Minnesota Defamation Law: What the New Anti-SLAPP Act Changed, and What It Didn't

From 2017 to 2024, Minnesota was a state with an anti-SLAPP statute on the books that no defendant could use. The Minnesota Supreme Court had held the operative section unconstitutional, and the legislature did not replace it for seven years. In May 2024 it finally did, adopting the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act.

Two years on, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has issued three published decisions applying the new act. Read together, they deliver a result almost nobody predicted: the statute survived the constitutional objection that killed its predecessor — and it still did not protect two of the three consumer reviewers who invoked it. A negative Google review of a dentist is not automatically speech on a matter of public concern, and the act’s express reference to “reviews or ratings of businesses” does not change that.

That is the current state of Minnesota defamation practice in one paragraph. The rest of this piece works through the underlying doctrine — elements, per se categories, truth, opinion, privilege, public-figure fault, and damages — and then returns to what UPEPA actually does to a case.

What does a Minnesota defamation plaintiff actually have to prove?

Three elements, plus fault. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s current formulation, restated in 2019, is that a plaintiff “must prove that the defendant made: (a) a false and defamatory statement about the plaintiff; (b) in [an] unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) that harmed the plaintiff’s reputation in the community.” Maethner v. Someplace Safe, Inc., 929 N.W.2d 868, 873 (Minn. 2019) (quoting Weinberger v. Maplewood Review, 668 N.W.2d 667, 673 (Minn. 2003)).

The court has also stated the elements in a four-part form that makes the fault requirement explicit: “a false and defamatory statement about the plaintiff; an unprivileged publication to a third party; a tendency to harm the plaintiff’s reputation in the community; and fault, at least negligence.” Britton v. Koep, 470 N.W.2d 518, 520 (Minn. 1991).

Two points that trip people up.

Falsity is the plaintiff’s burden, not the defendant’s. “The plaintiff has the burden of proving falsity in order to establish a successful defamation claim.” McKee v. Laurion, 825 N.W.2d 725, 730 (Minn. 2013). Truth is often described as a defense — Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. 1980) (“Truth, however, is a complete defense, and true statements, however disparaging, are not actionable”) — but the practical burden runs the other way.

Harm to reputation is a distinct element from emotional harm. In Maethner, the plaintiff offered anxiety, headaches, stomach aches, and difficulty sleeping. The court held he had not satisfied “the ‘reputational harm prerequisite’ that Minnesota law imposes in defamation actions,” because he testified he did not know whether the statements “had any impact on his reputation” and “could not name anyone who thought ill or less of him because of the statements.” 929 N.W.2d at 875 (quoting Richie v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 544 N.W.2d 21, 28 (Minn. 1996)). Feeling wronged is not the same as being lowered in the estimation of the community, and the distinction decides cases.

Which statements are defamatory per se — and does that still guarantee damages?

Minnesota recognizes as defamatory per se “false accusations of committing a crime and false statements about a person’s business, trade, or professional conduct.” Maethner, 929 N.W.2d at 875 (quoting Becker v. Alloy Hardfacing & Engineering Co., 401 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Minn. 1987)). Stuempges put the business-reputation branch this way:

Slanders affecting the plaintiff in his business, trade, profession, office or calling are slanders per se and thus actionable without any proof of actual damages.

297 N.W.2d at 255.

Historically that meant a per se plaintiff could reach a jury without proving a dollar of loss, and could recover punitive damages besides. Stuempges, 297 N.W.2d at 259.

Maethner narrowed it substantially. The court held:

a private plaintiff may not recover presumed damages for defamatory statements involving a matter of public concern unless the plaintiff can establish actual malice.

929 N.W.2d at 878.

So the per se categories no longer do the work they used to. If the speech touched a matter of public concern, a private plaintiff who cannot prove actual harm to reputation and cannot prove constitutional actual malice loses — even where the statement accused him of a crime. That is precisely what happened in Maethner, where the statements were capable of being read as accusing the plaintiff of domestic assault and stalking. Id. at 875.

