MNOSHA Employee Rights: The Private Action Federal OSHA Does Not Give You

An employee fired for calling in a safety complaint has a very different case in Minnesota than the same employee would have in a state without an approved plan.

Under the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act, a worker who is discharged for exercising safety rights files a complaint with the Secretary of Labor, and then waits. If the Secretary decides the statute was violated, “he shall bring an action in any appropriate United States district court against such person.” 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(2). The employee is not the plaintiff. There is no private federal cause of action for OSHA retaliation.

Minnesota’s statute ends with a sentence the federal statute does not contain:

An employee may bring a private action in the district court for relief under this section.

Minn. Stat. § 182.669, subd. 1. The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that such a claim, seeking only money damages, is a tort action at law carrying a constitutional right to a jury trial. That is a materially better posture than the federal scheme, and it is the reason ch. 182 is worth reading closely rather than treating as a state-flavored copy of federal OSHA.

It is also, importantly, the broadest thing an employee can privately enforce — the chapter’s two other private remedies, both noted below, are far narrower. The distinction between suing over retaliation and suing over the hazard is the line that decides most of these cases, and it is drawn in two places most people never look.

Is MNOSHA a state program or a federal one?

Both, in the specific sense that federal law contemplates.

Section 18 of the federal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 667(b), lets any state that “desires to assume responsibility for development and enforcement” of occupational safety standards submit a plan. Minnesota did. The federal regulation records the result:

(a) The Minnesota State plan received initial approval on June 8, 1973. (b) The Minnesota State plan received final approval on July 30, 1985.

29 C.F.R. § 1952.8. That regulation also records that the plan “covers all private-sector employers and employees, with several notable exceptions, as well as State and local government employers and employees, within the State.”

That last clause is not decorative. Federal OSHA does not cover state and local government employees. Minnesota’s does, and the statute says so in its definition rather than in a coverage section: “Employee” under ch. 182 “shall include state, county, town, city, school district, or governmental subdivision.” Minn. Stat. § 182.651, subd. 9. A county highway worker, a city public-works employee, and a school district custodian are all covered employees in Minnesota.

The chapter’s own coverage provision is broad and has one carve-out: it “shall apply to all places of employment within this state except as noted in subdivision 2,” § 182.652, subd. 1, and subdivision 2 provides that “[n]othing in this chapter shall apply to any working conditions which are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government.” That is the exception that matters for railroads, mines, maritime work, and other federally preempted sectors.

The chapter is formally titled the “Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1973,” § 182.65, subd. 1, and a large part of what employees actually use — hazard training, information access, and the right to refuse — came in a separate 1983 enactment that the statute names the “Employee Right to Know Act of 1983.” § 182.65, subd. 1a.

What does an employer actually owe an employee under Minnesota law?

A general duty that is written more broadly than the federal one.

The federal general duty clause requires each employer to furnish “employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees.” 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1). Minnesota’s reads:

Each employer shall furnish to each of its employees conditions of employment and a place of employment free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious injury or harm to its employees.

Minn. Stat. § 182.653, subd. 2. Two differences are on the page. Minnesota reaches “conditions of employment” as well as the place of employment. And it says “death or serious injury or harm” where the federal clause says “death or serious physical harm” — dropping “physical” and adding a second, ungraded noun. Whether those words have been given independent effect by a Minnesota appellate court is a separate question; what a practitioner should not do is assume the two clauses are interchangeable when drafting or defending a general-duty citation.

Beyond the general duty, § 182.653 imposes obligations with no federal analogue at all. The most significant is subdivision 8, the written workplace accident and injury reduction program — universally called AWAIR:

An employer covered by this section must establish a written work place accident and injury reduction program that promotes safe and healthful working conditions and is based on clearly stated goals and objectives for meeting those goals.

The program must describe five things: how managers, supervisors, and employees are responsible for implementing it and how continued management participation will be established, measured, and maintained; the methods used to identify, analyze, and control new or existing hazards; how the plan is communicated to affected employees; how accidents will be investigated and corrective action implemented; and how safe work practices and rules will be enforced. § 182.653, subd. 8(a)(1)–(5). Paragraph (b) adds an ongoing duty: the employer “must conduct and document a review of the work place accident and injury reduction program at least annually and document how procedures set forth in the program are met.”

