Minnesota's Junk Fee Law Has No Damages Remedy — and That Is by Placement, Not by Accident

Minnesota’s “junk fee” law is real, it is broad, and since January 1, 2025 it has required that any advertised, displayed, or offered price include every mandatory fee. What almost nobody notices is where the legislature put it.

It went into Minn. Stat. § 325D.44 — the definitional section of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, §§ 325D.43 to 325D.48. That is the one Minnesota consumer statute the Court of Appeals has squarely held provides no damages, and the one statute the Minnesota Supreme Court has expressly identified as missing from the attorney general’s list in Minn. Stat. § 8.31, subd. 1 — the list that gates the private attorney general damages remedy.

So a consumer who paid a $32 “resort fee” that was never in the advertised room rate has a violation, a statute, and a clear prohibition. What that consumer does not have, on the junk fee statute standing alone, is a claim for the $32.

The money claim exists. It just comes from a different statute, and it has an element the junk fee law does not.

What does Minnesota’s junk fee law actually require?

Section 325D.44, subd. 1a(a) states the rule in one sentence:

(a) A person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the course of business, vocation, or occupation, the person advertises, displays, or offers a price for goods or services that does not include all mandatory fees or surcharges. If the person that disseminates an advertisement is independent of the advertiser, the person is not liable for the content of the advertisement.

Three things in that sentence do a lot of work.

“Advertises, displays, or offers.” This is not limited to advertising. A price displayed on a menu board, a shelf tag, or a checkout screen is covered on the same terms as a television spot.

“All mandatory fees or surcharges.” Not “disclosed” — included. The number the consumer sees first must be the number that includes the fee.

The disseminator carve-out. A radio station or a print publisher that is independent of the advertiser is not liable for the advertiser’s content. That tracks the older publisher-liability provision at § 325D.46, subd. 1a, which reaches publishers, broadcasters, and printers only if they had knowledge of the practice or a financial interest in the goods.

The statute then defines the operative term. Subdivision 1a(b) says “mandatory fee” includes but is not limited to a fee or surcharge that:

(1) must be paid in order to purchase the goods or services being advertised;

(2) is not reasonably avoidable by the consumer; or

(3) a reasonable person would expect to be included in the purchase of the goods or services being advertised.

Those are disjunctive. Clause (3) is the aggressive one: a fee can be technically avoidable and still be a mandatory fee if a reasonable person would have expected it to be inside the price. That is a jury-friendly standard, and it is the clause that most fee-restructuring workarounds have to survive.

Taxes are out, by express text: “For the purposes of this subdivision, mandatory fee does not include taxes imposed by a government entity on the sale, use, purchase, receipt, or delivery of the goods or services.” § 325D.44, subd. 1a(b).

Shipping is out, but conditionally — subdivision 1a(d) permits “a reasonable postage or shipping fee that is actually incurred by a consumer who has purchased a good that requires shipping.” A flat “shipping and handling” charge untethered to actual cost is not obviously within that safe harbor.

Which businesses got a carve-out?

Subdivision 1a is unusual in that most of its paragraphs are not prohibitions but compliance safe harbors — each one says a described business “is compliant with this subdivision if” it does a specified thing. There are six, and then a separate exemption subdivision.

Delivery platforms (§ 325D.44, subd. 1a(c)) comply by doing two things: disclosing clearly and conspicuously, at the point the consumer views and selects a vendor or items, that an additional flat fee or percentage is charged, including the amount; and displaying, after selection but before checkout, a subtotal page itemizing the menu-item price and the additional fee included in the total cost.

Auctions (subd. 1a(f)) comply where the total cost is indeterminable, by clearly and conspicuously disclosing any mandatory fees and that the total may vary.

Variable-cost services (subd. 1a(g)) — those where the total depends on consumer selections and preferences, or on distance or time — comply by disclosing the factors that determine the total price, any mandatory fees, and that the total may vary. This is the rideshare and moving-company paragraph.

