Acceptance is the most consequential thing a Minnesota buyer of goods ever does, and almost nobody does it on purpose. You do not sign an acceptance. You accept by keeping the thing past a reasonable opportunity to inspect it, or by doing something with it that only an owner would do. Minn. Stat. § 336.2-606(1). By the time a buyer calls a lawyer, that door has usually closed.
It matters because the standard on either side of the door is not the same standard. Before acceptance, the buyer may reject if the goods “fail in any respect” to conform. § 336.2-601. After acceptance, the buyer has to prove a nonconformity that “substantially impairs” the value of the goods to the buyer, and has to fit one of two narrow predicates for how the goods came to be accepted at all — acceptance on the reasonable assumption the defect would be cured, or acceptance without discovery of it. § 336.2-608(1)(a)–(b). The buyer also now carries the burden of proof. § 336.2-607(4).
Most people in this position assume Minnesota’s Lemon Law is the escape hatch. It is not a better version of the same claim. It is a different claim, against a different defendant, on different numbers — and its numbers exclude a large share of the vehicles people bring in. The existing companion piece, The UCC Gives Buyers Warranties, Then Hands Sellers Three Ways to Take Them Back, covers how warranties are created and disclaimed. This one is about what happens after you have accepted.
When exactly did I accept?
Earlier than you think, and possibly without doing anything at all.
(1) Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer
(a) after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods signifies to the seller that the goods are conforming or that the buyer will take or retain them in spite of their nonconformity; or
(b) fails to make an effective rejection (subsection (1) of section 336.2-602), but such acceptance does not occur until the buyer has had a reasonable opportunity to inspect them; or
(c) does any act inconsistent with the seller’s ownership; but if such act is wrongful as against the seller it is an acceptance only if ratified by the seller.
— Minn. Stat. § 336.2-606(1)
Paragraph (b) is the one that catches consumers: acceptance by silence. Rejection “must be within a reasonable time after their delivery or tender,” and “[i]t is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably notifies the seller.” § 336.2-602(1). “Seasonably” means “at or within the time agreed or, if no time is agreed, at or within a reasonable time.” § 336.1-205(b). Nobody rejects a new car in the first week. Everyone drives it to the dealer instead. That is acceptance.
What did I give up by accepting?
Three things, and one of them is the seller’s problem becoming yours.
| Before acceptance (rejection) | After acceptance (revocation) | |
|---|---|---|
| Defect threshold | Goods “fail in any respect to conform” — § 336.2-601 | Nonconformity that “substantially impairs its value to the buyer” — § 336.2-608(1) |
| Extra predicate | None | Must have accepted on the reasonable assumption the defect would be cured and it was not seasonably cured, or without discovery where discovery was difficult or the seller gave assurances — § 336.2-608(1)(a)–(b) |
| Timing | Reasonable time after delivery or tender — § 336.2-602(1) | Reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground, and before any substantial change in condition not caused by the defects — § 336.2-608(2) |
| Seller’s right to cure | Yes, on the terms in § 336.2-508 | No, where the defect substantially impairs value — Johannsen, 304 N.W.2d at 657 |
| Burden of proof | On the seller in practice | “The burden is on the buyer to establish any breach with respect to the goods accepted” — § 336.2-607(4) |
The right-to-cure row is the underappreciated one, and it runs in the buyer’s favor. Section 336.2-508 is written entirely in terms of a rejected tender. The Minnesota Supreme Court refused to import it into revocation: “any right to cure should be limited to cases in which the defects are minor, and we hold that the seller has no right to cure defects which substantially impair the good’s value.” Johannsen v. Minn. Valley Ford Tractor Co., 304 N.W.2d 654, 657 (Minn. 1981).
What does it take to revoke acceptance?
Seven things. Minnesota’s supreme court enumerated them in Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Minn. 1977), and has repeated the list since:
(1) the goods must be nonconforming; (2) the nonconformity must substantially impair the value of the goods to the buyer; (3) the buyer must have accepted the goods on the reasonable assumption that the nonconformity would be cured; (4) the nonconformity must not have been seasonably cured; (5) the buyer must notify the seller of his revocation; (6) revocation must occur within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any substantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects; and (7) the buyer must take reasonable care of the goods for which he has revoked acceptance.