AWAIR does not apply to everyone. Subdivision 9 directs the commissioner to adopt by rule a list of standard industrial classifications or North American industry classifications whose employers must comply, based on the safety or workers’ compensation record of that industry segment, updated every five years; an employer must comply six months after its classification is added. The first question in an AWAIR case is therefore whether the employer’s classification is on the list — not whether the program is any good.

The chapter also carries a stack of training duties under the Employee Right to Know Act: hazardous substance training before initial assignment and annually thereafter, with ten specified content items and a written copy kept readily accessible in the area where the substance is used (§ 182.653, subd. 4b); harmful physical agent training with eight specified items (subd. 4c); waste-handling safety training (subd. 4d); a commissioner-developed program for farming operations with more than ten employees or a temporary labor camp (subd. 4e); and infectious agent training (subd. 4f). Subdivisions 4b and 4c each exclude farming operations, which is why subdivision 4e exists. Employees have a mirror-image right to that same information: an employee — other than one working a farming operation with ten or fewer employees and no temporary labor camp — or the employee’s designated representative, may request and receive from the employer, within a reasonable period of time, the information the employer is required to provide under § 182.653, subdivision 4b, 4c, 4d, or 4e. § 182.654, subd. 10.

Can an employee in Minnesota refuse to do dangerous work?

Yes — and unlike the federal right, Minnesota’s is in the statute, and it can require the employer to pay for the work the employee refused to do.

An employee acting in good faith has the right to refuse to work under conditions which the employee reasonably believes present an imminent danger of death or serious physical harm to the employee.

Minn. Stat. § 182.654, subd. 11. The subdivision then supplies a floor for what qualifies: “A reasonable belief of imminent danger of death or serious physical harm includes but is not limited to a reasonable belief of the employee that the employee has been assigned to work in an unsafe or unhealthful manner with a hazardous substance, harmful physical agent or infectious agent.”

The protection against discipline has one express condition, and it is the condition employees most often fail:

An employer may not discriminate against an employee for a good faith refusal to perform assigned tasks if the employee has requested that the employer correct the hazardous conditions but the conditions remain uncorrected.

So the sequence matters. Ask the employer to fix it. Let the request go unanswered. Then refuse. A refusal with no prior request for correction is outside the sentence that bars discrimination.

The pay provision is the part with no real federal counterpart:

An employee who has refused in good faith to perform assigned tasks and who has not been reassigned to other tasks by the employer shall, in addition to retaining a right to continued employment, receive pay for the tasks which would have been performed if (1) the employee requests the commissioner to inspect and determine the nature of the hazardous condition, and (2) the commissioner determines that the employee, by performing the assigned tasks, would have been placed in imminent danger of death or serious physical harm.

Both conditions are mandatory. The employee has to ask MNOSHA to inspect, and MNOSHA has to agree that performing the task would have placed the employee in imminent danger. Without the inspection request, there is a right to keep the job but no statutory right to be paid for the refused hours.

The Legislature added a remedies paragraph in 2023. Beyond the relief available under § 182.669, an administrative law judge may order (1) reinstatement to the same or an equivalent position, restoration of full fringe benefits and seniority, compensation for unpaid wages, benefits, and other remuneration, or front pay in lieu of reinstatement; and (2) “compensatory damages payable to the aggrieved worker equal to the greater of $5,000 or twice the actual damages, including unpaid wages, benefits, and other remuneration and punitive damages.” § 182.654, subd. 11.

There is a piece of legal history worth knowing here, because it explains why older authority reads the wrong way. In 1979 the supreme court rejected a discharged employee’s ch. 182 claim in Davis v. Boise Cascade Corp., where the employee walked off a 122-degree work area without ever contacting the department. The court reasoned that “even if defendant had not complied with regulations issued pursuant to ch. 182, nothing in that statute authorized plaintiff to leave his job to require compliance with the regulations,” and that the employee therefore “was not discharged because he had ‘exercised any right authorized under the provisions of sections 182.65 to 182.674.’” 288 N.W.2d 680, 684 (Minn. 1979).

That reading was accurate in 1979. It is not a description of current law, because the 1983 Employee Right to Know Act added subdivision 11 — the very right to refuse whose absence Davis relied on. Anyone citing Davis for the proposition that Minnesota workers may not walk away from an imminent danger is citing a case about a statute that no longer reads that way.

What happens if an employer retaliates?

Two paths, and the employee may choose either.

