Nonconsensual Intimate Images in Minnesota: The Deepfake Claim Is the Stronger One

Minnesota has four statutes aimed at nonconsensual sexual imagery: two civil causes of action and two crimes, split between authentic images and synthetic ones. Most discussions treat the synthetic-image statutes as the weaker, newer, less-tested add-on.

The statutory text says the opposite. The civil claim for a fabricated sexual image carries a statutory civil penalty of up to $100,000. The civil claim for a real one caps at $10,000. The deepfake claim also drops an element the real-image claim requires, and it comes with a full definitional section that the real-image claim does not have at all.

That last point is not a drafting curiosity. When the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the criminal nonconsensual-dissemination statute against a First Amendment attack, it leaned on that statute’s definitions as part of what made it narrowly tailored. The civil statute a plaintiff actually sues under has no definitions section. Anyone litigating one of these cases should know which of the four statutes they are in, and what the Legislature did and did not give them.

Which of the four statutes am I actually in?

Sort by two questions: is the image real or fabricated, and is this a lawsuit or a prosecution.

The 2016 pair came in as Laws 2016, chapter 126, sections 2 and 9. Section 604.31 is “effective August 1, 2016, and applies to causes of action commenced on or after that date” — note that the trigger is when the action is commenced, not when the image was disseminated. Section 617.261 took effect the same day and applies to crimes committed on or after that date.

The 2023 pair came in as Laws 2023, chapter 58 (H.F. 1370), sections 1 and 3. Section 604.32 is “effective August 1, 2023, and applies to dissemination of a deep fake that takes place on or after that date” — here the trigger is the conduct. Section 617.262 applies to crimes committed on or after August 1, 2023. The same act also created Minn. Stat. § 609.771, the crime of using deep fake technology to influence an election, which is outside the scope of this article.

Neither 2016 section has been amended since enactment; neither 2023 section has been amended at all. That is unusual for statutes this heavily litigated elsewhere, and it means the text you read today is the text the Legislature wrote.

There is a fifth claim hiding inside § 604.31 that is routinely missed. Subdivision 2 creates a separate cause of action for nonconsensual sexual solicitation:

A person who uses the personal information of another to invite, encourage, or solicit sexual acts without the individual’s consent and knows or has reason to know it will cause the person whose personal information is used to feel harassed, frightened, threatened, oppressed, persecuted, or intimidated, is liable for damages to the individual whose personal information was published or disseminated publicly.

— Minn. Stat. § 604.31, subd. 2

That subdivision does not require any image. It reaches the fake dating-app profile, the Craigslist ad posted with a real address, the “come to this house” post — conduct that often accompanies image dissemination and sometimes substitutes for it. The damages provision in subdivision 3 applies to a person “found liable under subdivision 1 or 2.”

What does § 604.31 actually require me to prove?

Four elements, and — this is the part that surprises people — no mental state.

(a) A cause of action against a person for the nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images exists when:

(1) a person disseminated an image without the consent of the person depicted in the image;

(2) the image is of an individual depicted in a sexual act or whose intimate parts are exposed in whole or in part;

(3) the person is identifiable:

(i) from the image itself, by the person depicted in the image or by another person; or

(ii) from the personal information displayed in connection with the image; and

(4) the image was obtained or created under circumstances in which the person depicted had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

— Minn. Stat. § 604.31, subd. 1(a) (emphasis added)

Compare the crime. Section 617.261, subdivision 1, requires that the defendant “intentionally disseminate” the image, that “the actor knows or reasonably should know that the person depicted in the image does not consent to the dissemination,” and that the image was obtained or created under circumstances in which “the actor knew or reasonably should have known the person depicted had a reasonable expectation of privacy.”

Three scienter requirements in the crime. Zero in the civil claim. Subdivision 1(a)(1) asks only whether the person disseminated without consent; subdivision 1(a)(4) asks about the circumstances the depicted person was in, not what the defendant knew about them. On the face of the statute, § 604.31 is a strict-liability tort for republication — the friend who forwards a screenshot without knowing its provenance is inside the text, and the seven exemptions in subdivision 6 are where the defense has to live.

And consent to creation is not consent to distribution:

The fact that the individual depicted in the image consented to the creation of the image or to the voluntary private transmission of the image is not a defense to liability for a person who has disseminated the image without consent.

