Minnesota Bans the Gym Termination Fee — and the Junk Fee Law Is Not Why

A gym contract explains itself on the day you try to leave. You send the notice, and the club answers with an invoice — one more month of dues, a charge for terminating, an administrative fee for processing your departure. Before you pay it, look at the first charge on the account rather than the last.

A Minnesota health club that collects an enrollment fee of more than $50 before a member has used the gym once has done more than add a line to the price. It has added to what the club’s surety bond has to cover. That fee is a “prepayment” by statutory definition, the bond is sized to the prepayments the club holds, and a copy of it is filed with the attorney general. The club does not get to choose whether that is true by renaming the charge.

I keep meeting people who assume Minnesota’s new all-in pricing rule is the answer to gym fees. For a health club it is the weaker of the two claims, and it is not close. Minnesota’s club-contract sections — Minn. Stat. §§ 325G.23 to 325G.28 — were signed on April 10, 1974, fifty-two years ago, and they do four things the junk fee law does not. They define the fee. They forbid the exit fee outright. They deny validity to the long-term contract that the fee was sold to support. And § 325G.28, subd. 2 gives the member a damages action with attorney’s fees that runs directly off the statute, with no detour through Minn. Stat. § 8.31 and no public-benefit showing.

The new law gives an injunction. The old one pays.

A club cannot rename its way out of a “prepayment”

Section 325G.23, subd. 8 is the most useful sentence in the chapter, and almost nobody reads past its first line:

“Prepayment” means any payment over $50 for service or merchandise made before the service is rendered or the merchandise is received. The term “prepayment” includes, but is not limited to, the payment of any service fee, initiation fee, application fee, administrative fee, deposit fee, processing fee, enrollment fee, maintenance fee, or similar fee no matter how the fee is denominated. It is not a prepayment if a payment for service is made on the same day the service is rendered.

That closing clause is an anti-relabeling rule, and it is not new. The 1974 act set the threshold at $25 and said nothing about what the fee was called. The 1987 legislature raised it to $50 and added the whole enumerated list, in an act titled “An act relating to consumer protection; requiring registration for health, buying, and social referral clubs; providing bonding and alternative security requirements; regulating bond claims . . .”. 1987 Minn. Laws ch. 367, § 2.

In 1987 the legislature looked at an industry that renames its charges, and wrote the renaming out of the statute in advance.

Three consequences follow from the definition, and they are exact.

The threshold is “over $50”, not fifty dollars. A $49 enrollment fee is not a prepayment. A $59 one is. The attorney general’s published Club Contracts page describes the trigger differently — it says clubs register by “completing and filing the required forms (see below), paying a registration fee, and filing a surety bond if they accept prepayments from members of $50 or more.” The statute says “any payment over $50”. A flat $50 charge sits in the gap between those two texts, and the statute controls.

Same-day service takes the payment out. A drop-in rate paid at the door on the day the member works out is not a prepayment. An annual fee billed every March for a year not yet delivered is.

The financed contract is still a prepayment. Subdivision 8’s last sentence reaches money the club receives from a lender on assignment of the contract, “when and to the extent the member is required to make prepayments to the financial institution pursuant to the contract.” Routing the enrollment fee through a third-party financing company does not convert it into something else.

Now, what the chapter does not do. It does not cap the amount. Sections 325G.23 to 325G.28 impose no ceiling on what a club may collect up front; they define the money, secure it, and make the club account for it. A club may charge a $500 initiation fee and comply completely — so long as it has registered, bonded, used a conforming contract, and honored the cancellation rights.

Which businesses are actually “clubs”?

This is where a promising claim most often dies.

Section 325G.23, subd. 2 defines “club” as “any health club, social referral club or buying club.” Subdivision 4 then defines the one that matters here:

“Health club” means any corporation, partnership, unincorporated association, or other business enterprise having the primary purpose of offering one or more facilities for instruction, training, encouragement, or assistance in physical fitness, in return for the payment of a fee entitling the member to the use of the facilities. The term does not include any nonprofit organizations, any private club owned and operated by its members, or any facility operated by the state or any of its political subdivisions.

Read the exclusion sentence carefully, because it removes a large share of Minnesota’s fitness capacity. A nonprofit is out. A member-owned private club is out. A municipal or school-district recreation center is out. That language is not original — the 1974 act limited the definition to enterprises “organized for profit,” and 1987 Minn. Laws ch. 367, § 1 struck that phrase and substituted the three named exclusions. The Court of Appeals recorded the change in State ex rel. Humphrey v. Ri-Mel, Inc., 417 N.W.2d 102, 106 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. Feb. 17, 1988), and upheld the profit/nonprofit line against an equal protection challenge, id. at 107.