Section 182.654, subd. 9 states the prohibition: “No employee shall be discharged or in any way discriminated against because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding or inspection under or related to this chapter or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding or because of the exercise by such employee on behalf of the employee or others of any right afforded by this chapter.”

Path one — the commissioner. An employee “may, within 30 days after the alleged discrimination occurs, file a complaint with the commissioner alleging the discriminatory act.” § 182.669, subd. 1. The commissioner investigates; if the commissioner finds a discriminatory act, the matter is referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings for a contested-case hearing under ch. 14. The commissioner files and serves a complaint and notice of hearing by registered or certified mail, and the respondent has 20 days to answer. Communications between a discrimination complainant and attorneys representing the commissioner are privileged as attorney–client communications.

If the ALJ finds discrimination, the ALJ “may order payment to the employee of back pay and compensatory damages,” and may also order rehiring, reinstatement of the former position, fringe benefits, and seniority rights, “and other appropriate relief.” The ALJ may additionally order payment to the commissioner or the employee of costs, disbursements, witness fees, and attorney fees. Interest accrues on the unpaid balance of the ALJ’s order from the date it is signed, at the rate in § 549.09, subd. 1(c).

Path two — district court. The subdivision’s final sentence: “An employee may bring a private action in the district court for relief under this section.”

That the two are genuine alternatives, not sequential steps, is settled. In Brevik v. Kite Painting, Inc., two commercial painters complained about ventilation, called MNOSHA, and were fired the next day. The trial court dismissed on the theory that ch. 182 created no private action. The supreme court disagreed, reading the then-final sentence of § 182.669 to authorize the suit: “The plain import of the last sentence of section 182.669 is that an employee can bring a private civil action to remedy discrimination based on an employee’s exercise of MOSHA rights.” 416 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Minn. 1987). It concluded: “We thus conclude that plaintiffs’ private cause of action for retaliatory discharge is authorized by section 182.669.” Id. at 717.

Brevik also disposed of two defenses that still get raised. On exhaustion: “The statute in this case grants plaintiffs alternative methods to pursue remedies for discrimination under MOSHA,” and the court held “that plaintiffs’ retaliatory discharge claim may proceed in district court notwithstanding the potential administrative remedy available to them.” Id. at 719. On labor-law preemption, where the plaintiffs were union members under a collective bargaining agreement: “plaintiffs’ claim is created by statute and independent of the collective bargaining agreement,” and because resolving it requires only a determination of why the employee was fired — not what the agreement permits — it is not preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. Id. at 718–19. Section 182.675 says as much prospectively: an employee who uses a labor agreement’s dispute procedure “is not deemed to have waived or lost any substantive or procedural rights under this chapter.”

Brevik construed the 1984 text, whose operative sentence read that “[n]othing in this section precludes an employee from bringing an action for relief under this section or any other provision of law.” The Legislature replaced that sentence in 2000 with the more direct authorization now in the statute. The 2000 amendment moved in the same direction Brevik had already gone.

The jury right. In Abraham v. County of Hennepin, the supreme court held “that an action brought in district court under the Whistleblower Act, Minn.Stat. § 181.935(a), and MOSHA, Minn.Stat. § 182.669, subd. 1, alleging the tort of retaliatory discharge and seeking only money damages, is a cause of action at law with a constitutional right to jury trial.” 639 N.W.2d 342, 354 (Minn. 2002). Abraham also held that the two statutes can be run together: claims for retaliatory discharge seeking only money damages under both the Whistleblower Act and MOSHA “may be pursued concurrently in one action,” id. at 348, distinguishing the Human Rights Act on the ground that neither statute “includes an exclusive remedy provision.” Id. at 347. A safety-retaliation file in Minnesota should ordinarily be pleaded under both § 182.669 and the Minnesota Whistleblower Act, and where the trigger was a work injury, under Minn. Stat. § 176.82 as well.

Timing. The 30-day period in § 182.669, subd. 1 is written as the window to file with the commissioner. The sentence authorizing a private district court action states no limitations period of its own, and this article does not assert one. That is a genuinely unsettled question, and the practical answer is not to test it: preserve the administrative filing inside 30 days while the private action is being evaluated.

Can an employee sue over the hazard itself?

No. This is the ceiling on everything above, and it is set by one provision and two cases.

The first is Minn. Stat. § 182.67, subd. 1: “The department has sole authority and responsibility for the administration and enforcement of this chapter.”