— Minn. Stat. § 604.31, subd. 1(b)

The gap nobody mentions: § 604.31 has no definitions

Read § 604.31 straight through. Subdivision 1 is the claim, 2 is solicitation, 3 is damages, 4 is injunctive relief, 5 is confidentiality, 6 is exceptions, 7 is jurisdiction, 8 is venue, 9 is the discovery rule. There is no definitions subdivision anywhere in the section.

So “image,” “disseminated,” “intimate parts,” and “sexual act” are undefined in the civil statute. Every one of those terms is expressly defined in the criminal counterpart at § 617.261, subdivision 7, and in both deepfake statutes. Section 617.261, subdivision 7(e), for instance, defines “intimate parts” as “the genitals, pubic area, or anus of an individual, or if the individual is female, a partially or fully exposed nipple.” The deepfake statutes drop the sex qualifier, and do not even agree with each other on word order: § 604.32, subdivision 1(d), reads “the genitals, pubic area, partially or fully exposed nipple, or anus of an individual,” while § 617.262, subdivision 1(f), reads “the genitals, pubic area, anus, or partially or fully exposed nipple of an individual.”

Three different formulations across four statutes about the same subject, and the one a plaintiff sues under supplies none of them. That is a live question in any § 604.31 case that turns on what the image shows.

Why is the fake-image claim worth more than the real one?

Because the Legislature said so, in the same structural slot, seven years apart.

Both damages provisions are built identically — four clauses, same order, same language. Only the third number differs:

(3) a civil penalty awarded to the plaintiff of an amount up to $10,000

— Minn. Stat. § 604.31, subd. 3(3)

(3) a civil penalty awarded to the plaintiff of an amount up to $100,000

— Minn. Stat. § 604.32, subd. 3(3)

The other three clauses are common to both: general and special damages “including all finance losses due to the dissemination” and “damages for mental anguish”; disgorgement of “any profit made from the dissemination … by the person who intentionally disclosed” the image; and “court costs, fees, and reasonable attorney fees.” Both statutes also authorize a temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order, and both let the court impose “a civil fine for the violation of a court order in an amount up to $1,000 per day for failure to comply with an order granted under this section.” §§ 604.31, subd. 4; 604.32, subd. 4.

The elements diverge in two ways that both matter more than the headline number.

The deepfake claim has no reasonable-expectation-of-privacy element. Section 604.31, subdivision 1(a)(4), requires that the image “was obtained or created under circumstances in which the person depicted had a reasonable expectation of privacy.” Nothing like it appears in § 604.32, subdivision 2 — and it could not, because a fabricated image was never obtained from the plaintiff under any circumstances at all. Removing that element removes the defense argument that consumes most of the litigation in real-image cases.

The deepfake claim adds a knowledge element. Section 604.32, subdivision 2(a)(1), requires that the defendant “disseminated a deep fake with knowledge that the depicted individual did not consent to its public dissemination.” That is a real burden and it is the price of the larger penalty. Note the object of the knowledge: nonconsent to public dissemination.

What the deepfake claim covers is also broader than most people assume. Subdivision 2(a)(2) reaches a deep fake that realistically depicts “the intimate parts of another individual presented as the intimate parts of the depicted individual,” “artificially generated intimate parts presented as the intimate parts of the depicted individual,” or “the depicted individual engaging in a sexual act.” The first clause is the face-swap. The second is the wholly synthetic body. The third is a fabricated depiction of the individual actually performing the act, not just a composite of body parts. All three are in.

And “deep fake” is defined by capability, not by tool:

“Deep fake” means any video recording, motion-picture film, sound recording, electronic image, or photograph, or any technological representation of speech or conduct substantially derivative thereof:

(1) that is so realistic that a reasonable person would believe it depicts speech or conduct of an individual; and

(2) the production of which was substantially dependent upon technical means, rather than the ability of another individual to physically or verbally impersonate such individual.

— Minn. Stat. § 604.32, subd. 1(b)

No mention of artificial intelligence, machine learning, or any named technology. A convincing Photoshop composite satisfies both prongs. So does whatever comes next.

Is any of this constitutional?

The criminal statute is. The Minnesota Supreme Court said so in State v. Casillas, No. A19-0576 (Minn. Dec. 30, 2020), and it did so on the hardest possible standard.

