Congress didn’t write a statute of limitations into 42 U.S.C. § 1983. So federal courts borrow one from the forum state. That means the deadline on a federal civil rights claim arising in Minnesota is a question of Minnesota law, answered by federal courts applying a federal rule of selection.
The answer is six years, and a published Eighth Circuit holding says so. In Anderson v. City of Minneapolis, 934 F.3d 876, 880 (8th Cir. 2019), the defendants argued the court lacked jurisdiction because the suit hadn’t been brought within the three years Minnesota’s death statute allows. The court said no, in so many words:
Rather, as we have held several times, the limitations period for all § 1983 actions in Minnesota comes from the state’s personal injury statute and is set at six years.
That sentence was necessary to the decision. The court reached the merits only because it had rejected the three-year argument.
So the number isn’t in doubt. What’s worth knowing is how the courts got there — and the several deadlines that will end a Minnesota civil rights case long before the six years does.
Where the six years comes from
Two Supreme Court decisions do the work. You have to read them together.
Step one, Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985). The Court ended the practice of hunting for the state cause of action most analogous to each particular § 1983 claim and adopted one characterization for all of them. At the close of the opinion, the Court described what it had done as a “holding that § 1983 claims are best characterized as personal injury actions,” and affirmed the application of New Mexico’s three-year period for an injury to the person. Id. at 280. So a State’s personal injury limitations period governs every § 1983 claim, whatever the claim’s about.
Step two, Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989). Wilson solved nothing in a state with more than one personal injury statute — which is most states. Owens took up “the question of what limitations period should apply to a § 1983 action where a State has one or more statutes of limitations for certain enumerated intentional torts, and a residual statute for all other personal injury actions.” Id. at 236. Here’s the holding, at 250:
[W]here state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions, courts considering § 1983 claims should borrow the general or residual statute for personal injury actions.
The Court’s reason was practical. “In marked contrast to the multiplicity of state intentional tort statutes of limitations, every State has one general or residual statute of limitations governing personal injury actions.” Id. at 245. Borrowing the enumerated-intentional-tort statute would just move the confusion from one shelf to another.
Minnesota has exactly the two statutes Owens was describing
Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) gives six years for an action “for criminal conversation, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract, and not hereinafter enumerated.”
Minn. Stat. § 541.07(1) gives two years for an action “for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or other tort resulting in personal injury,” along with veterinary malpractice.
One lists intentional torts and runs short. The other is the catch-all that picks up whatever the list doesn’t reach. That’s the Owens split on its face. And the Owens Court itself illustrated the “general provision which applies to all personal injury actions with certain specific exceptions” with statutes worded almost exactly like Minnesota’s subdivision 1(5). The North Carolina example the Court gave covers “[a]ny other injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract and not hereafter enumerated.” Id. at 246 n.9.
Who actually decided this for Minnesota
This is where the pedigree gets thinner than the confidence people usually state the rule with. Know that before you lean on any single citation.
The decision that squarely made the choice is a state one. Two months after Owens came down, the Minnesota Court of Appeals applied it in Berg v. Groschen, 437 N.W.2d 75 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). The court laid out both statutes, noted that a federal district court had earlier picked the two-year period, and then held, at 77:
Under the Supreme Court’s directive, we designate the six-year limitations period in Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) as the applicable statutory limitations period for section 1983 claims.
The Eighth Circuit’s statement of the rule lives in a footnote. In Egerdahl v. Hibbing Community College, 72 F.3d 615 (8th Cir. 1995), footnote 3 reads in full: “In Minnesota, § 1983 claims are governed by the six-year limitations period of Minnesota’s personal-injury statute, Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5). Berg v. Groschen, 437 N.W.2d 75, 77 (Minn.App.1989).” The Eighth Circuit has since cited that footnote as its own authority, by pin cite, in both Anderson, 934 F.3d at 880, and Anunka v. City of Burnsville, 534 F. App’x 575, 576 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
And you have to cite Egerdahl carefully. Its holding isn’t about § 1983 at all. Egerdahl’s argument on appeal was that the district court wrongly applied the Minnesota Human Rights Act’s one-year period to her Title VI and Title IX claims; the court agreed and held “that the six-year limitations period of Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) governs Title VI and Title IX claims.” 72 F.3d at 618. Her § 1983 claim was disposed of on Eleventh Amendment grounds, because she hadn’t pleaded personal-capacity claims. Id. at 619–20. Cite Egerdahl for the § 1983 period and you’re citing footnote 3, which is dictum resting on a state intermediate appellate decision. Cite the case itself for that proposition and you’ve attributed to it a holding it doesn’t contain.
The Eighth Circuit has since said it in the text of published opinions. Anderson is one. Rassier v. Sanner, 996 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 2021), is another: “Under Minnesota law, the Rassiers’ section 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim has a six-year statute of limitations.” Slip op. at 4.