Food and beverage establishments, including hotels (subd. 1a(h)), comply if every pricing offer or advertisement includes “a clear and conspicuous disclosure of the percentage of any automatic and mandatory gratuities charged.” Note the limit: this paragraph addresses automatic and mandatory gratuities, expressed as a percentage. It is not a general license to keep a service charge or a kitchen-appreciation fee outside the menu price.

Broadband providers (subd. 1a(i)) comply by complying with the FCC broadband consumer label requirements at 47 C.F.R. § 8.1(a).

Cable and video providers (subd. 1a(j)) comply by complying with the pricing requirements the FCC adopted in Report and Order FCC 24-29 under 47 U.S.C. § 552.

Then subdivision 1b takes three categories out entirely:

(1) fees authorized by law related to the purchase or lease of a motor vehicle that are charged by a motor vehicle dealer, as defined by section 168.27, subdivision 1, paragraph (f);

(2) any business or the business’ affiliate where either the business or the affiliate is regulated by the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission; or

(3) any fees, surcharges, or other costs associated with settlement services, as defined in the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, United States Code, title 12, section 2602(3). This clause does not apply to real estate broker commissions and fees.

That last sentence is worth reading twice. Real estate settlement service fees are exempt; real estate broker commissions and fees are not.

Finally, subdivision 1a(k): “This subdivision is enforceable unless preempted by federal law.”

When did it take effect, and was there a split date?

Yes — and the second date is easy to miss.

The law is 2024 Minn. Laws ch. 111, an act “relating to consumer protection; making the failure to disclose mandatory fees in advertising a deceptive trade practice; providing exemptions”. It was presented to the governor May 17, 2024 and signed May 20, 2024. Both sections carry the identical effective-date clause:

This section is effective January 1, 2025, except that this section is effective June 1, 2025, for industries where the prices are regulated by the Metropolitan Airports Commission.

So the general effective date is January 1, 2025; for industries whose prices are regulated by the Metropolitan Airports Commission, it is June 1, 2025. Paragraph (j) was later revised to reference the FCC’s Report and Order FCC 24-29 directly (2025 Minn. Laws ch. 20, § 247, per the section’s history line); the current text at revisor.mn.gov reflects that.

Why can’t I sue for my money under the junk fee law?

Because the remedy section of the act it sits in gives an injunction, and only an injunction.

Section 325D.45, subd. 1:

A person likely to be damaged by a deceptive trade practice of another may be granted an injunction against it under the principles of equity and on terms that the court considers reasonable. Proof of monetary damage, loss of profits, or intent to deceive is not required.

That “proof of monetary damage … is not required” language reads like a gift, and in the injunction posture it is one — you do not have to show you lost a dollar to enjoin the practice. But it is also the tell. The statute contemplates a plaintiff who is likely to be damaged, seeking to stop conduct. It does not contemplate a plaintiff collecting.

The Court of Appeals said so directly. In Alsides v. Brown Institute, Ltd., 592 N.W.2d 468, 476 (Minn. App. 1999), the court held: “We therefore conclude that the sole statutory remedy for deceptive trade practices is injunctive relief.”

Eight months later, in Dennis Simmons D.D.S., P.A. v. Modern Aero, Inc., 603 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Minn. App. 1999), the court applied it: “we affirm the district court’s conclusion that the DTPA provides only injunctive relief, and because appellant pursued damages, not an injunction, he has not stated a claim for which relief could be granted.”

Simmons also closed the fee-shifting workaround. Section 325D.45, subd. 2, allows costs to the prevailing party and permits attorney fees where the claim was brought knowing it to be groundless or where the practice was willful. The plaintiff in Simmons pled a DTPA count on top of negligence and contract claims to reach that fee provision. The court held that “prevailing party” applies “only to a claim for injunctive relief under the DTPA,” and stated flatly: “A party may not assert a DTPA claim for the sole purpose of receiving attorney fees.” 603 N.W.2d at 339.