The facts were ordinary in the worst way. After a three-month relationship ended, Casillas used his ex-girlfriend’s login credentials to reach her cloud account, pulled a photograph and a video of her engaged in sexual relations with another man, and — after she warned him it was a prosecutable offense — sent the video to 44 people and posted it online. He was convicted after a stipulated-facts trial and sentenced to 23 months.

The district court held § 617.261 constitutional on the theory that it reached only obscenity. The court of appeals reversed, holding the statute “proscribes a substantial amount of protected expressive conduct” and was therefore overbroad. State v. Casillas, 938 N.W.2d 74, 90 (Minn. App. 2019), as quoted in the supreme court’s opinion. The supreme court reversed the court of appeals. Its syllabus is one sentence:

Although Minnesota Statutes § 617.261 (2018), prohibits more than obscenity, it survives strict scrutiny and, therefore, is a constitutional restriction on speech.

— Casillas, slip op. at 2

Three parts of the reasoning matter to a civil practitioner.

The State lost the easy arguments. The court refused to create a new category of unprotected speech for substantial invasions of privacy, holding “the State has failed to carry the heavy burden required to provide a basis to establish a new category of unprotected speech.” Slip op. at 9. It also rejected the argument that the statute reaches only obscenity, only speech integral to criminal conduct, or only child pornography, giving the example of a man who “shares a picture of his wife breast-feeding their baby against her wishes” — an image that would not appeal “to the prurient interest,” “but may fall under the statute.” Slip op. at 12. So these statutes reach protected speech, and everyone should proceed on that premise.

It won on strict scrutiny anyway. The court found a compelling interest in the harms — describing victims who suffer effects severe enough that “victims have psychological profiles that match sexual assault survivors,” slip op. at 17 — and then found narrow tailoring on four grounds: the Legislature “explicitly defined the type of image that is criminalized,” with “sexual act,” “intimate parts,” and “image” all “expressly defined”; the intent requirement means “negligent, accidental, or even reckless distributions are not proscribed”; the seven exemptions in subdivision 5 take protected speech out of the statute’s scope; and a disseminator “must act without consent.” Slip op. at 19–20. The court concluded: “Because the statute proscribes only private speech that (1) is intentionally disseminated without consent, (2) falls within numerous statutory definitions, and (3) is outside of the seven broad exemptions, we find the statute to be narrowly tailored.” Slip op. at 21.

The court expressly rejected “just use civil remedies” as the narrower alternative. In footnote 10 it held that “the permissible constitutional scope of civil remedies and criminal remedies is the same,” quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan: “What a State may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law . . . .” Slip op. at 21 n.10. It added that criminal charges may actually be preferable because defendants get more procedural protection and “the prospect of steep civil damages can chill speech even more than that of criminal prosecution,” and voiced concern that “a victim’s identity may become publicized by a civil suit.”

Put those together and the practitioner takeaway is uncomfortable but clear. Casillas does not automatically validate § 604.31. Footnote 10 says the constitutional yardstick is the same for both. But two of the four narrow-tailoring grounds — “numerous statutory definitions” and the intentional-dissemination mens rea — are features of § 617.261 that § 604.31 does not have. The statute the supreme court upheld is not the statute a plaintiff files under.

That is a defense argument waiting to be made, and it has not yet been resolved by a Minnesota appellate court that we are aware of. Plead accordingly: allege the defendant’s knowledge and intent even though subdivision 1 does not require it, and plead the facts that put the case outside every subdivision 6 exemption.

Note also what Casillas did not decide. Because the court of appeals had rested entirely on overbreadth, it never reached Casillas’s vagueness challenge or his sentencing argument, and the supreme court remanded “for consideration and decision of the remaining issues raised in this appeal.” Slip op. at 26. And the deepfake statutes did not exist in 2020; no reported Minnesota decision has tested §§ 604.32 or 617.262 that we have been able to locate.

Can I sue the website that hosted it?

Almost never. Sue the poster.

Minnesota’s two civil statutes do not create a platform carve-out. They defer:

This section does not alter or amend the liabilities and protections granted by United States Code, title 47, section 230, and shall be construed in a manner consistent with federal law.

— Minn. Stat. § 604.31, subd. 6(b); identical language at § 604.32, subd. 6(b)

Section 230 itself supplies the rule and the preemption. “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). And: “No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.” § 230(e)(3). “Interactive computer service” is defined broadly at § 230(f)(2) to include “any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server.”