The older line, which you’ll still find in briefs
Two decisions predate the modern rule, and they landed in different places.
Before Wilson, the Eighth Circuit took the six years from a different clause. Occhino v. United States, 686 F.2d 1302, 1308 (8th Cir. 1982), rejected the two-year intentional-tort statute and reached for Minnesota’s six-year period for liabilities created by statute — now § 541.05, subd. 1(2) — reasoning under Garmon v. Foust that “the federal cause of action should not be foreclosed by a limitations period directed at the alleged underlying tortious conduct.” Same six years, different subdivision, superseded rationale.
After Wilson but before Owens, the District of Minnesota went the other way entirely. Cook v. City of Minneapolis, 617 F. Supp. 461, 465 (D. Minn. 1985), characterized § 1983 claims as personal injury actions “along the lines of an intentional tort” and held that “for § 1983 claims brought in Minnesota, this court will borrow the two-year limitations period of Minn.Stat. § 541.07(1).” Owens is what displaced that reading, and Berg said so.
One more trap. This one’s about citations, not substance. The clause numbering in § 541.05, subd. 1 changed in 2015. Laws 2015, ch. 5, art. 15, § 18 struck the old clause (7) (actions to enforce a trust) and renumbered (8), (9), and (10) as (7), (8), and (9). Clause (5) — the residual personal injury clause — was untouched and has always been (5). But an opinion citing a clause above (6) is citing the pre-2015 numbering. United States v. Bailey, 700 F.3d 1149, 1153 (8th Cir. 2012), stated that the limitations period on § 1983 and Bivens claims “is six years in Minnesota” and cited “Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(10)” — which, in the edition then in force, was the clause for torts constituting domestic abuse. The six years was right. The subdivision pointer wasn’t the residual clause.
Accrual is a federal question, and it’s where the cases actually get lost
The borrowed period tells you how long the clock runs. It doesn’t tell you when it starts, and that second question isn’t Minnesota’s to answer.
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007), says it outright: “the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.” The federal rule is the common-law one — accrual “when the plaintiff has ‘a complete and present cause of action,’” that is, when “the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.” Ibid. The Eighth Circuit applies exactly that framework to Minnesota cases; see Rassier, slip op. at 4.
A Minnesota discovery rule doesn’t automatically travel with the borrowed period. The period comes from state law. The start date doesn’t.
But tolling generally does come from state law. Wallace again, at 394: “We have generally referred to state law for tolling rules, just as we have for the length of statutes of limitations.” Minnesota’s tolling provision is Minn. Stat. § 541.15, which suspends the running of a limitations period during specified disabilities, including that “the plaintiff is within the age of 18 years,” and which caps the extension at five years “except in the case of infancy.”
The deadlines that will actually end the case
Six years is the longest clock in the file. It isn’t the operative one. In a Minnesota case arising out of a police encounter, several shorter ones run at the same time, and they run against different claims.
The state-law torts run on two years. Rassier shows it: the § 1983 retaliation claim had six years and the companion state defamation and emotional-distress claims had two, under § 541.07(1). Same complaint, same facts, one deadline three times shorter than the other. That two-track setup gets its own companion article, on the state-law claims that travel alongside a § 1983 case.
Against a city or county, the notice comes first. Minn. Stat. § 466.05 requires written notice to the governing body within 180 days of discovering the loss. That’s a presentment deadline, not a limitations period, and it runs long before most claimants have identified a governmental defendant. We cover it at length in the deadline that ends your case against a Minnesota city.
That notice doesn’t apply to the federal claim. In Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988), the Supreme Court held as to Wisconsin’s notice-of-claim statute that “the state law is pre-empted when the § 1983 action is brought in a state court,” because the requirement conflicts “in both its purpose and effects with the remedial objectives of § 1983.” Id. at 138. The Court also observed that “the lower federal courts have all, with but one exception, concluded that notice-of-claim provisions are inapplicable to § 1983 actions brought in federal court.” Id. at 140. That doesn’t mean you can skip the notice. It means the notice governs the state claims, and missing it doesn’t defeat the federal one. So a missed notice is a reason to reassess which claims survive. It isn’t a reason to close the file.
If someone died, a third clock applies to who may sue. Minnesota’s trustee mechanism carries its own three-year period for the state death claim. That’s why Anderson had a live federal claim and dead state ones. We walk through that interaction in who holds the claim when someone dies in custody.
And dismissal of the federal claim doesn’t automatically kill the state ones. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), the limitations period on a supplemental state claim “shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.”
For the shorter Minnesota periods generally, see our survey of Minnesota civil limitations periods; for how accrual works on a wrongful-arrest theory in particular, see false arrest and probable cause.
The number is solid. The citations aren’t.
There’s nothing unstable about the six-year answer. Two published Eighth Circuit opinions state it in their text, one of them as a necessary step in the disposition, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals designated the subdivision more than thirty-five years ago in a decision nobody has disturbed.