“Primary purpose” is the other limit, and it is doing real work. A business whose principal offering is a service performed on the customer rather than a facility the customer trains in — a tanning salon, a nail or massage studio, a monthly car wash plan — is not offering “facilities for instruction, training, encouragement, or assistance in physical fitness”. Those businesses sell memberships that look identical to a gym’s on the billing statement and are not reached by § 325G.28, subd. 2 at all. Their members are left with the automatic-renewal sections and the Consumer Fraud Act. A climbing gym, a boxing gym, a Pilates or barre studio, a personal-training facility — I read each of those as inside subd. 4 on its face.

Can a Minnesota gym charge me to quit?

No. Section 325G.24, subd. 2(c) is one sentence and it has no qualifiers:

A club must not impose a termination fee or any other liability on the member for termination under this subdivision.

The unilateral right to quit that subdivision 2 created, the methods a club must accept, and the amendment history behind both are covered in Minnesota’s automatic-renewal law. What it does not reach is how the ban interacts with the fees — the whole question for a member holding a cancellation invoice.

Two limits sit on the ban, and both matter.

The first is timing. Termination “is effective at the end of the membership term in which the member provides the notice of termination”, and for a month-to-month membership with no defined term, “termination under this subdivision is effective no later than 30 days after the date of a verified consumer’s notice of termination.” § 325G.24, subd. 2(d). So the ban on the exit fee is not a same-day off switch. One more billing cycle can be lawful. A charge dated after the effective termination date is not.

The second is reach. Subdivision 2(c) bans a fee for terminating. It says nothing about an enrollment fee or an annual fee, which are governed by the prepayment and contract-form sections instead. Conflating them is how a good demand letter turns into a bad one.

A fee cannot be smuggled back in through the cancellation process either. Subdivision 3(b) sets the standard the process itself is measured against — “The process to cancel must be stated clearly and be easily accessible and completed with ease” — and subd. 4 forecloses the contractual workaround: “A right of cancellation or right of termination under this section may not be waived or otherwise surrendered.”

The date matters. The unilateral termination right, the fee ban, the notice methods and the anti-waiver rule came from 2024 Minn. Laws ch. 114, art. 3, § 53, which carries its own dating rule: “This section is effective January 1, 2025, and applies to contracts entered into, modified, or renewed on or after that date.” The 30-day clause in subd. 2(d) is newer: it replaced “immediately” by 2025 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 4, art. 7, § 31, which is “effective July 1, 2025, and applies to contracts entered into, modified, or renewed on or after that date.” A membership that renewed in 2025 or 2026 is inside both regardless of when it started.

The three-day window refunds the fees, not just the dues

Section 325G.24, subd. 1(a) gives a member until “midnight of the third business day following the date on which membership was attained” to cancel outright. “Business day” is defined — any day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday under Minn. Stat. § 645.44. § 325G.23, subd. 9.

Subdivision 1(c) is the part that gets ignored:

Cancellation under this subdivision shall be without liability on the part of the member and the member shall be entitled to a refund, within ten days after notice of cancellation is given, of the entire consideration paid for the contract.

Entire consideration. Not the dues alone, not the prorated portion, not everything except the enrollment fee. Take an invented but perfectly ordinary set of numbers: you sign on a Monday, pay a $59 enrollment fee plus $10 for the first month, and cancel on Wednesday. The club owes you $69 by the tenth day. A form that recites a non-refundable enrollment fee, or a refund policy written to a national calendar-day standard rather than Minnesota’s three business days, does not comply with subd. 1(c) — and a club cannot cure that by pointing to the paragraph the member signed, because § 325G.24, subd. 4 makes the right unwaivable.

That refund language is original to the 1974 act. It has survived every version of the fitness-club business model that has come and gone since.

Eighteen months, and not a month longer

Section 325G.26 is three sentences long and I have never once seen it raised:

No contract shall be valid for a term longer than 18 months from the date upon which the contract is signed. However, a club may allow a member to convert a contract into a contract for a period longer than 18 months after the member has been a member of the club for a period of at least six months. The duration of the contract shall be clearly and conspicuously disclosed in the contract in bold face type of a minimum size of 14 points.