The second is Davis, which relied on exactly that provision. After noting the last sentence of § 182.669, the court wrote that “any inference from the last sentence of § 182.669 that individuals were accorded a right of action to achieve enforcement of the statute is contradicted by § 182.67, subd. 1 (1978), which provides that the department has sole authority and responsibility for the enforcement of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1973.” 288 N.W.2d at 684.

Brevik did not disturb that. It confined Davis precisely: “the holding of Davis that no private cause of action was authorized is limited to the situation where an employee sought to enforce MOSHA regulations in a private suit and never exercised any rights under MOSHA such as lodging a complaint regarding working conditions.” 416 N.W.2d at 717.

The two cases fit together cleanly. An employee may privately sue over what the employer did to the employee for exercising a right. An employee may not privately sue over whether the workplace complies with a standard. That is the department’s job, and the remedy is a citation.

How does this interact with workers’ compensation?

Chapter 182 leaves the workers’ compensation bargain exactly where it found it.

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or in any manner affect the workers’ compensation law of this state.

Minn. Stat. § 182.671. So a MNOSHA violation does not open a door around exclusivity. Minn. Stat. § 176.031 states the general rule directly: “The liability of an employer prescribed by this chapter is exclusive and in the place of any other liability to such employee, personal representative, surviving spouse, parent, any child, dependent, next of kin, or other person entitled to recover damages on account of such injury or death.” An employee injured by a MNOSHA violation still collects comp benefits, and the tort claim against the employer is still barred. (The supreme court applied that same exclusivity rule to an illegally employed minor in the child-labor context: “Since the act now applies to all minors, the remedies of the act are exclusive and common-law actions against an employer are barred.” Danek v. Meldrum Manufacturing & Engineering Co., 312 Minn. 404, 413–14, 252 N.W.2d 255 (1977).) See our discussion of the exclusive remedy rule.

Two things are worth flagging about that savings clause.

First, note what it does not say. The federal Act contains a much broader disclaimer: nothing in it “shall be construed to supersede or in any manner affect any workmen’s compensation law or to enlarge or diminish or affect in any other manner the common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and employees under any law with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees arising out of, or in the course of, employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4). Minnesota’s § 182.671 has only the first half. Chapter 182 says nothing at all about the evidentiary effect of a safety violation in a civil case against a non-employer defendant — a general contractor, a property owner, an equipment manufacturer.

A related point of confusion worth heading off: ch. 182’s own “trade secrets” section, § 182.668, is about protecting confidential business information disclosed during an inspection. It has nothing to do with tort liability and should not be cited as a liability-limiting provision, for either an employer or a non-employer defendant.

Second, the exclusivity shield is not unconditional. Minn. Stat. § 176.031 provides that where an employer other than the state or a municipal subdivision “fails to insure or self-insure liability for compensation to injured employees and their dependents,” the injured employee “may elect to claim compensation under this chapter or to maintain an action in the courts for damages on account of such injury or death.” In that action the employer may not plead fellow-servant, assumption of risk, or contributory negligence unless the employee’s negligence was willful, and the employer bears the burden on that. An uninsured employer with a serious safety violation is in a materially different position from an insured one.

How does a MNOSHA complaint actually work?

Any employee or employee representative “who believes that a violation of a safety or health standard exists that threatens physical harm, or that an imminent danger exists, may request an inspection by giving notice to the commissioner.” Minn. Stat. § 182.659, subd. 4. The notice must be in writing, set out the grounds with reasonable particularity, and be signed. Three features of that subdivision matter to a worried employee:

The name can be withheld. A copy of the notice goes to the employer no later than the time of the inspection, “except that, upon the request of the person giving such notice, the employee’s name and the names of individual employees referred to therein shall not appear in such copy or on any record published, released, or made available” under the department’s statistics section.
The inspection is not confined to the complaint. “An inspection conducted pursuant to a complaint may cover all of the premises of the employer and shall not be limited to that portion of the premises specified in the notice.”
A refusal to inspect can be reconsidered. If the commissioner finds no reasonable grounds, the commissioner must notify the employee in writing, and the employee may request reconsideration.