Whether speech is on a matter of public concern is “based on a totality of the circumstances,” considering “the content, form, and context of the speech.” No single factor is dispositive; courts “evaluate all the circumstances of the speech, including what was said, where it was said, and how it was said.” Id. at 881.

Does calling it “just my opinion” protect you?

Not by itself. There is no free-standing opinion privilege. The Supreme Court said so directly in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990):

we do not think this passage from Gertz was intended to create a wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled “opinion.”

The Court’s illustration is the one to remember: “If a speaker says, ‘In my opinion John Jones is a liar,’ he implies a knowledge of facts which lead to the conclusion that Jones told an untruth.” Id. The prefix does not launder the factual assertion underneath.

What is protected is a statement that “does not contain a provably false factual connotation” and statements that cannot “reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts” about a person — the space the Court described as “imaginative expression” and “rhetorical hyperbole.” Id. at 20.

Minnesota applies that line. In McKee v. Laurion, the court held that describing a physician as “a real tool” was pure opinion, “amounting to ‘mere vituperation and abuse’ or ‘rhetorical hyperbole’ that cannot be the basis for a defamation action,” because the phrase “cannot be reasonably interpreted as stating a fact and it cannot be proven true or false.” 825 N.W.2d at 733. But the court immediately drew the distinction that matters: the assertion that a nurse told the writer the doctor was a real tool “is one of fact because whether a nurse actually made the statement to Laurion is an assertion that can be proven true or false.” Id.

The practical test is not whether the sentence sounds like an opinion. It is whether anything inside it can be checked.

Is truth a defense if the details are wrong?

Usually yes. Minnesota follows the substantial-truth doctrine:

Minor inaccuracies do not amount to falsity so long as “the substance, the gist, the sting, of the libelous charge [is] justified.”

McKee, 825 N.W.2d at 730 (quoting Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991)). “A statement is substantially true if it would have the same effect on the mind of the reader or listener as that which the pleaded truth would have produced.” Id.

This is why quibbling over wording rarely saves a defamation claim. If the accusation is that you embezzled $40,000 and you embezzled $38,500, the sting is justified. Plaintiffs who build a case on the gap between the statement and the record generally need that gap to change what a reader would think, not merely what a reader would read.

There is a related trap for public-official plaintiffs. Minnesota does not recognize defamation-by-implication in that posture: “an allegedly false implication arising out of true statements is generally not actionable in defamation by a public official.” Diesen v. Hessburg, 455 N.W.2d 446, 452 (Minn. 1990).

When is a speaker privileged?

Minnesota recognizes two kinds of privilege, and the difference between them is the whole ballgame.

The Minnesota Supreme Court has explained that “[a]bsolute privilege applies without regard to the intent of the speaker,” extending immunity “even for intentionally false statements, coupled with malice[,] while a qualified or conditional privilege” applies only if the statements “are publicized in good faith and without malice.” Harlow v. State Department of Human Services, 883 N.W.2d 561, 569 (Minn. 2016) (quoting Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Minn. 2010), quoting Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 223, 67 N.W.2d 413, 416 (1954)).

The judicial-proceedings privilege has a three-part test. Statements are protected if “(1) made by a judge, judicial officer, attorney, or witness; (2) made at a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding; and (3) the statement at issue is relevant to the subject matter of the litigation.” Mahoney & Hagberg v. Newgard, 729 N.W.2d 302, 306 (Minn. 2007).

Note the second element. In 2025 the Court of Appeals held, as a published syllabus point, that “[s]tatements made by an attorney to the media regarding a lawsuit do not generally fall within the protections of the judicial-proceedings privilege.” Cook v. Trimble, 22 N.W.3d 196 (Minn. App. May 5, 2025) (No. A24-1486), rev. granted (Minn. Aug. 12, 2025). The same statements, made in a memorandum filed with the court, were absolutely privileged. Filing protects; the press release does not.