A 24-month commitment, a 36-month founding-member rate, a three-year price lock sold at the counter on the day someone joins — the statute does not say the excess months fall away. It says the contract is not valid for that term. And the escape hatch is barred at the front end: the conversion to a longer term is available only “after the member has been a member of the club for a period of at least six months”, so the longer term cannot be sold at signup at all.

This is the provision that reaches a rate-guarantee fee directly. A charge collected to lock a rate for two or three years is consideration for a term the statute will not validate, and the duration disclosure carries its own 14-point boldface requirement on top.

What the club had to file before it took your money

Registration and bonding are § 325G.27, and they generate violations that have nothing to do with what any individual member was told.

Registration. “Every buying, health, or social referral club doing business in this state shall register with the attorney general and provide all information requested on forms the attorney general provides.” § 325G.27, subd. 1(a). The fee is $250 at registration and $150 on September 1 of each following year. § 325G.27, subd. 1(b). The attorney general’s office publishes the forms — initial registration, surety bond, application for exemption from the bond requirement, statement of alternative security, application for exemption from registration, annual renewal, and a statement upon ceasing operations — and its Club Contracts page states the rule plainly: Minnesota law “requires health, dating, and buying clubs to register with the Attorney General’s Office and renew their registration annually.”

The bond. Every club must maintain a surety bond “in an amount not less than the aggregate value of outstanding liabilities to members as defined in section 325G.23, subdivision 10”, with a copy filed with the attorney general. § 325G.27, subd. 2(a). And § 325G.23, subd. 10 defines outstanding liabilities as “the amount of prepayment actually received from club members less the amount of the prepayment as prorated over the duration of any contract for services rendered by the club.” The bond is sized by the fees. Charge no prepayments and the number is zero; charge them and the number climbs with every enrollment.

Three features of that regime matter to a member.

The amount is capped. “No club shall be required to file with the attorney general a bond, letter of credit, or cash in excess of $200,000, regardless of the number of facilities.” § 325G.27, subd. 2(b). For a single studio that is ample. For a chain with tens of thousands of Minnesota members it is not, and no member should read the bond as a guarantee of a full refund if a club collapses. Subdivision 3(d) says so: “The liability of the surety under any bond may not exceed the aggregate amount of the bond, regardless of the number or amount of claims filed.”

The remedy for an underbonded club is a sales freeze. If outstanding liabilities exceed the bond and the club has not increased it, the club “shall immediately stop selling club memberships and shall refrain from selling club memberships until the requirements of this subdivision have been satisfied.” § 325G.27, subd. 2(d). The attorney general may also bring mandamus to force registration or bonding. § 325G.27, subd. 1(c).

And the way out of the bond is a sworn statement. Subdivision 2(f) exempts a club that files a declaration with the attorney general, “executed under penalty of perjury by the owner or manager of such club,” stating that the club “does not require or in the ordinary course of business does not receive prepayment for services or merchandise.” A club that filed that declaration and then began charging a $59 enrollment fee has a problem considerably larger than a fee dispute.

The claim deadline. A member who loses prepaid money because a facility closed or the seller went bankrupt files a claim with the surety, and if it is not paid, may sue on the bond. § 325G.27, subd. 3(a). The window is short: “Any claim under paragraph (a) shall be filed no later than one year from the date on which the facility closed or bankruptcy was filed.” § 325G.27, subd. 3(b). Do not wait on this one. The attorney general may also file a claim with the surety on a member’s behalf. § 325G.27, subd. 3(c).

What § 325G.28 gives, and to whom

Two subdivisions, two different beneficiaries, and the distinction between them decides who can collect.

Subdivision 1 is the attorney general’s. It authorizes the attorney general to investigate violations and to sue for an injunction, for “a civil penalty, in an amount to be determined by the court, not in excess of $25,000” payable to the state’s general fund, and — where a club has failed to maintain the required bond or is insolvent or in imminent danger of insolvency — for an order appointing a receiver to wind up its affairs.

Subdivision 2 is the member’s, and here it is in full:

In addition to the remedies otherwise provided by law, any person injured by a violation of any of the provisions of sections 325G.23 to 325G.28, may bring a civil action and recover damages, together with costs and disbursements, including reasonable attorney’s fees, and receive other equitable relief as determined by the court.

Five things in that sentence do the work.

It runs to “any person injured”. Not to a “consumer”, not to a “member”, and not to a “natural person”. Anyone injured by a violation of any of the six sections may sue.

Injury is an element. Subdivision 2 is not a statutory-penalty provision; it pays damages to someone who was hurt, and a claim has to say how.