Related protections in the same section deserve more attention than they get. Since 2023, § 182.659, subd. 1 provides that “[a]n employer or its representatives, including but not limited to its management, attorneys, or consultants, may not be present for any employee interview.” Subdivision 3 gives an authorized employee representative the right to accompany the inspector, and provides that “[n]o employee as a consequence of aiding such inspection shall lose any privilege or payment that the employee would otherwise earn, such loss being a discriminatory act subject to the sanctions contained in section 182.669” — walkaround time is paid, and docking it is retaliation. Subdivision 8 provides that data identifying individuals who provide information as part of an investigation “shall be private.”

For an imminent danger, § 182.662 supplies faster machinery. An inspector who finds a condition presenting “a substantial probability that the condition or practice could result in death or serious physical harm” must, after consulting the commissioner and on the commissioner’s recommendation, issue an order prohibiting the employment or continuing operational process until it is corrected; that order “shall not be effective for a period longer than three days.” Subd. 1. The commissioner may then petition district court for injunctive relief, and a TRO issued without notice may not exceed five days. Subds. 2–3. And if the commissioner will not act, subdivision 6 supplies an unusual remedy: “If the commissioner arbitrarily or capriciously fails to seek relief under this section, any employee who may be injured by reason of such failure, or the representative of such employees, may bring an action against the commissioner in district court for a writ of mandamus to compel the commissioner to seek such an order and for such further relief as may be appropriate.”

What happens after a citation issues?

The deadlines are short and one of them is fatal.

A citation must issue “with reasonable promptness and in no event later than six months following the inspection,” by certified mail, describing the violation with particularity and fixing a reasonable abatement time. § 182.66, subd. 1. The employer must post the citation and proposed penalty at or near each place the violation occurred for at least 20 days. Subd. 2. Citation data becomes public 20 days after the employer receives it, including the employer’s name, the worksite address, the severity level, the proposed penalty, and any abatement guidelines. Subd. 4.

The employer then has 20 calendar days to file a notice of contest. If it does not, and no employee or employee representative contests, “the citation and assessment, as proposed, shall be deemed a final order of the commissioner and not subject to review by any court or agency.” § 182.661, subd. 1. That is as final as administrative practice gets. Employees and authorized representatives have their own contest right — limited to the abatement period — under subdivision 3. If a final order is ignored, the commissioner “may bring an action in district court for injunctive or other appropriate relief including monetary damages.” Subd. 2a.

Where an employee has died, the next of kin is not a bystander. The department must make reasonable efforts to locate the next of kin and mail them citations and notifications of penalty, notices of hearing, complaints and answers, settlement agreements, orders and decisions, and notices of appeal, and the next of kin may request a consultation with the department about citations issued from the death investigation. § 182.6545. Note: Laws 2026, ch. 95, art. 1, § 8 (signed by the governor May 14, 2026) amends § 182.6545, but only to fix an internal cross-reference — the definition of “next of kin” points to “section 253B.03, subdivision 6, paragraph (b), clause (3),” and the amendment changes that pointer to “paragraph (a), clause (3)” because a companion section of the same act renumbers the paragraphs of § 253B.03, subd. 6. The next-of-kin rights described above are unchanged. Section 8 carries no stand-alone effective-date clause; the chapter itself contains a small number of appropriation items (in unrelated articles), which under Minn. Stat. § 645.02 could push the default from August 1 to July 1, 2026 for the whole act — confirm the applicable date against the Revisor’s next published edition before relying on a specific effective date.

What are the penalties?

Substantially larger than most Minnesota employers expect, and indexed.

Willful or repeated violations of § 182.653 or any standard, rule, or order: a fine “not to exceed $156,259 for each violation,” with a minimum fine for a willful violation of $11,162. § 182.666, subd. 1.
Serious violations: up to $15,625 for each violation — and if a serious violation of the general duty clause “causes or contributes to the death of an employee, the employer shall be assessed a fine of up to $25,000 for each violation.” Subd. 2.
Nonserious violations, failure to correct, and posting violations: up to $15,625, with failure-to-correct assessed per day. Subds. 3–5.
Deaths, minimum floor. Subdivision 2a sets a floor rather than a ceiling. For a serious, willful, or repeated violation other than a general-duty violation, or a failure to correct, that causes or contributes to an employee’s death, “the minimum total nonnegotiable fine which shall be assessed for all citations connected to the death of an employee is $50,000 if there is a willful or repeated violation or $25,000 if there is no willful or repeated violation.” A smaller employer — fewer than 50 employees, no willful or repeated violation — instead pays an initial $5,000 and $5,000 for each of the following four years, any of which the commissioner may waive if the employer received no citations the preceding calendar year.
Waiver of rights. Section 182.6575 provides that “[n]o employer may request or require any employee to waive any rights under this chapter or under occupational safety and health standards adopted pursuant to this chapter.” An employer who knowingly violates it faces a fine up to $7,000 per violation and — this is the second private remedy in the chapter — “shall also be liable to each aggrieved employee for civil punitive damages of $400.” § 182.666, subd. 5a.