The two criminal statutes go further and write the immunity into Minnesota law directly. Sections 617.261, subdivision 6, and 617.262, subdivision 7, each provide that nothing in the section imposes liability on an interactive computer service as defined in § 230(f)(2), a provider of public mobile services or private radio services, or a telecommunications network or broadband provider — “solely as a result of content or information provided by another person.”

Two openings survive, and they are narrow. Section 230 protects a service from liability for another’s content; a site that creates or develops the material in whole or in part is an “information content provider” under § 230(f)(3) and is outside the shield as to that material. And § 230(e)(1) provides that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to impair the enforcement of section 223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110 (relating to sexual exploitation of children) of title 18, or any other Federal criminal statute” — which matters more now than it used to, for reasons in the next section.

For the ordinary case, the defendant is the person who pressed send. That is also where the money and the discovery are. Identifying an anonymous poster is its own problem — one that overlaps with the proof problems in Minnesota defamation cases and with the common-law privacy torts Minnesota recognized in Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. 1998). Lake is worth remembering here for a reason beyond doctrine: the supreme court quoted it in Casillas for the proposition that “[o]ne’s naked body is a very private part of one’s person and generally known to others only by choice.” Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 235. Lake recognized intrusion upon seclusion, appropriation, and publication of private facts, and declined to recognize false light publicity. Id. at 235–36. Those torts remain available; § 604.31, subdivision 6(c), states that a cause of action under the section “does not prevent the use of any other cause of action or remedy available under the law.”

What changed federally since Casillas

Two things, and both of them are larger than the Minnesota claim.

A federal civil action with $150,000 in liquidated damages. Congress created one in the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6851 and effective October 1, 2022. An individual whose intimate visual depiction is disclosed in or affecting interstate commerce without consent, “where such disclosure was made by a person who knows that, or recklessly disregards whether, the individual has not consented to such disclosure,” may sue in federal district court. § 6851(b)(1)(A). The remedy:

an individual may recover the actual damages sustained by the individual or liquidated damages in the amount of $150,000, and the cost of the action, including reasonable attorney’s fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred

— 15 U.S.C. § 6851(b)(3)(A)(i)

The court may also order a TRO, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction to cease display or disclosure, § 6851(b)(3)(A)(ii), and “may grant injunctive relief maintaining the confidentiality of a plaintiff using a pseudonym,” § 6851(b)(3)(B). Consent to creation does not establish consent to distribution, and disclosure to one person does not establish consent to further disclosure. § 6851(b)(2). Four exceptions apply: commercial pornographic content not produced by force or fraud; good-faith disclosures to law enforcement or as part of a legal proceeding; “a matter of public concern or public interest”; and disclosure “reasonably intended to assist the identifiable individual.” § 6851(b)(4).

A Minnesota plaintiff choosing between $10,000 under § 604.31 and $150,000 under § 6851 has a straightforward decision to make, subject to the higher federal scienter standard (“knows … or recklessly disregards”) and to venue and service realities. The two are not exclusive: § 604.31, subdivision 6(c), preserves other remedies.

The TAKE IT DOWN Act. Signed May 19, 2025 as Pub. L. 119–12, it did two distinct things.

First, it created a federal crime at 47 U.S.C. § 223(h) covering both authentic intimate visual depictions and “digital forgeries.” The definition is technology-agnostic and turns on realism:

The term “digital forgery” means any intimate visual depiction of an identifiable individual created through the use of software, machine learning, artificial intelligence, or any other computer-generated or technological means, including by adapting, modifying, manipulating, or altering an authentic visual depiction, that, when viewed as a whole by a reasonable person, is indistinguishable from an authentic visual depiction of the individual.

— 47 U.S.C. § 223(h)(1)(B)

Publication of an authentic depiction of a non-minor is unlawful where the depiction was obtained or created under circumstances implicating a reasonable expectation of privacy, what is depicted was not voluntarily exposed publicly or commercially, it is not a matter of public concern, and publication “is intended to cause harm” or “causes harm, including psychological, financial, or reputational harm.” § 223(h)(2)(A). The digital-forgery offense is parallel but replaces the privacy element with simple lack of consent. § 223(h)(3)(A). Penalties run to two years for offenses involving adults and three years for minors, § 223(h)(4), and there are separate threat offenses — including 18 months for threatening to publish a digital forgery of an adult. § 223(h)(6)(B)(i). Because § 230(e)(1) expressly preserves the enforcement of “section 223,” this new federal crime sits outside the § 230 shield.