The qualified privilege has been stated the same way in Minnesota since 1899: “a communication, to be privileged, must be made upon a proper occasion, from a proper motive, and must be based upon reasonable or probable cause.” Stuempges, 297 N.W.2d at 256 (quoting Hebner v. Great Northern Railway, 78 Minn. 289, 292, 80 N.W. 1128, 1129 (1899)). Once the defendant establishes the privilege, the plaintiff must prove abuse.

Why does “actual malice” mean two different things in the same case?

Because Minnesota uses the phrase for two unrelated standards, and briefs routinely conflate them.

Common-law malice, which defeats a qualified privilege, means the statement was “made … from ill will and improper motives, or causelessly and wantonly for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff.” Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp., 766 N.W.2d 910, 920 (Minn. 2009) (quoting Stuempges, 297 N.W.2d at 257). It is about the speaker’s attitude toward the plaintiff.

Constitutional actual malice, required of public officials and public figures, means the statement was made “with the knowledge that [it was] false or with reckless disregard of whether [it was] false or not.” Maethner, 929 N.W.2d at 873. It is about the speaker’s attitude toward the truth.

A defendant can lose the first and win the second in the same case. Under Bahr, common-law malice “is not proved merely by the fact that the statement has been made or by the fact that the statement is later proven to be false,” but may be shown by evidence extrinsic to the statement (personal ill feeling) or intrinsic to it (“exaggerated language,” “the character of the language used,” “the mode and extent of publication”). 766 N.W.2d at 920.

Who counts as a public official or public figure?

Public or private status is a question of law for the court, not a fact question for the jury. Britton, 470 N.W.2d at 520.

Britton identified three criteria drawn from earlier decisions: performing governmental duties directly related to the public interest; holding a position from which one can significantly influence the resolution of public issues; and being among “those … government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs.” 470 N.W.2d at 522. The court held a county probation officer qualified. Id. at 522, 524. Law enforcement officers routinely do, including at low rank. Id. at 522.

Minnesota gives non-media defendants the same First Amendment protection for criticism of public officials that it gives the press. Id. at 521.

The consequence is the fault standard. A public official must prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence; a private plaintiff need show only negligence. Id. at 520–21. That is why the classification fight often decides the case before any jury sees a fact. In Cook, a professional football player’s defamation claim failed at the UPEPA stage because, as a public figure, he could not produce evidence sufficient to prove actual malice as to the pre-suit media statements.

What did the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act actually change?

Everything about the procedural posture, and nothing about the substantive tort.

The old anti-SLAPP law, Minn. Stat. §§ 554.01–.06, required the district court to make pretrial findings and required the plaintiff to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant’s conduct was not immunized. In Leiendecker v. Asian Women United of Minnesota, 895 N.W.2d 623 (Minn. 2017), the supreme court held § 554.02 unconstitutional as applied to claims at law alleging torts. Two defects: the statute “transfer[red] the jury’s fact-finding role to the district court,” and it “require[d] the responding party to meet a higher burden of proof before trial (clear and convincing evidence) than it would have to meet at trial (preponderance of the evidence).” Id. at 636. Because the unconstitutional clauses could not be severed, the section had no workable procedure left. Id. at 637–38.

The 2024 legislature repealed §§ 554.01, .02, .03, .04, .045, .05, and .06 and enacted UPEPA at §§ 554.07 to 554.20. 2024 Minn. Laws ch. 123, art. 18, §§ 1–17. The article “is effective the day following final enactment and applies to a civil action pending on or commenced on or after that date.” Id. § 17. The governor signed on May 24, 2024, making the effective date May 25, 2024.

