a) negates the application of Pierringer principles to the State’s statutory reimbursement claim (835).

Lake Superior Center Authority v. Hammel, Green & Abrahamson, Inc., 715 N.W.2d 458 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (Nos. A05-800, A05-1533, decided June 6, 2006) — metadata from static.case.law/nw2d/715; opinion read at static.case.law/nw2d/715/html/0458-01.html. Relied on for the three-element restatement quoting Kellen v. Mathias, 519 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (477). The Kellen reporter citation, docket (No. C7-93-2411), court, and 1994 date were separately confirmed against the Caselaw Access Project metadata at static.case.law/nw2d/519; the Kellen opinion itself was not read, and it is cited here only as the source Lake Superior Center quotes.

Miller v. Shugart, 316 N.W.2d 729 (Minn. 1982) (No. 81-533, decided March 12, 1982) and Naig v. Bloomington Sanitation, 258 N.W.2d 891 (Minn. 1977) (No. 46983, decided October 7, 1977) are named for contrast only; their reporter citations, dockets, courts, and dates were confirmed against Caselaw Access Project metadata at static.case.law/nw2d/316 and static.case.law/nw2d/258, and their doctrines are treated in the linked articles rather than restated here. Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis.2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1963), and Peiffer v. Allstate Insurance Co., 51 Wis.2d 329, 187 N.W.2d 182 (1971), are Wisconsin decisions reported here only as they are cited and quoted within the Minnesota opinions above; neither was read in its own reporter.

No citator was consulted; the Caselaw Access Project contains none. This article reports what these opinions and statutes say as of 2026-08-21; it does not assert the current precedential status of any decision, and Frederickson and Hosley in particular were decided under a version of Minn. Stat. § 604.02, subd. 1 that the 2003 amendments replaced. This is general legal information about Minnesota law, not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney–client relationship. Every case depends on its own facts. No outcome is promised or implied.