Doesn’t the private attorney general statute fix that?

It does not reach this act. That is the point most consumers — and more than a few complaints — get wrong.

Minn. Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a, creates the private damages remedy: “any person injured by a violation of any of the laws referred to in subdivision 1 may bring a civil action and recover damages, together with costs and disbursements, including costs of investigation and reasonable attorney’s fees, and receive other equitable relief as determined by the court.”

The operative words are the laws referred to in subdivision 1. Subdivision 1 enumerates the statutes the attorney general is charged with investigating: the Nonprofit Corporation Act, the Act Against Unfair Discrimination and Competition (§§ 325D.01 to 325D.07), the Unlawful Trade Practices Act (§§ 325D.09 to 325D.16), the Antitrust Act (§§ 325D.49 to 325D.66), § 325F.67 and other laws against false or fraudulent advertising, § 325D.67, § 325D.68, § 325E.39, the Prevention of Consumer Fraud Act (§§ 325F.68 to 325F.70), and chapter 53A.

Sections 325D.43 to 325D.48 are not on it. The Minnesota Supreme Court noticed this in State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490, 496 (Minn. 1996), where the State and Blue Cross had pled four consumer statutes:

The only statute not listed in subdivision 1 but still pled by plaintiffs is the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices statute. This statute, however, contains its own legislative grant of standing and, thus, requires no reference to Minn.Stat. § 8.31.

And Simmons held it as a matter of decision, at 603 N.W.2d at 340: “Yet, subdivision 3a specifically limits its relief to those statutes referred to in subdivision 1, and the DTPA is not included in that list.”

The 2024 legislature amended § 325D.44. It did not amend § 8.31, subd. 1. A reader is free to argue that the junk fee provision is one of the “other laws against false or fraudulent advertising” swept in by subdivision 1’s residual phrase — but that argument runs into Humphrey and Simmons, both of which treated the section-by-section list as controlling for this act. Treat it as a litigating position, not a settled route. More on the mechanics of the private attorney general statute is in our guide to Minnesota’s private attorney general statute.

Then where does the damages claim come from?

The Prevention of Consumer Fraud Act — §§ 325F.68 to 325F.70 — which is on the § 8.31 list, and which since 2023 carries its own private right of action.

The substantive prohibition, § 325F.69, subd. 1, is broad enough to cover a hidden mandatory fee on its own terms:

The act, use, or employment by any person of any fraud, unfair or unconscionable practice, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, misleading statement or deceptive practice, with the intent that others rely thereon in connection with the sale of any merchandise, whether or not any person has in fact been misled, deceived, or damaged thereby, is enjoinable as provided in section 325F.70.

A price advertised as $189 when the unavoidable charge is $221 is a misleading statement made in connection with the sale of merchandise. The junk fee statute is then useful as evidence of the standard rather than as the cause of action — and as a legislative declaration that this exact conduct is a deceptive trade practice in Minnesota.

The 2023 change matters a great deal. Effective August 1, 2023, the legislature added § 325F.70, subd. 3:

(a) In addition to the remedies otherwise provided by law, a consumer injured by a violation of sections 325F.68 to 325F.70, in connection with a sale of merchandise for personal, family, household, or agricultural purposes, may bring a civil action and recover damages, together with costs and disbursements, including costs of investigation and reasonable attorney fees, and receive other equitable relief as determined by the court. An action brought under this section benefits the public.

That final sentence is a direct legislative response to Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302 (Minn. 2000), where the supreme court held, at 314, that “the Private AG Statute applies only to those claimants who demonstrate that their cause of action benefits the public.” For a qualifying consumer proceeding under § 325F.70, subd. 3, the public-benefit showing is now supplied by statute.

“Consumer” for this purpose is narrower than “any person”: subdivision 3(b) defines it as “a natural person or family farmer”, with “family farm” taking the meaning given in § 116B.02, subd. 6. And the enacting law provides that the subdivision “is effective August 1, 2023, and applies to causes of action commenced on or after that date.” 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 19, § 15.