The mechanics:

• A 60-day window. A party may file a special motion for expedited relief “[n]ot later than 60 days after a party is served with a complaint, crossclaim, counterclaim, third-party claim, or other pleading” asserting a covered cause of action, “or at a later time on a showing of good cause.” Minn. Stat. § 554.09.
• An automatic stay. On filing, “all other proceedings between the moving party and responding party, including discovery and a pending hearing or motion, are stayed.” § 554.10(a)(1). Limited discovery is available only if a party shows specific information is necessary to a § 554.13(a) burden and is not otherwise reasonably available. § 554.10(d).
• A calendar. Hearing within 60 days of filing; ruling within 60 days of the hearing. §§ 554.11(a), 554.14.
• Summary-judgment evidence. The court considers “the pleadings, the motion, any reply or response to the motion, and any evidence that could be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment under Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure 56.03.” § 554.12.
• An immediate appeal of right. “A moving party may appeal as a matter of right from an order denying, in whole or in part, a motion under section 554.09. The appeal must be filed not later than 30 days after entry of the order.” § 554.15.
• Mandatory fees to a prevailing movant. The court “shall award court costs, reasonable attorney fees, and reasonable litigation expenses related to the motion … to the moving party if the moving party prevails.” § 554.16(1). A responding party recovers only if it prevails and the court finds the motion “was frivolous or filed solely with intent to delay the proceeding.” § 554.16(2).

That asymmetry in § 554.16 is the reason a Minnesota defamation plaintiff now has to think about UPEPA before filing, not after being served with a motion.

Is the new statute constitutional this time?

The Court of Appeals says yes, in a published 2026 decision that addresses Leiendecker head-on.

In Anderson v. Anderson, No. A25-1075 (Minn. App. Apr. 27, 2026), the plaintiff argued that UPEPA’s burden-shifting recreated the Leiendecker defect. The court disagreed on both of Leiendecker’s grounds. UPEPA “does not require district courts to make factual findings”; it “merely ‘provides an accelerated procedure for obtaining rulings under standards articulated in Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) and 56.’” And it does not impose a higher pretrial burden than the trial burden, because § 554.13(a)(3)(i) asks only that the nonmovant “establish a prima facie case as to each essential element of the cause of action” — a requirement already built into the summary-judgment and failure-to-state-a-claim standards. The court held UPEPA constitutional as applied.

That resolves the structural question. It does not resolve the scope question, which is where the cases are actually being won.

Will UPEPA get a defamation case dismissed?

Only if the speech clears a real gate first. Courts apply a three-part analysis under § 554.13(a): (1) does UPEPA apply; (2) has the nonmovant established a prima facie case on each essential element; and (3) has the movant shown a basis for dismissal under Rule 12.02(e) or Rule 56. Review on appeal is de novo. Cook, 22 N.W.3d at 204.

Step one is the one defendants lose. Section 554.08(b) reaches a cause of action based on the defendant’s:

(1) communication in a legislative, executive, judicial, administrative, or other governmental proceeding; (2) communication on an issue under consideration or review in a legislative, executive, judicial, administrative, or other governmental proceeding; or (3) exercise of the right of freedom of speech or of the press, the right to assemble or petition, or the right of association, guaranteed by the United States Constitution or the Minnesota Constitution on a matter of public concern.

In J&D Dental v. Hou, 26 N.W.3d 491 (Minn. App. 2025), a former patient posted Google reviews telling readers that “[a]nyone who cares about their dental health should avoid this practice.” She moved to dismiss the resulting defamation suit under UPEPA. The Court of Appeals held as a syllabus point that whether an action is based on speech “on a matter of public concern” under UPEPA is decided “consistent with common-law interpretation of the phrase in the defamation context, on a case-by-case basis given the totality of circumstances, taking into consideration the content, form, and context of the speech, as well as any other pertinent factors” — the Maethner test. Applying it, the court held her reviews were not on a matter of public concern: “[t]he majority of Hou’s speech recounts an individual grievance about her personal experience,” she “did not connect her experience directly to a community or broader movement,” and she “did not set forth a detailed explanation of her motives.”