Second — and this is the piece a lawyer can actually use next week — it created a notice-and-removal duty at 47 U.S.C. § 223a, aimed not at prosecutors but at the platforms themselves. That duty, not the criminal statute, is where the next section picks up.

Can I make a platform take it down in 48 hours?

Yes — and as of May 19, 2026, every covered platform is supposed to have a process for it. This is the most practically useful development in this area in a decade, and it is not a lawsuit.

Section 223a(a)(1)(A) required covered platforms to build a notice-and-removal process “[n]ot later than 1 year after May 19, 2025.” Section 223a(a)(2) requires a “clear and conspicuous notice” of that process, “easy to read and in plain language.” Then the operative duty:

Upon receiving a valid removal request from an identifiable individual (or an authorized person acting on behalf of such individual) using the process described in paragraph (1)(A)(ii), a covered platform shall, as soon as possible, but not later than 48 hours after receiving such request—

(A) remove the intimate visual depiction; and

(B) make reasonable efforts to identify and remove any known identical copies of such depiction.

— 47 U.S.C. § 223a(a)(3)

A valid request has four required components under § 223a(a)(1)(B): a physical or electronic signature; identification of, and information reasonably sufficient to locate, the depiction; a brief good-faith-belief statement that the depiction is not consensual, including relevant information for the platform to determine it was published without consent; and contact information. Send an incomplete request and the 48-hour clock does not start. Draft it as a compliance document, not a complaint letter.

Two limits to state plainly.

There is no private right of action in § 223a. Enforcement is by the Federal Trade Commission: a failure to reasonably comply “shall be treated as a violation of a rule defining an unfair or a deceptive act or practice under section 18(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.” § 223a(b)(1). The statute gives the Commission FTC Act powers to enforce it, including — notably — over organizations “not organized to carry on business for their own profit or that of their members.” § 223a(b)(2)(D). What the statute gives a victim is a deadline and a referral, not a claim.

Platforms are protected for over-removal. Section 223a(a)(4) shields a covered platform from “any claim based on the covered platform’s good faith disabling of access to, or removal of, material claimed to be a nonconsensual intimate visual depiction,” regardless of whether the material turns out to be unlawful. That is deliberate: it makes removal the cheap choice.

“Covered platform” is defined in an uncodified definitions section, Pub. L. 119–12, § 4(3), as a website, online service, or application that serves the public and either primarily provides a forum for user-generated content or, in the regular course of business, publishes, curates, hosts, or makes available nonconsensual intimate visual depictions. Broadband providers, email, and largely non-user-generated services are excluded.

So the sequence in a real case is usually: § 223a takedown request first, because it is fast and costs nothing; then the civil claim against the poster under § 604.31, § 604.32, or 15 U.S.C. § 6851; then, where appropriate, a report to law enforcement under § 617.261, § 617.262, or 47 U.S.C. § 223(h). A harassment restraining order is often the fastest court process of all where the parties know each other.

How long do I have?

Two different clocks — and one applicability date that is easy to mistake for a third.

Minn. Stat. § 604.31 and § 604.32 each contain a discovery rule. “In a civil action brought under subdivision 1, the statute of limitations is tolled until the plaintiff discovers the image has been disseminated.” § 604.31, subd. 9. Section 604.32, subdivision 9, says the same as to a deep fake. Note what these subdivisions do and do not do: they toll a limitations period, they do not supply one. Neither section states a limitations period of its own, so the applicable period comes from chapter 541 and depends on how the claim is characterized — a question to run down early rather than assume. Mark it as an open issue in any case that is not obviously fresh.

15 U.S.C. § 6851 contains no limitations period. The federal catch-all applies: “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, a civil action arising under an Act of Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of this section may not be commenced later than 4 years after the cause of action accrues.” 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a). Section 6851 was enacted in 2022, well after § 1658’s December 1, 1990 enactment, so four years from accrual is the working assumption.

Applicability dates are a separate question from limitations. Section 604.31 applies to causes of action commenced on or after August 1, 2016. Section 604.32 applies to dissemination that takes place on or after August 1, 2023. Section 6851 took effect October 1, 2022. A 2021 dissemination of a fabricated image has no § 604.32 claim no matter how recently it was discovered.