What’s unstable is the citation. The rule has been pinned on a statutory-liability clause, on an intentional-tort clause, on the residual clause under two different numbering schemes, and — most often — on a footnote in a Title VI and Title IX case whose § 1983 claim was decided on the Eleventh Amendment. Any of those will get a reader to “six years.” Only one of them is the authority for it.
And six years is the wrong number to plan around anyway. It’s the outer boundary of the longest claim in a case that’ll usually also contain a two-year state tort, a 180-day municipal notice, and, if someone died, a three-year trustee deadline. The limitations question worth asking on day one isn’t “how long do I have.” It’s “which of these clocks expires first, and has it already run.”
Madgett Law, LLC litigates civil rights and police misconduct claims in Minnesota state and federal court, including questions of which limitations period governs a claim and when it began to run. If a deadline may be close, that’s a reason to ask now, not later. Send us a message or call 612-470-6529.
Sources: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (no limitations period in the text) and 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) (borrowing of state law where federal law is “deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies”), and 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (tolling of supplemental claims while pending and for 30 days after dismissal) (Office of the Law Revision Counsel, uscode.house.gov, text in effect August 1, 2026). Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2) and subd. 1(5) (six-year periods); Minn. Stat. § 541.07(1) (two-year period); Minn. Stat. § 541.15(a) (suspension of the limitations period during enumerated disabilities, including that “the plaintiff is within the age of 18 years,” and the five-year cap “except in the case of infancy”); Minn. Stat. § 466.05 (180-day notice to the governing body) (Minnesota Office of the Revisor of Statutes, 2025 Minnesota Statutes). Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1 (2012) (ten clauses; the trust clause at (7) and the domestic-abuse clause at (10)). Laws of Minnesota 2015, ch. 5 (S.F. No. 578), art. 15, § 18: clause (7) (enforcement of a trust) struck and clauses (8), (9), and (10) renumbered (7), (8), and (9); clause (5) unchanged. Revisor’s history line for § 541.05 ends at “2015 c 5 art 15 s 18”. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985) (“§ 1983 claims are best characterized as personal injury actions”). Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 236, 245–46, 246 n.9, 250 (1989) (statement of the question presented and of the holding at 236; “every State has one general or residual statute of limitations governing personal injury actions” and the “general provision” / “residual provision” distinction at 245–46; footnote 9, quoting the North Carolina general provision, “[a]ny other injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract and not hereafter enumerated,” and an Alabama analogue; holding at 250 that courts should borrow “the general or residual statute for personal injury actions”). Berg v. Groschen, 437 N.W.2d 75, 76–77 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (designating § 541.05, subd. 1(5) for § 1983 claims and noting Cook’s contrary choice). Egerdahl v. Hibbing Community College, 72 F.3d 615, 617–20 (8th Cir. 1995) (Title VI and Title IX holding at 618; Eleventh Amendment disposition of the § 1981, § 1983, and equal-protection claims at 617 and 619–20; the § 1983 limitations statement at 618 n.3, citing Berg). Anderson v. City of Minneapolis, 934 F.3d 876, 880 (8th Cir. 2019) (six-year period as the ground for rejecting the three-year survival argument). Anunka v. City of Burnsville, 534 F. App’x 575, 576 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam, nonprecedential under 8th Cir. R. 47B; applying “the applicable Minnesota six-year statute of limitations,” citing Egerdahl, 72 F.3d at 618 n.3). Rassier v. Sanner, 996 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 2021), No. 20-1708, slip op. at 4 (8th Cir. Apr. 30, 2021) (six-year § 1983 period; two years for the companion state defamation and emotional-distress claims under § 541.07(1); accrual as a question of federal law). United States v. Bailey, 700 F.3d 1149, 1153 (8th Cir. 2012) (“six years in Minnesota,” citing Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(10)). Occhino v. United States, 686 F.2d 1302, 1308 (8th Cir. 1982) (pre-Wilson selection of Minnesota’s six-year statutory-liability period over the two-year tort period). Cook v. City of Minneapolis, 617 F. Supp. 461, 465 (D. Minn. 1985) (post-Wilson, pre-Owens selection of the two-year period of § 541.07(1)). Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388, 394 (2007) (accrual as a question of federal law; the “complete and present cause of action” standard; tolling generally referred to state law). Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138, 140 (1988) (Wisconsin notice-of-claim statute pre-empted as to § 1983 actions brought in state court; near-unanimous lower federal court view as to federal-court actions). This article does not address the separate limitations questions raised by claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1985, by Bivens actions, or by the Minnesota Human Rights Act. This article is general legal information about Minnesota law, not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney–client relationship. Which limitations period governs a particular claim, and when that claim accrued, depends entirely on the facts. No outcome is promised or implied.