The contrast is Johnson v. Freborg, 995 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 2023), where a Facebook post accusing three Twin Cities dance instructors of sexual assault was speech on a matter of public concern. The supreme court’s syllabus tied the result to context — the post connected the writer’s experience to the #MeToo movement and to sexual assault in the dance community. Personal grievance plus a public frame can qualify. Personal grievance alone does not.

Then there is the provision that looks like it should decide these cases. Section 554.08(d)(2) extends the act to an action “related to the communication, gathering, receiving, posting, or processing of consumer opinions or commentary, evaluations of consumer complaints, or reviews or ratings of businesses.” In Paragon Restorations, LLC v. Robinet Productions, LLC, 31 N.W.3d 218 (Minn. App. 2025), a contractor posted a review saying “do not work with this company,” and argued that (d)(2) brought him inside UPEPA regardless of public concern. The Court of Appeals rejected it as a syllabus holding: a movant

must establish pursuant to section 554.08(b)(3) that the cause of action is based on speech on a matter of public concern, as required by section 554.13(a), regardless of whether, per section 554.08(d)(2), the action relates to the communication … of consumer opinions or commentary, evaluations of consumer complaints, or reviews or ratings of businesses.

Paragraph (d) is a carve-back from the paragraph (c) exclusions. It is not an independent entry point into the statute.

Where UPEPA does bite hard is government-facing speech. In Anderson, a report to the Minnesota Board of Social Work that triggered an investigation was held to be a “communication in a . . . governmental proceeding” under § 554.08(b)(1) — no public-concern showing required — and the defamation and civil-conspiracy claims built on that report were dismissed. Complaints to licensing boards, agencies, and law enforcement are now expensive things to sue over. (On the derivative-claim problem in that case, see our companion piece on civil conspiracy and aiding-and-abetting liability.)

Paragraph (c) then removes twelve categories from the act entirely. In the order the statute lists them, UPEPA does not apply to a cause of action:

1. against a governmental unit, or an employee or agent of one acting or purporting to act in an official capacity;
2. by a governmental unit, or an employee or agent acting in an official capacity, to enforce a law protecting against an imminent threat to public health or safety;
3. against a person primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or services, where the claim arises out of a communication related to that sale or lease;
4. against a person named in a civil suit brought by a crime victim against a perpetrator;
5. brought to establish or declare real property possessory rights, use of real property, recovery of real property, quiet title, or related real-property claims;
6. seeking recovery for bodily injury, wrongful death, or survival, or concerning statements made about that action — unless the claims involve damage to reputation;
7. brought under the insurance code or arising out of an insurance contract;
8. based on a common-law fraud claim;
9. brought under chapters 517 to 519A; counterclaims based on a criminal no-contact order under § 629.72 or § 629.75; claims for or based on an antiharassment order or sexual assault protection order under § 518B.01; or for or based on a vulnerable adult protection order under §§ 609.232, 609.2325, 609.233, 609.2335, and 609.234;
10. brought under chapters 175, 177, 178, 179, and 179A; negligent supervision, retention, or infliction of emotional distress unless the claims involve damage to reputation; wrongful discharge in violation of public policy; whistleblowing; or enforcement of employee rights under civil service, collective bargaining, or handbooks and policies;
11. brought under consumer protection, chapter 325F or 325G; or
12. for any claim brought under federal law.

Minn. Stat. § 554.08(c)(1)–(12). Note clause 8 in particular: a common-law fraud claim is outside UPEPA — subject to the paragraph (d) carve-back where the action targets protected publishing or consumer-review activity.

Does Minnesota have a retraction statute?

It has one, and for most modern cases it is a dead letter.

Minnesota Statutes § 548.06 applies only to “the publication of a libel in a newspaper.” Where it applies, the plaintiff “shall recover no more than special damages, unless a retraction be demanded and refused.” The demand must specify the statements claimed to be libelous and request their withdrawal. To cut off general damages, the publisher must print a retraction

on the same page and in the same type and the statement headed in 18-point type or larger “RETRACTION,” as were the statements complained of, in a regular issue thereof published within one week after such service.