Will suing make it worse? Filing confidentially

This is the objection that stops most of these cases, and the Minnesota Supreme Court shared it — in Casillas the court said it was “additionally concerned that a victim’s identity may become publicized by a civil suit, thus leading to greater harm.” Slip op. at 21 n.10.

The Legislature addressed it directly, in one sentence that is easy to skip:

The court shall allow confidential filings to protect the privacy of the plaintiff in cases filed under this section.

— Minn. Stat. § 604.31, subd. 5; identical at § 604.32, subd. 5

“Shall,” not “may.” Ask for it in the first filing, and cite the subdivision.

Venue reinforces the point. Both civil sections permit filing in “the county of residence of the defendant or plaintiff or in the jurisdiction of the plaintiff’s designated address if the plaintiff participates in the address confidentiality program established by chapter 5B,” or in the county where the image was produced, reproduced, or stored. §§ 604.31, subd. 8; 604.32, subd. 8. The criminal venue provisions in §§ 617.261, subdivision 4, and 617.262, subdivision 5, carry the same Safe at Home accommodation. Jurisdiction is satisfied “if the plaintiff or defendant resides in this state.” §§ 604.31, subd. 7; 604.32, subd. 7.

On the federal side, 15 U.S.C. § 6851(b)(3)(B) provides that in ordering relief “the court may grant injunctive relief maintaining the confidentiality of a plaintiff using a pseudonym.” That is discretionary, unlike the Minnesota provision.

What the first week looks like

1. Preserve everything before you do anything. Full-page screen captures with visible URL, timestamp, and account handle; the underlying file where obtainable; message threads showing the threat or the demand. Do not rely on the platform to keep it — you are about to ask them to delete it.
2. Send the § 223a request. Include all four required components from § 223a(a)(1)(B). Calendar 48 hours from delivery. Document the delivery method.
3. Decide which image you have. Real or fabricated determines whether the claim is § 604.31 (up to $10,000 penalty, reasonable-expectation-of-privacy element, no scienter element) or § 604.32 (up to $100,000 penalty, no privacy element, knowledge element).
4. Run the federal comparison. If the disclosure touches interstate commerce and the defendant knew or recklessly disregarded nonconsent, 15 U.S.C. § 6851 offers $150,000 in liquidated damages and fees.
5. Check the exemptions before you plead, not after. Seven of them in § 604.31, subdivision 6, and a differently worded seven in § 604.32, subdivision 6 — the deepfake version adds a labeling-and-good-faith condition to the public-interest and research exemptions that the real-image version does not have.
6. Ask for confidential filing under subdivision 5 in the first document you file.
7. Do not sue the platform. Sue the person who disseminated. Consider whether the site independently created or developed content, which would take it outside 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
8. Plead intent even though § 604.31 does not require it. Given Casillas’s narrow-tailoring reasoning, a complaint that alleges knowledge and intent is better positioned against a First Amendment defense than one that rests on the bare statutory elements.

Related reading on this site: Minnesota’s three privacy regimes for how statutory, constitutional, and common-law privacy fit together; recording and surveillance consent for how images are lawfully or unlawfully captured in the first place; and the invasion of privacy torts for the claims that survive alongside these statutes.

Madgett Law, LLC

Madgett Law, LLC represents Minnesota clients in civil actions under Minn. Stat. § 604.31 and § 604.32 and under 15 U.S.C. § 6851, including platform takedown demands under 47 U.S.C. § 223a, motions for confidential filing, injunctive relief to stop ongoing dissemination, and identification of anonymous posters. We also advise clients on how a civil case interacts with a pending criminal prosecution under § 617.261 or § 617.262. If images of you are circulating, the first hours matter more than the first month. Call 612-470-6529 or send us a message.