What still has to be proved?

Causation. The junk fee statute’s “proof of monetary damage … is not required” language belongs to § 325D.45, and it does not travel to the money claim.

In Group Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc., 621 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 2001), the supreme court answered two certified questions from the District of Minnesota. It held that a private plaintiff need not be a purchaser and need not plead individual reliance. But at 13 it drew the line:

Causation is, therefore, a necessary element of an action to recover damages under section 8.31, subdivision 3a.

In a hidden-fee case that element is usually straightforward — the consumer saw a price, transacted, and paid more. It is not free, though, and it is the piece a defendant will attack where the fee appeared somewhere before the final click.

How the two Minnesota routes compare

The two are not mutually exclusive. Section 325D.45, subd. 3, says the injunctive relief “is in addition to remedies otherwise available against the same conduct under the common law or other statutes of this state.” Pleading both is ordinary practice — the UDTPA count to stop the pricing, the CFA count to recover. What does not work is pleading only the first and asking for money. Our broader treatment of the two acts side by side is at the Consumer Fraud Act and deceptive trade practices.

Does the FTC’s junk fee rule cover the same ground?

Only a slice of it, and it does not displace Minnesota’s law.

The FTC’s Trade Regulation Rule on Unfair or Deceptive Fees was published at 90 Fed. Reg. 2066 (Jan. 10, 2025), took effect May 12, 2025, and is codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 464.

Its reach is narrow by design. Section 464.1 defines “covered good or service” as:

(1) Live-event tickets; or

(2) Short-term lodging, including temporary sleeping accommodations at a hotel, motel, inn, short-term rental, vacation rental, or other place of lodging.

Within that scope, § 464.2(a) makes it “an unfair and deceptive practice and a violation of this part for any business to offer, display, or advertise any price of a covered good or service without clearly and conspicuously disclosing the total price”. Section 464.2(b) requires the total price be displayed more prominently than any other pricing information. Section 464.3 separately bars misrepresenting the nature, purpose, amount, or refundability of a fee.

Two structural points matter for a Minnesota consumer.

The federal rule is a floor, not a ceiling. Section 464.4(b) provides that a state provision “is not inconsistent with the provisions of this part if the protection such statute, regulation, order, or interpretation affords any consumer is greater than the protection provided under this part.” Minnesota’s law is broader — it reaches all goods and services, not just tickets and lodging. That answers the preemption reservation in § 325D.44, subd. 1a(k) for most fact patterns.

The federal rule is enforced by the government. 15 U.S.C. § 57b(a)(1) provides that where a person violates a rule respecting unfair or deceptive acts or practices, “the Commission may commence a civil action against such person, partnership, or corporation for relief under subsection (b) in a United States district court or in any court of competent jurisdiction of a State.” Subsection (b) authorizes rescission, refunds, return of property, damages, and public notification — but the action is the Commission’s. A consumer who wants a check writes a Minnesota complaint.

There is one defense the federal rule creates on the state side worth flagging. Section 325D.46, subd. 1, provides that §§ 325D.43 to 325D.48 “do not apply to … (1) conduct in compliance with the orders or rules of, or a statute administered by, a federal, state, or local governmental agency; or (2) actions or appeals pending on July 1, 1973.” A ticket seller or lodging operator in full compliance with 16 C.F.R. pt. 464 will argue that clause. Whether it defeats a Minnesota junk fee claim where the state standard is more demanding has not, so far as our research shows, been decided by a Minnesota appellate court. Expect it to be raised.

Practical points for a Minnesota consumer

Screenshot the first price. The violation is defined by what was advertised, displayed, or offered — not by what the receipt says. The listing page, the search result, the menu board photograph, the shelf tag: that is the evidence.

Capture the sequence. Where a fee surfaced matters. A resort fee disclosed only on the payment screen and a resort fee disclosed on the search results page are different cases, and delivery platforms have an express safe harbor keyed to when the disclosure appears (§ 325D.44, subd. 1a(c)).