Even a compliant retraction does not fully defeat general damages: the plaintiff “may still recover general damages, unless the defendant shall show that the libelous publication was made in good faith and under a mistake as to the facts.” Candidates for office get an additional protection — a retraction is unavailable unless it also runs “in a conspicuous place on the editorial page,” and no retraction is available at all “if the libel was published within one week next before the election.” The section closes with a carve-out that dates it precisely: “This section shall not apply to any libel imputing unchastity.”

The statute has not been amended since 1987. It says nothing about websites, social platforms, review sites, broadcast, or podcasts. A demand letter to an online publisher is often worth sending, but § 548.06 supplies no leverage outside a newspaper.

How long is the deadline?

Two years. Minn. Stat. § 541.07 requires that actions “for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or other tort resulting in personal injury” be commenced within two years. § 541.07(1).

Two years is short, and it runs while a client is deciding whether to be the sort of person who sues. It is also short relative to the six-year period that governs most contract and business-tort claims, which is why related claims — tortious interference, for example — are sometimes still live after a defamation claim is not. Recasting a time-barred defamation claim as something else does not usually work; Minnesota courts look at the gravamen of the pleading, not its caption.

Where defamation claims tend to go instead

Not every reputational injury is a defamation case, and the alternatives have different elements, defenses, and clocks:

• Employment separations. Minnesota recognizes compelled self-publication: “the publication requirement may be satisfied where the plaintiff was compelled to publish a defamatory statement to a third person if it was foreseeable to the defendant that the plaintiff would be so compelled.” Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 389 N.W.2d 876, 888 (Minn. 1986). We cover that doctrine and its limits in self-publication defamation in the employment context.
• True but private facts. Defamation requires falsity. Where the statement is true, the theory is invasion of privacy — and note that in Cook, the UPEPA motion failed as to the invasion-of-privacy claim even as it succeeded on defamation.
• Interference with a relationship rather than reputation. See tortious interference with contract and prospective advantage.
• Ongoing conduct rather than a single statement. Where the problem is repeated targeting, a harassment restraining order may reach conduct a damages action cannot — though a petition premised on someone’s speech now carries its own UPEPA risk in some postures.

Madgett Law, LLC

Madgett Law, LLC handles defamation and reputation matters in Minnesota state and federal court, on both sides. That includes evaluating whether a statement is provably false or protected opinion, whether a client is a public official or public figure, whether an absolute or qualified privilege applies, and — increasingly the first question in any case — whether the claim can survive a special motion for expedited relief under UPEPA and its mandatory fee-shifting provision. If you have received a demand letter, been served with a UPEPA motion, or are deciding whether to sue over something published about you, call 612-470-6529 or send us a message.