The predicate is any violation of any of the six sections. A missing 14-point notice under § 325G.25, subd. 1. A 30-month contract under § 325G.26. A failure to register under § 325G.27, subd. 1. A termination fee under § 325G.24, subd. 2(c). Each is a “violation of any of the provisions of sections 325G.23 to 325G.28”.

Attorney’s fees are in the statute’s own text, with no willfulness gate and no requirement that the claim be groundless before fees move. Compare § 325D.45, subd. 2, the fee clause attached to the deceptive trade practices act, which reaches fees only where a plaintiff sued knowing the claim was groundless or the defendant acted willfully knowing the practice was deceptive. Our map of Minnesota’s fee-shifting statutes does not yet carry § 325G.28; it should.

What subd. 2 does not include is costs of investigation. Section 8.31, subd. 3a does. That is a small difference and a real one.

The routing question is the reason this matters. In Ri-Mel, the Court of Appeals held that the private attorney general statute does not govern Club Contracts Act claims, reasoning that the Act “was enacted after Minn.Stat. § 8.31 and includes a specific provision authorizing the attorney general to investigate violations of the Act and specifically enumerates remedies available both to the attorney general and a person injured by a violation of the act”, and that § 325G.28, subd. 2 “also authorizes any person injured by a violation of the Act to bring a civil action to recover damages, costs, and reasonable attorney fees.” 417 N.W.2d at 111.

The Minnesota Supreme Court has since read § 8.31 more broadly — “The list of 10 specific laws following the broad grant of authority is not exclusive.” Findling v. Group Health Plan, Inc., Nos. A21-1518, A21-1527, A21-1528, A21-1530, slip op. at 7 (Minn. Dec. 6, 2023). That points the other way.

My view is that the argument does not need to be had. Section 325G.28, subd. 2 supplies its own standing and its own fee award. A club-contract plaintiff never has to prove that the case benefits the public, because the statute never sends her to § 8.31 to begin with.

Ri-Mel is the only Minnesota appellate decision I have located construing §§ 325G.23 to 325G.28, and it was decided December 15, 1987 — thirty-eight years ago. I searched for more, in several phrasings, and found none. That is not the same as certainty that none exists.

The court in Ri-Mel explained the silence itself: “injured club members may not avail themselves of their remedy under the Club Contracts Act because of the economic burden of suing on a small claim.” Id. at 112. A fee-shifting statute nobody invokes stays untested. Minnesota’s conciliation court exists for exactly the size of claim the court was describing.

Where the junk fee law comes in, and where it stops

Since January 1, 2025, Minn. Stat. § 325D.44, subd. 1a(a) has made it a deceptive trade practice to advertise, display, or offer a price that does not include all mandatory fees or surcharges. A gym’s annual fee is a mandatory fee on the face of subd. 1a(b): it “must be paid in order to purchase the goods or services being advertised” under cl. (1), and it is a fee “a reasonable person would expect to be included in the purchase of the goods or services being advertised” under cl. (3). The clauses are disjunctive; one is enough.

The arithmetic is what makes the point. Hypothetically, a club advertises $10 a month and bills every member a $59 annual fee. Twelve months of dues is $120; add the annual fee and the member pays $179 in the first year, which is $14.92 a month. The real number is just under 50 percent higher than the advertised one. That is not a rounding problem. It is the price.

No safe harbor in subd. 1a reaches a health club. Paragraphs (c) and (f) through (j) cover delivery platforms, auctions, variable-cost services, food and beverage establishments, broadband providers, and cable and video providers; paragraphs (d) and (e) do no more than allow an actual shipping charge and a discount off the advertised price. None of them describes a gym. Neither do the subd. 1b exemptions, which take out motor vehicle dealer fees authorized by law, businesses regulated by the Public Utilities Commission and their affiliates, and RESPA settlement services. A health club is squarely inside subd. 1a, including a nonprofit club that § 325G.23, subd. 4 excludes from the club sections entirely — subd. 1a has no nonprofit carve-out.

The catch is the remedy, and it is structural. Subdivision 1a sits inside the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, whose remedies section authorizes an injunction and no damages: “A person likely to be damaged by a deceptive trade practice of another may be granted an injunction against it under the principles of equity and on terms that the court considers reasonable.” § 325D.45, subd. 1. I worked through that placement and where the money claim actually comes from in Minnesota’s junk fee law has no damages remedy, and I will not repeat it here. For a gym member the practical upshot is short: plead subd. 1a to stop the advertising, plead § 325G.28, subd. 2 to be paid, and plead the Consumer Fraud Act alongside both.