Those dollar figures move. Subdivision 6a requires the commissioner to increase the fines in subdivisions 1 to 5 (excepting the death-related general-duty fine) to match the corresponding federal penalties as adjusted for inflation; an increase “takes effect on the next October 1 after any increases to the corresponding federal penalties,” and the commissioner must publish notice in the State Register by September 1 each year. Check the State Register notice, not just the printed statute.

Unpaid fines compound aggressively: they increase to 125 percent of the assessed amount if not paid within 60 days of becoming a final order, and then accrue “an additional penalty of ten percent per month compounded monthly until the fine is paid in full or until the fine has accrued to 300 percent of the original assessed amount.” § 182.666, subd. 7. Fines are deposited in the special compensation fund.

Criminal exposure exists and is not trivial. Knowingly making a false statement in any document required under the chapter is a gross misdemeanor punishable by a fine up to $20,000, six months, or both. § 182.667, subd. 1. A willful or repeated violation of § 182.653 or a safety and health standard may be punished by a fine up to $70,000 or six months or both — and up to $100,000 or one year for a violation committed after a first conviction. Subd. 2. Giving advance notice of an inspection without the commissioner’s consent carries a fine up to $3,000, six months, or both. Subd. 3.

What this means in practice

For an employee. The right to refuse is real but conditional: ask the employer to correct the hazard first, refuse only while it remains uncorrected, and — if you want to be paid for the refused work — ask the commissioner to inspect. Put the complaint in writing and ask that your name be withheld under § 182.659, subd. 4. If you are then disciplined, treat the 30-day clock in § 182.669, subd. 1 as running from the adverse action, and understand that the district court action under the same subdivision is an alternative, not a sequel. Do not sign anything waiving chapter rights; § 182.6575 makes the request itself unlawful, and § 182.666, subd. 5a puts a price on it.

For an employer. The 20-day contest window in § 182.661, subd. 1 is the only one that cannot be fixed later — an uncontested citation is final and unreviewable by any court or agency. Confirm whether your industry classification puts you inside the AWAIR requirement in § 182.653, subds. 8 and 9, and if it does, that the annual documented review actually happened. Train supervisors that an employee who complains, calls the department, walks the inspection, or refuses an assignment under subdivision 11 is in a protected category, and that docking walkaround time is itself a discriminatory act under § 182.659, subd. 3. And recognize that on a retaliation claim the employer is not in an administrative forum of its choosing — the employee can put the case in front of a jury.

For counsel. Plead § 182.669 alongside the Whistleblower Act; Abraham permits both in one action and both carry the jury right. Do not plead the safety violation itself as the wrong — § 182.67, subd. 1 and Davis foreclose it. Check whether the employer carried comp; § 176.031 changes the entire shape of an injury file if it did not. And where a third party’s equipment or worksite contributed, the employer’s citation is evidence in a different case, not a claim in this one — the same structural pattern that runs through Minnesota child labor cases, where Keenan used the employer’s violation against the manufacturer and dealer rather than the employer itself.

Madgett Law, LLC

Madgett Law, LLC represents Minnesota employees in workplace retaliation and whistleblower claims, including discharge and discipline following safety complaints, MNOSHA inspections, and refusals to perform dangerous work, and handles the related injury and wage claims that often travel with them. If you have a question about a specific situation, call 612-470-6529 or send us a message.