Item five is where cases die. Section 336.2-608(2) closes with a sentence that does all the work: revocation “is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller of it.” Complaining is not revoking. Bringing the car back for the fifth repair is not revoking. There has to be a communication that says the buyer is done and is giving the vehicle back — in Jacobs, a letter; in Johannsen, a written notice from counsel directing the dealer to pick the tractor up.
And note that this is a third notice obligation, distinct from the two in the neighborhood. Rejection requires seasonable notice under § 336.2-602(1). A retained-goods breach claim requires notice under § 336.2-607(3)(a) or the buyer is “barred from any remedy.” Revocation requires its own notice under § 336.2-608(2). A buyer who gave one of the three has not necessarily given the others.
How bad does the defect have to be?
Bad enough that the buyer’s confidence in the goods is gone — which is a lower bar than “unfixable.”
Durfee set the Minnesota standard, borrowing a common-sense frame: minor defects that do not substantially interfere with the vehicle’s operation or with the comfort and security it affords passengers are not grounds for revocation, but “if the defect substantially interferes with operation of the vehicle or a purpose for which it was purchased, a court may find grounds for revocation. Indeed, substantial impairment has been found even where the defect is curable, if it shakes the faith of the purchase in the automobile.” 262 N.W.2d at 354.
The buyer in Durfee won on a Saab that stalled repeatedly plus an accumulation of smaller annoyances; the court noted that “[a] seller does not have an unlimited time to deliver conforming goods,” and that the availability of a repair does not by itself defeat substantial impairment. 262 N.W.2d at 355. In Jacobs v. Rosemount Dodge-Winnebago South, 310 N.W.2d 71, 76 (Minn. 1981), a motor home that broke down on the road and spent long stretches in the shop substantially impaired its value to buyers who had bought it to travel in.
Does driving it kill the claim?
Not automatically, and this is the misconception that keeps buyers in a vehicle they should have handed back.
Durfee found 6,300 miles “troublesome” but not a substantial change in condition precluding revocation. 262 N.W.2d at 353 n.4. Jacobs went further — about 900 of the miles were driven after the revocation letter, and the court held that continued use “is not inconsistent with the necessity of checking the vehicle after repairs were made.” 310 N.W.2d at 77.
Johannsen is the governing statement. There is “no blanket rule which prohibits such a buyer from continuing to use the goods,” because a blanket rule “would contravene the code’s rule of reasonableness.” 304 N.W.2d at 658. Reasonableness is a fact question, and the court listed what a jury may weigh: the seller’s instructions to the buyer after revocation; the degree of economic and other hardship the buyer would suffer by discontinuing use; whether continued use was a reasonable method of mitigating damages; the degree of prejudice to the seller; and whether the seller acted in bad faith. Id.
Timeliness is likewise a jury question. Johannsen, 304 N.W.2d at 657; Holland v. Dick Youngberg Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 348 N.W.2d 770, 775 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). Jacobs upheld a revocation sent just short of twelve months after delivery, where the vehicle had gone back at least five times. 310 N.W.2d at 76.
Why does revocation matter more than a warranty suit?
Because the two remedies are not the same size.
A buyer who justifiably revokes “has the same rights and duties with regard to the goods involved as if the buyer had rejected them,” § 336.2-608(3), which routes into § 336.2-711(1) — cancel, and recover “so much of the price as has been paid.” That is the money back.
A buyer who keeps the goods and sues on the warranty gets § 336.2-714(2): “the difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount.” That is an appraisal fight, usually much smaller, and it requires the § 336.2-607(3)(a) notice anyway. Revocation is also self-securing: § 336.2-711(3) gives the revoking buyer a security interest in the goods in the buyer’s possession for payments made and reasonable expenses of inspection, receipt, transportation, care, and custody.