Sources: Minn. Stat. § 604.31, subd. 1(a)(1)–(4) (elements; no scienter requirement), subd. 1(b) (consent to creation not a defense), subd. 2 (nonconsensual sexual solicitation), subd. 3(1)–(4) (damages; $10,000 civil penalty at clause (3)), subd. 4 (injunction; $1,000 per day fine for violating an order), subd. 5 (court shall allow confidential filings), subd. 6(a)(1)–(7) (exemptions), subd. 6(b) (no alteration of 47 U.S.C. § 230), subd. 6(c) (other remedies preserved), subd. 7 (jurisdiction), subd. 8 (venue; chapter 5B designated address), subd. 9 (tolling until discovery); § 604.32, subd. 1(b) (definition of “deep fake”), subd. 1(d) (definition of “intimate parts”), subd. 2(a)(1)–(3) (elements; knowledge of nonconsent to public dissemination; no reasonable-expectation-of-privacy element), subd. 2(b) (consent to creation not a defense), subd. 3(3) ($100,000 civil penalty), subd. 4, subd. 5, subd. 6(a)(4)–(6) (labeling and good-faith conditions absent from § 604.31), subd. 6(b)–(c), subds. 7–9; § 617.261, subd. 1(1)–(3) (crime; three scienter elements), subd. 2(a)–(b) (gross misdemeanor; three years and $5,000 on any of seven factors), subd. 3, subd. 4 (venue), subd. 5 (seven exemptions), subd. 6 (immunity for interactive computer services, mobile and radio providers, and telecommunications and broadband providers), subd. 7(d)–(e), (g) (definitions of “image,” “intimate parts,” “sexual act”); § 617.262, subd. 1(b) (deep fake), subd. 1(f) (intimate parts), subd. 2 (crime), subd. 3 (penalties), subd. 4 (no defense), subd. 5 (venue), subd. 6 (exemptions), subd. 7 (immunity); § 609.771 (deep fake technology to influence an election, noted only). Session laws: Laws 2016, ch. 126, § 2 (enacting § 604.31; effective August 1, 2016 and applicable to causes of action commenced on or after that date) and § 9 (enacting § 617.261; effective August 1, 2016, applicable to crimes committed on or after that date); Laws 2023, ch. 58 (H.F. 1370), § 1 (enacting § 604.32; effective August 1, 2023 and applicable to dissemination taking place on or after that date), § 2 (§ 609.771), § 3 (enacting § 617.262; effective August 1, 2023, applicable to crimes committed on or after that date). Federal: 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (no treatment as publisher or speaker), § 230(e)(1) (no impairment of enforcement of section 223), § 230(e)(3) (preemption of inconsistent state law), § 230(f)(2)–(3) (definitions of interactive computer service and information content provider); 47 U.S.C. § 223(h)(1)(B) (definition of “digital forgery”), § 223(h)(2)(A) (authentic depictions, adults), § 223(h)(3)(A) (digital forgeries, adults), § 223(h)(4) (penalties), § 223(h)(6)(B)(i) (threats involving digital forgeries of adults); 47 U.S.C. § 223a(a)(1)(A)–(B) (process required within one year of May 19, 2025; four components of a valid request), § 223a(a)(2) (notice of process), § 223a(a)(3) (48-hour removal and identical copies), § 223a(a)(4) (good-faith removal immunity), § 223a(b)(1)–(2) (FTC enforcement as an unfair or deceptive practice; jurisdiction over nonprofits), and Pub. L. 119–12, § 4(3) (definition of “covered platform”); 15 U.S.C. § 6851(b)(1)(A) (right of action), § 6851(b)(2) (consent rules), § 6851(b)(3)(A)(i) (actual damages or $150,000 liquidated damages, costs, and fees), § 6851(b)(3)(A)(ii) (equitable relief), § 6851(b)(3)(B) (pseudonym), § 6851(b)(4) (four exceptions), and Pub. L. 117–103, div. W, § 4 (effective October 1, 2022); 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a) (four-year default limitations period). Cases: State v. Casillas, No. A19-0576 (Minn. Dec. 30, 2020), slip op. at 2 (syllabus), 3–4 (facts and procedural history), 9 (refusal to create a new category of unprotected speech), 12 (statute reaches non-obscene images), 17 (harms), 19–21 (narrow tailoring; definitions and intent), 21 n.10 (civil and criminal constitutional scope are the same), 26 (remand of undecided issues), retrieved as the Minnesota Judicial Branch slip opinion PDF; State v. Casillas, 938 N.W.2d 74, 90 (Minn. App. 2019), as cited in the supreme court’s opinion; Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235–36 (Minn. 1998) (naked body as a private interest; recognizing intrusion upon seclusion, appropriation, and publication of private facts; declining false light). Minn. Stat. § 604.31 contains no definitions subdivision; that statement is based on a full reading of the section as published by the Revisor. This article is general legal information about Minnesota and federal law. It is not legal advice, it does not create an attorney–client relationship, and no particular outcome is promised or implied.