One safe harbor that does not apply here

Health-club memberships also sit inside Minnesota’s automatic-renewal statute. Section 325G.56, subd. 6 says indefinite subscription agreements “include but are not limited to contracts, as defined in section 325G.23, subject to automatic renewal or continuous service”, and subd. 8 adds that “Seller includes but is not limited to a club as defined in section 325G.23, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.” Sections 325G.58 and 325G.60 each define “agreement” for their own purposes to mean “an indefinite subscription agreement, as defined in section 325G.56, and a contract, as defined in section 325G.23.” So the dark-pattern and website-termination rules reach a gym on their own terms.

The one thing to carry across from that act is a boundary. Section 325G.63, its enforcement section, reads in full:

A seller is not subject to civil penalties if the seller has made a good faith effort to comply with each applicable provision of sections 325G.56 to 325G.61.

That is a genuine concession and a club is entitled to it — on the sections it names. It reaches §§ 325G.56 through 325G.61 and no further. It does not shelter a violation of §§ 325G.23 to 325G.28. And it excuses only “civil penalties”, which is the machinery in § 325G.28, subd. 1 and § 8.31, subd. 3 — not the private damages action in § 325G.28, subd. 2. A club that made a good-faith effort still owes an injured member damages and fees under subd. 2.

The four documents

If a Minnesota gym fee is worth arguing about, the file is small and it is always the same four items.

The signed membership agreement, because §§ 325G.25, subd. 1 and 325G.26 are testable from the face of it — the 14-point boldface cancellation and termination notices, the notice-information block with the club’s address, telephone number, email address, and website, and the stated duration. A contract missing the required notice can be canceled “at any time by giving notice of cancellation by any means.” § 325G.25, subd. 2.

The signup screen or printed price, dated, because the § 325D.44, subd. 1a claim is defined by what was advertised, displayed, or offered — not by what the receipt eventually said.

The charge record showing every fee separately from the dues, because the prepayment analysis, the refund analysis, and the damages model all run off which dollars were collected before service was rendered.

The cancellation attempt — the email, the chat transcript, the date of the phone call, a screenshot of the website’s termination election or its absence — because § 325G.24, subd. 3 is written in terms of what the club accepted and how burdensome the process was, and the website will be redesigned before anyone gets to a deposition.

Madgett Law, LLC

Madgett Law, LLC represents Minnesota consumers in deceptive-pricing and consumer fraud matters, landlord-tenant disputes, and debt collection and credit reporting cases, in state and federal court. If a health club charged you a fee to leave, kept an enrollment fee after you canceled inside the three-day window, or advertised a monthly rate that was not the rate, we can tell you whether these sections reach it. Call 612-470-6529 or send us a message.