Where does the Lemon Law fit — and what are the actual numbers?
Minn. Stat. § 325F.665 runs against the manufacturer, not the dealer. Subdivision 13 says so: “Nothing in this section imposes liability on a dealer or creates an additional cause of action by a consumer against a dealer, except for written express warranties made by the dealer apart from the manufacturer’s warranties.” If your complaint is about the dealership, this statute is not your claim.
The thresholds, quoted exactly:
The coverage period. Subdivision 2 obligates the manufacturer to repair a nonconformity reported “during the term of the applicable express warranties or during the period of two years following the date of original delivery of the new motor vehicle to a consumer, whichever is the earlier date.”
The repair-attempt and out-of-service presumption. Subdivision 3(b):
It is presumed that a reasonable number of attempts have been undertaken to conform a new motor vehicle to the applicable express warranties, if (1) the same nonconformity has been subject to repair four or more times by the manufacturer, its agents, or its authorized dealers within the applicable express warranty term or during the period of two years following the date of original delivery of the new motor vehicle to a consumer, whichever is the earlier date, but the nonconformity continues to exist, or (2) the vehicle is out of service by reason of repair for a cumulative total of 30 or more business days during the term or during the period, whichever is the earlier date.
Read clause (2) carefully: business days, not calendar days, and cumulative, not consecutive.
The safety exception. If the nonconformity “results in a complete failure of the braking or steering system” and is “likely to cause death or serious bodily injury if the vehicle is driven,” the presumption arises if the nonconformity “has been subject to repair at least once” within the same term or two-year period and continues to exist. Subd. 3(c).
The written-notice precondition. The presumption in paragraph (b) “applies against a manufacturer only if the manufacturer, its agent, or its authorized dealer has received prior written notification from or on behalf of the consumer at least once and an opportunity to cure the defect alleged.” Subd. 3(e). Same lesson as the UCC: the writing is the claim.
The outer window. Expiration of the subdivision 3(b) periods “does not bar a consumer from receiving a refund or replacement vehicle under paragraph (a) if the reasonable number of attempts to correct the nonconformity causing the substantial impairment occur within three years following the date of original delivery of the new motor vehicle to a consumer,” provided the consumer first reported the nonconformity during the express warranty term. Subd. 3(f).
The suit deadline. A civil action “must be commenced within three years of the date of original delivery of the new motor vehicle to a consumer”; if the consumer applied to an informal dispute settlement mechanism within that period and is aggrieved by the outcome, suit must be commenced “within six months after the date of the final decision by the mechanism.” Subd. 10.
What comes off the refund. A reasonable allowance for use, “not exceeding ten cents per mile driven or ten percent of the purchase price, whichever is less.” Subd. 3(a).
Which vehicles and which buyers does the Lemon Law exclude?
This is where most readers actually land, so read the definitions before the remedies.
Used vehicles are out. The statute governs a “new motor vehicle.” A used vehicle is covered instead by Minn. Stat. § 325F.662, discussed below.
Vehicles that are not “passenger automobiles” are out. “Motor vehicle” means a passenger automobile as defined in § 168.002, subd. 24, including pickup trucks and vans; the self-propelled chassis or van portion of a recreational vehicle as defined in § 168.002, subd. 27; and the self-propelled chassis or van portion of an ambulance. Subd. 1(f). And § 168.002, subd. 24(b) provides that “‘Passenger automobile’ does not include motorcycles, motor scooters, buses, school buses, or commuter vans as defined in section 168.126.” Motorcycles are not covered by Minnesota’s Lemon Law.
On an RV, only the chassis is covered. The statute reaches “the self-propelled motor vehicle chassis or van portion” — not the coach, not the living quarters, not the appliances. A towable travel trailer has no self-propelled chassis at all.
Buyers who are not “consumers” are out. A consumer is a purchaser or lessee “other than for purposes of resale or sublease,” of a new motor vehicle “used for personal, family, or household purposes at least 40 percent of the time.” Subd. 1(b). A vehicle titled to a business and used mostly for the business fails the 40 percent test. So does a vehicle bought to flip.