Sources: Minn. Stat. § 182.65, subds. 1, 1a (chapter titled the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1973; Employee Right to Know Act of 1983); § 182.651, subd. 9 (“employee” includes state, county, town, city, school district, governmental subdivision); § 182.652, subds. 1–2 (all places of employment; federal exclusive-jurisdiction carve-out); § 182.653, subd. 2 (general duty — “death or serious injury or harm”), subds. 4b–4f (hazardous substance, harmful physical agent, waste disposal, farming operation, and infectious agent training), subd. 8 (AWAIR written program and its five required descriptions; annual documented review), subd. 9 (classification list; six-month compliance lag; five-year update); § 182.654, subd. 9 (discriminatory acts prohibited), subd. 10 (access to information), subd. 11 (good-faith refusal; the request-for-correction condition; pay for refused tasks on commissioner inspection and determination; 2023 ALJ remedies including the greater of $5,000 or twice actual damages); § 182.6545 (next-of-kin rights; Laws 2026, ch. 95, art. 1, § 8, signed May 14, 2026, amends only the internal cross-reference to § 253B.03, subd. 6, paragraph lettering — no substantive change to the rights described; effective date to be confirmed against the Revisor’s next published edition); § 182.6575 (waiver prohibited); § 182.659, subd. 1 (no employer representative present at employee interviews), subd. 3 (walkaround; no loss of privilege or payment, such loss being a discriminatory act), subd. 4 (inspection request; name withheld on request; inspection may cover all premises; reconsideration), subd. 7 (advance notice), subd. 8 (private data); § 182.66, subd. 1 (citation within six months), subd. 2 (20-day posting), subd. 4 (citation data public at 20 days); § 182.661, subd. 1 (20 calendar days to contest; otherwise a final order “not subject to review by any court or agency”), subd. 2a (district court action on noncompliance), subd. 3 (contested citations; employee contest limited to abatement period); § 182.662, subd. 1 (three-day temporary order), subds. 2–3 (district court restraint; five-day TRO without notice), subd. 6 (mandamus against the commissioner); § 182.666, subd. 1 ($156,259 maximum; $11,162 willful minimum), subd. 2 ($15,625; $25,000 where a general-duty serious violation causes or contributes to death), subd. 2a (nonnegotiable minimums of $50,000 / $25,000; small-employer alternative), subds. 3–5 (nonserious, failure to correct, posting), subd. 5a (waiver violations: up to $7,000 and $400 civil punitive damages to each aggrieved employee), subd. 6a (indexing to federal amounts; October 1 effective date; State Register notice by September 1), subd. 7 (special compensation fund; 125 percent at 60 days; ten percent per month compounding to 300 percent); § 182.667, subds. 1–3 (criminal penalties); § 182.668 (trade secrets — not a liability-limiting provision); § 182.669, subd. 1 (30-day complaint to the commissioner; OAH referral; 20-day answer; ALJ remedies including back pay, compensatory damages, reinstatement, costs and attorney fees; § 549.09, subd. 1(c) interest; “An employee may bring a private action in the district court for relief under this section.”); § 182.67, subd. 1 (department has sole enforcement authority); § 182.671 (nothing supersedes or affects the workers’ compensation law); § 182.675 (labor agreement procedures do not waive chapter rights); § 176.031 (exclusive remedy; uninsured-employer election and lost defenses). 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (federal savings clause, broader than § 182.671); § 654(a)(1) (federal general duty — “death or serious physical harm”); § 660(c)(1)–(3) (federal retaliation; the Secretary, not the employee, brings the action); § 667(a)–(c) (state plans). 29 C.F.R. § 1952.8(a)–(d) (Minnesota plan initial approval June 8, 1973; final approval July 30, 1985; coverage of private-sector and state and local government employers and employees), text current August 2026. Brevik v. Kite Painting, Inc., 416 N.W.2d 714, 716–19 (Minn. 1987) (private civil action authorized by § 182.669; alternative remedies, no exhaustion requirement; no LMRA § 301 preemption). Davis v. Boise Cascade Corp., 288 N.W.2d 680, 684 (Minn. 1979) (no private action to enforce chapter 182 standards, given § 182.67, subd. 1; decided before the 1983 addition of § 182.654, subd. 11). Abraham v. County of Hennepin, 639 N.W.2d 342, 348, 354 (Minn. 2002) (Whistleblower Act and MOSHA retaliatory-discharge claims for money damages may be pursued concurrently; such an action is a cause of action at law with a constitutional right to jury trial). Danek v. Meldrum Manufacturing & Engineering Co., 312 Minn. 404, 413–14, 252 N.W.2d 255 (1977) (workers’ compensation remedies exclusive; common-law actions against the employer barred). This article is general legal information about Minnesota law. It is not legal advice, it does not create an attorney–client relationship, and no outcome is promised or implied. Penalty amounts under § 182.666 are adjusted annually under subdivision 6a and should be confirmed against the current State Register notice before use.