Sources: Minn. Stat. § 325G.23, subd. 2 (definition of “club”), subd. 3 (definition of “contract”), subd. 4 (definition of “health club”; nonprofit, member-owned, and governmental exclusions), subd. 7 (definition of “member”), subd. 8 (definition of “prepayment”; over $50; enumerated fee labels; same-day service; assignment to a financial institution), subd. 9 (definition of “business day”, referencing Minn. Stat. § 645.44), subd. 10 (definition of “outstanding liabilities”); § 325G.24, subd. 1(a) (three-business-day cancellation), subd. 1(b) (mailbox rule), subd. 1(c) (ten-day refund of the entire consideration), subd. 2(a)–(c) (unilateral termination; mailbox rule; no termination fee or other liability), subd. 2(d) (effective date of termination; 30 days for at-will memberships), subd. 3(a) (accepted notice methods), subd. 3(b) (process to cancel stated clearly, easily accessible, completed with ease), subd. 4 (no waiver); § 325G.25, subd. 1 (required 14-point boldface contract notices and notice-information block), subd. 2 (contract lacking the notice may be canceled at any time by any means); § 325G.26 (18-month limitation on membership period; conversion after six months; 14-point duration disclosure); § 325G.27, subd. 1(a) (registration with the attorney general), subd. 1(b) ($250 registration fee; $150 renewal each September 1), subd. 1(c) (mandamus), subd. 2(a) (surety bond not less than outstanding liabilities; copy filed with the attorney general), subd. 2(b) ($200,000 cap regardless of the number of facilities), subd. 2(d) (immediate stop on membership sales), subd. 2(e) (letter of credit or cash deposit), subd. 2(f) (declaration under penalty of perjury of no prepayment), subd. 3(a) (member claim against the surety), subd. 3(b) (one-year claim deadline), subd. 3(c) (attorney general may file a claim), subd. 3(d) (surety liability capped at the bond), subd. 4 (planned or under-construction facilities); § 325G.28, subd. 1 (attorney general enforcement; injunction; civil penalty not in excess of $25,000; receiver), subd. 2 (private remedies; any person injured; damages, costs and disbursements, reasonable attorney’s fees, other equitable relief); § 325G.56, subd. 6 (indefinite subscription agreements include § 325G.23 contracts), subd. 8 (seller includes a § 325G.23 club); § 325G.58, subd. 1 and § 325G.60, subd. 1 (each defining “agreement” to include a § 325G.23 contract); § 325G.63 (good-faith safe harbor limited to §§ 325G.56 to 325G.61 and to civil penalties); § 325D.44, subd. 1a(a) (advertised, displayed, or offered price must include all mandatory fees or surcharges), subd. 1a(b)(1), (3) (mandatory fee definition; disjunctive clauses), subd. 1a(c), (f)–(j) (compliance safe harbors: delivery platforms, auctions, variable-cost services, food and beverage establishments including hotels, broadband, cable and video), subd. 1a(d)–(e) (actual shipping or postage charge; discounting off the advertised price), subd. 1b(1)–(3) (exemptions: motor vehicle dealer fees authorized by law, PUC-regulated businesses and affiliates, RESPA settlement services); § 325D.45, subd. 1 (injunction to a person likely to be damaged), subd. 2 (attorney fees on groundlessness or willfulness); § 8.31, subd. 3 (civil penalty), subd. 3a (private remedies; costs of investigation) — all as published by the Minnesota Office of the Revisor of Statutes at revisor.mn.gov. Session laws: 1974 Minn. Laws ch. 418 (S.F. No. 3123), approved April 10, 1974, §§ 1–6 (original enactment of the club-contract sections at Minn. Stat. §§ 325.96–325.965, including the $25 prepayment threshold, the ten-day refund of the entire consideration, the 18-month term limit, the bond and the no-prepayment declaration, and the private remedy with reasonable attorney’s fees); 1987 Minn. Laws ch. 367 (H.F. No. 949), §§ 1–4 (amending the “health club” definition to delete “organized for profit” and add the nonprofit, member-owned and governmental exclusions; raising the prepayment threshold from $25 to $50 and adding the enumerated fee labels and the “no matter how the fee is denominated” clause; adding the “outstanding liabilities” definition; rewriting § 325G.27); 2024 Minn. Laws ch. 114, art. 3, § 53 (rewriting § 325G.24; “This section is effective January 1, 2025, and applies to contracts entered into, modified, or renewed on or after that date”) and § 54 (amending § 325G.25, subd. 1, same effective-date clause); 2024 Minn. Laws ch. 111, §§ 1–2 (adding § 325D.44, subds. 1a and 1b; “This section is effective January 1, 2025, except that this section is effective June 1, 2025, for industries where the prices are regulated by the Metropolitan Airports Commission”); 2025 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 4, art. 7, § 31 (amending § 325G.24, subd. 2(d) to replace “immediately” with the 30-day clause; “This section is effective July 1, 2025, and applies to contracts entered into, modified, or renewed on or after that date”). State ex rel. Humphrey v. Ri-Mel, Inc., 417 N.W.2d 102 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. Feb. 17, 1988), at 106 n.1 (1987 amendment to the “health club” definition; footnote pinned to the page where its reference mark is called), 107 (statutory purpose; profit/nonprofit distinction upheld on rational-basis review), 108 (bond requirement a proper exercise of the state’s regulatory powers), 111 (§ 8.31 does not govern Club Contracts Act actions; § 325G.28, subd. 2 authorizes any person injured to recover damages, costs and reasonable attorney fees), 112 (economic burden of suing on a small claim), read from the Caselaw Access Project star-paginated archive at static.case.law. Findling v. Group Health Plan, Inc., Nos. A21-1518, A21-1527, A21-1528, A21-1530 (Minn. Dec. 6, 2023), slip op. at 7 (the list of 10 specific laws in § 8.31, subd. 1 is not exclusive), read from the Minnesota Judicial Branch slip opinion PDF. Minnesota Attorney General’s Office, “Club Contracts” page, ag.state.mn.us (registration, annual renewal, and bond requirements; published forms). This article is general legal information about Minnesota law. It is not legal advice, it does not create an attorney–client relationship, and no particular outcome is promised or implied.