Most leases are out. A qualifying “lease” must be to “a natural person,” for “a period of time exceeding four months,” and used for personal, family, or household purposes “at least 40 percent of the time.” Subd. 1(e). A company car on a fleet lease does not qualify.
Small manufacturers are out. “Manufacturer” reaches only a person who “will, under normal business conditions during the year, manufacture, assemble or distribute to dealers at least ten new motor vehicles.” Subd. 1(c).
One inclusion worth flagging: a licensed ambulance service under chapter 144E that purchases or leases a qualifying ambulance is expressly a “consumer.” Subd. 1(b).
What if the vehicle is used?
Minnesota has a separate statute, and it is a dealer-side obligation rather than a manufacturer-side one. Section 325F.662, subd. 2(a), requires every dealer selling a used motor vehicle to provide a written express warranty, with statutory minimum terms keyed to odometer reading: at least 60 days or 2,500 miles, whichever comes first, under 36,000 miles; at least 30 days or 1,000 miles from 36,000 to under 75,000 miles; and, unless sold by a new motor vehicle dealer, at least 15 days or 500 miles from 75,000 to under 200,000 miles. Subdivision 5 makes it self-executing: “If a dealer fails to give the express warranty required by this section, the dealer nevertheless is considered to have given the express warranty as a matter of law.”
Subdivision 3 then lists nine exclusions — among them diesel-engine vehicles, gross weight over 9,000 pounds, custom-built or racing vehicles, vehicles at 200,000 miles or more at sale, salvage-branded titles, and (subject to a carve-back) vehicles sold for a total cash price under $3,000 or eight model years old or older. Check that list before assuming a used-car claim exists at all.
The arbitration step you cannot skip
Subdivision 6(a) requires every covered manufacturer to operate or participate in an informal dispute settlement mechanism in Minnesota complying with 16 C.F.R. part 703 — and then provides that “[t]he provisions of subdivision 3 concerning refunds or replacement do not apply to a consumer who has not first used this mechanism before commencing a civil action, unless the manufacturer allows a consumer to commence an action without first using this mechanism.” Filing suit for a Lemon Law refund without going through the mechanism forfeits the refund remedy.
The mechanism’s decision is nonbinding unless the parties agree otherwise, and any party may remove it to district court for a trial de novo — but a manufacturer must file the application to remove “within 30 days after the date the decision is received by the parties,” failing which the court “shall, upon application of a party, issue an order confirming the decision.” Subd. 7. A party that removes in bad faith faces “three times the actual damages sustained, together with costs and disbursements, including reasonable attorney’s fees.” Subd. 8. Subdivision 9 gives the consumer a civil action with “costs and disbursements, including reasonable attorney’s fees,” and lets the attorney general proceed under § 8.31 — the same fee-shifting architecture described in Minnesota’s Private Attorney General Statute.
Crucially, subdivision 11 preserves everything else: “Nothing in this section limits the rights or remedies which are otherwise available to a consumer under any other law.” The UCC revocation claim, a Consumer Fraud Act claim, and the Lemon Law claim are cumulative, not alternatives. And if there is a loan against the vehicle, revoking acceptance does not by itself resolve the lender’s position — see Repossession and Deficiency Judgments Under UCC Article 9.
What Madgett Law, LLC does here
We represent Minnesota buyers and lessees in revocation-of-acceptance and breach-of-warranty disputes over vehicles, equipment, and other goods — drafting the revocation notice so that it actually works, preserving the § 336.2-607(3)(a) notice while the facts are still developing, running the § 325F.665 arbitration step where it applies, and handling the lender side when a financed vehicle is going back. If you are still driving something you have been fighting about, the clock in § 336.2-608(2) is already running: Send us a message or call 612-470-6529.