Check the exemption list before you draft. Motor vehicle dealer fees authorized by law, PUC-regulated businesses and their affiliates, and RESPA settlement services are out under subdivision 1b. Real estate broker commissions and fees are back in.

Plead the Consumer Fraud Act if you want money. And plead a natural person or family farmer as the plaintiff if you are relying on § 325F.70, subd. 3.

Watch the transaction type. Section 325F.70, subd. 3, is limited to “a sale of merchandise for personal, family, household, or agricultural purposes”. A business-to-business fee dispute is not in that lane, though § 8.31, subd. 3a, with the Ly public-benefit showing, may still be.

Related Minnesota consumer statutes with their own disclosure and cancellation rules are covered in our articles on automatic renewal subscriptions, gift cards, and the Truth in Repairs Act.

Madgett Law, LLC

Madgett Law, LLC represents Minnesota consumers in deceptive pricing, consumer fraud, debt collection, and credit reporting disputes, in state and federal court. If you were charged a mandatory fee that was not in the price you were shown, we can tell you which statute reaches it and whether the amount justifies a claim. Call 612-470-6529 or send us a message.

Sources: Minn. Stat. § 325D.44, subd. 1a (paragraphs (a)–(k): all-in pricing requirement, “mandatory fee” definition, tax exclusion, shipping, delivery-platform, auction, variable-cost-service, food-and-beverage, broadband, and cable safe harbors, and the preemption reservation), and subd. 1b (motor vehicle dealer, PUC-regulated, and RESPA settlement-service exemptions); Minn. Stat. § 325D.45, subd. 1 (injunction; proof of monetary damage not required), subd. 2 (costs and attorney fees to the prevailing party), subd. 3 (remedies cumulative); Minn. Stat. § 325D.46, subd. 1 (nonapplication to conduct in compliance with a federal, state, or local agency rule) and subd. 1a (publishers, broadcasters, printers); Minn. Stat. § 325D.48 (short title); Minn. Stat. § 8.31, subd. 1 (list of designated statutes) and subd. 3a (private remedies); Minn. Stat. § 325F.69, subd. 1 (unlawful practices); Minn. Stat. § 325F.70, subd. 3 (private enforcement; “benefits the public”; “consumer” definition); 2024 Minn. Laws ch. 111, §§ 1–2 (enactment of subds. 1a and 1b; effective January 1, 2025, and June 1, 2025 for Metropolitan Airports Commission-regulated pricing); 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 19, § 15 (enactment of § 325F.70, subd. 3; effective August 1, 2023, applying to causes of action commenced on or after that date); Alsides v. Brown Institute, Ltd., 592 N.W.2d 468, 476 (Minn. App. 1999) (sole statutory remedy is injunctive relief); Dennis Simmons D.D.S., P.A. v. Modern Aero, Inc., 603 N.W.2d 336, 339–40 (Minn. App. 1999) (DTPA provides only injunctive relief; no DTPA claim solely for attorney fees; DTPA not on the § 8.31, subd. 1 list); State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490, 496 (Minn. 1996) (UDTPA not listed in § 8.31, subd. 1; own grant of standing); Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 314 (Minn. 2000) (public-benefit requirement under § 8.31, subd. 3a); Group Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc., 621 N.W.2d 2, 13 (Minn. 2001) (causation a necessary element of a § 8.31, subd. 3a damages action); 16 C.F.R. §§ 464.1 (covered good or service), 464.2 (hidden fees prohibited), 464.3 (misleading fees prohibited), 464.4(b) (greater protection under state law); Trade Regulation Rule on Unfair or Deceptive Fees, 90 Fed. Reg. 2066 (Jan. 10, 2025) (effective May 12, 2025); 15 U.S.C. § 57b(a)(1), (b) (Commission civil actions for rule violations). This article is general legal information about Minnesota law. It is not legal advice, it does not create an attorney–client relationship, and no particular outcome is promised or implied.