Sources: Minn. Stat. § 554.07 (short title); § 554.08(b)(1)–(3) (scope), (c)(1)–(12) (exclusions), (d)(2) (consumer opinions); § 554.09 (60-day filing window); § 554.10(a)(1), (d) (stay; limited discovery); § 554.11(a) (hearing within 60 days); § 554.12 (Rule 56.03 evidentiary standard); § 554.13(a) (three-part analysis; prima facie case); § 554.14 (ruling within 60 days); § 554.15 (appeal of right; 30 days); § 554.16(1)–(2) (mandatory costs and fees to prevailing movant; fees to responding party only on frivolousness finding); § 554.17 (broad construction); § 554.19 (savings clause); § 554.20 (no waiver). 2024 Minn. Laws ch. 123, art. 18, § 16 (repealing Minn. Stat. 2022, §§ 554.01–.06) and § 17 (effective the day following final enactment; applies to actions pending on or commenced on or after that date; signed May 24, 2024). Minn. Stat. § 548.06 (newspaper libel; retraction demand; 18-point “RETRACTION” heading; candidate and unchastity provisions). Minn. Stat. § 541.07(1) (two-year limitation for libel and slander). Leiendecker v. Asian Women United of Minnesota, 895 N.W.2d 623, 634–38 (Minn. 2017) (No. A16-0360) (§ 554.02 unconstitutional as applied to claims at law alleging torts; jury fact-finding and burden-of-proof defects; nonseverability). Maethner v. Someplace Safe, Inc., 929 N.W.2d 868, 873, 875, 878, 881 (Minn. 2019) (No. A17-0998) (873: elements and constitutional actual-malice definition; 875: reputational-harm prerequisite and per se categories; 878: presumed damages unavailable on matters of public concern absent actual malice; 881: content-form-context test). Weinberger v. Maplewood Review, 668 N.W.2d 667, 673 (Minn. 2003) (three-element formulation, as quoted in Maethner). Britton v. Koep, 470 N.W.2d 518, 520–22, 524 (Minn. 1991) (No. C8-90-1169) (520: four-element formulation with fault and public/private status as a question of law; 521: nonmedia defendants; 522: public-official criteria and probation-officer authority; 524: holding). Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 255–57, 259 (Minn. 1980) (No. 49951) (255: slander per se and truth as complete defense; 256: conditional privilege elements quoting Hebner v. Great Northern Railway; 257: malice definition; 259: presumed and punitive damages). Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp., 766 N.W.2d 910, 920 (Minn. 2009) (No. A07-1353) (common-law malice definition; intrinsic and extrinsic proof). McKee v. Laurion, 825 N.W.2d 725, 730, 733 (Minn. 2013) (No. A11-1154) (plaintiff’s burden on falsity; substantial truth quoting Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991); “real tool” as rhetorical hyperbole; attributed statement as fact). Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18–20 (1990) (No. 89-645) (no wholesale opinion exemption; “In my opinion John Jones is a liar”; provably false connotation). Diesen v. Hessburg, 455 N.W.2d 446, 452 (Minn. 1990) (No. C2-88-1345) (false implication from true statements not actionable by a public official). Harlow v. State Department of Human Services, 883 N.W.2d 561, 569 (Minn. 2016) (No. A14-1342) (absolute vs. qualified privilege, quoting Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Minn. 2010), quoting Matthis v. Kennedy). Mahoney & Hagberg v. Newgard, 729 N.W.2d 302, 306 (Minn. 2007) (No. A05-1523) (three-part judicial-proceedings privilege test). Cook v. Trimble, 22 N.W.3d 196 (Minn. App. May 5, 2025) (No. A24-1486), rev. granted (Minn. Aug. 12, 2025) (de novo review of UPEPA rulings; attorney statements to the media not protected by the judicial-proceedings privilege; public-figure actual-malice failure; invasion-of-privacy claim survived). J&D Dental v. Hou, 26 N.W.3d 491 (Minn. App. Sept. 15, 2025) (No. A24-2046) (public-concern test under UPEPA; Google reviews of a dental practice not on a matter of public concern). Paragon Restorations, LLC v. Robinet Productions, LLC, 31 N.W.3d 218 (Minn. App. Dec. 29, 2025) (No. A25-0826) (§ 554.08(d)(2) does not excuse the § 554.08(b)(3) public-concern showing). Anderson v. Anderson, No. A25-1075 (Minn. App. Apr. 27, 2026) (report to a licensing board is a communication in a governmental proceeding under § 554.08(b)(1); UPEPA constitutional as applied). Johnson v. Freborg, 995 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. Sept. 20, 2023) (No. A21-1531) (Facebook post accusing dance instructors of sexual assault involved a matter of public concern). Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 389 N.W.2d 876, 888 (Minn. 1986) (No. C8-84-1065) (compelled self-publication).

This article is general legal information about Minnesota law. It is not legal advice, it does not address any particular reader’s situation, and reading it does not create an attorney–client relationship with Madgett Law, LLC. No outcome is promised or implied. Statutes and case law change; verify current authority before acting.