Sources: Minn. Stat. § 336.2-601 (buyer’s rights on improper delivery; “fail in any respect”); § 336.2-602(1) (rejection within a reasonable time; ineffective unless the buyer seasonably notifies); § 336.2-602(2)(b) (duty to hold rejected goods with reasonable care at the seller’s disposition); § 336.2-606(1)(a)–(c) (what constitutes acceptance, including failure to make an effective rejection and acts inconsistent with the seller’s ownership); § 336.2-607(3)(a) (notice of breach after acceptance “or be barred from any remedy”) and § 336.2-607(4) (burden on the buyer); § 336.2-608(1)(a)–(b), (2), (3) (revocation of acceptance; substantial impairment; the two acceptance predicates; reasonable time and substantial change in condition; “not effective until the buyer notifies the seller of it”; revoking buyer has a rejecting buyer’s rights); § 336.2-508(1)–(2) (seller’s cure, framed in terms of a rejected tender); § 336.2-711(1), (3) (recovery of the price paid; buyer’s security interest); § 336.2-714(2) (value-as-warranted measure for accepted goods); § 336.1-205(b) (definition of “seasonably”). Minn. Stat. § 325F.665, subd. 1(b) (definition of “consumer”: not for resale or sublease; new motor vehicle; personal, family, or household use at least 40 percent of the time; licensed ambulance services), subd. 1(c) (“manufacturer” — at least ten new motor vehicles), subd. 1(e) (qualifying “lease”: natural person, exceeding four months, 40 percent), subd. 1(f) (definition of “motor vehicle”: passenger automobile; chassis or van portion of a recreational vehicle; chassis or van portion of an ambulance), subd. 2 (duty to repair; term of the express warranty or two years from original delivery, whichever is earlier), subd. 3(a) (refund or replacement; use allowance not exceeding ten cents per mile or ten percent of the purchase price, whichever is less), subd. 3(b)(1)–(2) (presumption: four or more repairs of the same nonconformity; 30 or more cumulative business days out of service), subd. 3(c) (braking or steering failure; at least once), subd. 3(e) (prior written notification at least once and an opportunity to cure), subd. 3(f) (three-year outer window), subd. 6(a) (informal dispute settlement mechanism; subdivision 3 remedies unavailable to a consumer who has not first used it), subd. 7 (nonbinding decision; 30 days to remove for trial de novo; confirmation if not removed), subd. 8 (treble damages for bad-faith removal), subd. 9 (civil remedy; attorney’s fees; attorney general action under § 8.31), subd. 10 (three years from original delivery; six months after a final mechanism decision), subd. 11 (remedy nonexclusive), subd. 13 (no dealer liability), subd. 14 (title branding). Minn. Stat. § 168.002, subd. 24(a)–(b) (definition of “passenger automobile”; exclusion of motorcycles, motor scooters, buses, school buses, and commuter vans) and subd. 27 (definition of “recreational vehicle”). Minn. Stat. § 325F.662, subd. 2(a)(1)–(3) (minimum used-vehicle express warranty terms), subd. 3(1)–(9) (exclusions), subd. 5 (warranty implied as a matter of law if not given). Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349, 353 & n.4, 354, 355 (Minn. 1977) (seven requirements for revocation; mileage not a substantial change in condition; substantial impairment where the defect “shakes the faith”; seller has no unlimited time to deliver conforming goods); Johannsen v. Minn. Valley Ford Tractor Co., 304 N.W.2d 654, 657–58 (Minn. 1981) (no right to cure a substantially impairing defect; reasonable time is a jury question; no blanket bar on continued use, and the factors a jury may weigh); Jacobs v. Rosemount Dodge-Winnebago South, 310 N.W.2d 71, 76–77 (Minn. 1981) (substantial impairment of a motor home; revocation just short of twelve months timely; post-revocation use not reacceptance); Holland v. Dick Youngberg Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 348 N.W.2d 770, 775 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (timeliness of revocation is a jury question). Statutory text from the Minnesota Office of the Revisor of Statutes, 2025 Minnesota Statutes; no 2026 amendment banner appears on § 325F.665, § 325F.662, § 168.002, or any Article 2 section cited. This article is general legal information about Minnesota law. It is not legal advice, it does not create an attorney–client relationship, and no particular outcome is promised or implied.