Minnesota's 'Uniform' Anti-SLAPP Law Has 12 Exemptions. The Uniform Act Has 3. Some of Minnesota's Are Texas's, Word for Word.

November 4, 2026 · David J.S. Madgett

Minnesota’s anti-SLAPP statute calls itself the “Uniform Public Expression Protection Act.” It even tells Minnesota judges to think about uniformity when they read it: “consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.” Minn. Stat. § 554.18.

So I pulled the uniform act. The Uniform Law Commission’s version, approved in July 2020, lists 3 kinds of lawsuits the act doesn’t reach. Minnesota’s lists 12. And when I put Minnesota’s extra language next to the Texas anti-SLAPP statute, some of it matched. Not close. Word for word.

Texas has been running its version, the Texas Citizens Participation Act, since June 17, 2011. Minnesota’s took effect May 25, 2024. This is a round in my Minnesota-vs-Texas series, which started on the paycheck at /news/minnesota-vs-texas-wage-garnishment-571-922/. This time the person being protected isn’t a debtor. It’s somebody who got sued for saying something. And on most of the things that decide those cases, Texas protects that person more.

What is an anti-SLAPP law, and why does Minnesota have a new one?

A SLAPP is a lawsuit filed to make somebody stop talking: the neighbor who complained to the city council, the customer who posted a review, the landowner who called a regulator. The suit doesn’t have to win. It just has to cost enough. An anti-SLAPP statute gives the person sued a fast motion to throw the case out early, and usually makes the plaintiff pay the defendant’s lawyer if the motion wins.

Minnesota had one starting in 1994, at §§ 554.01 to 554.06. In 2017 the Minnesota Supreme Court held its core procedure, § 554.02, unconstitutional as applied to a claim at law alleging a tort, because it required a judge to make a pretrial finding a jury should make. Leiendecker v. Asian Women United of Minn., 895 N.W.2d 623, 631, 637–38 (Minn. 2017). The Legislature repealed the old chapter and enacted the uniform act in its place, 2024 Minn. Laws ch. 123, art. 18, effective the day after the governor signed it on May 24, 2024. I told that whole story, and walked the Minnesota statute section by section, at /news/minnesota-anti-slapp-upepa-554/. Here I’m putting it next to Texas.

Where did Minnesota’s exemption list come from?

Start with the uniform act. Section 2(c) says the act doesn’t apply to a cause of action asserted against a government body or official acting in an official capacity, by a government body enforcing a law “to protect against an imminent threat to public health or safety”, or against a business over a communication related to its sale or lease of goods or services. Uniform Public Expression Protection Act § 2(c)(1)–(3) (Unif. L. Comm’n 2020). Three. The drafters’ comment says “Section 2(c) provides a list of exemptions, or situations to which the Act does not apply.” Id. § 2 cmt. 10.

Minnesota kept those three as clauses (1) through (3) of § 554.08(c) and added nine more: suits by crime victims against perpetrators, real-property suits, bodily-injury and wrongful-death suits, insurance suits, common-law fraud, family law and protective orders, a long list of employment claims, consumer-protection claims under chapters 325F and 325G, and “any claim brought under federal law.” § 554.08(c)(4)–(12).

Now Texas. Three of Minnesota’s additions, next to Texas’s:

(6) seeking recovery for bodily injury, wrongful death, or survival or to statements made regarding that legal action, unless the claims involve damage to reputation;

(7) brought under the insurance code or arising out of an insurance contract;

(8) based on a common law fraud claim;

— Minn. Stat. § 554.08(c)(6)–(8)

(3) a legal action seeking recovery for bodily injury, wrongful death, or survival or to statements made regarding that legal action;

(4) a legal action brought under the Insurance Code or arising out of an insurance contract;

…

(12) a legal action based on a common law fraud claim; or

— Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.010(a)(3), (4), (12)

Same words, down to “or survival or to statements made regarding that legal action”. Set aside the lead-in (“a legal action”) and one capital letter, and Minnesota’s only change was tacking “unless the claims involve damage to reputation” onto the first one.

Then the carve-back. Both statutes take a handful of exemptions back for the media and for online reviews. Texas brings back three of its exemptions, the commercial-speech one, its consumer-protection statute, and fraud, for “a legal action against a person arising from any act of that person, whether public or private, related to the gathering, receiving, posting, or processing of information for communication to the public,” and so on for more than a hundred words, ending “no matter the method or extent of distribution”, and for “a legal action against a person related to the communication, gathering, receiving, posting, or processing of consumer opinions or commentary, evaluations of consumer complaints, or reviews or ratings of businesses.” § 27.010(b). Minnesota brings back the same three, commercial speech, its consumer-protection chapters, and fraud, in the same two paragraphs. § 554.08(d). I compared them by script. Set aside the word that joins the two paragraphs (Minnesota ends the first with “or”, Texas with “and”), and the only difference I found is a hyphen: Texas writes “audio-visual” and Minnesota writes “audiovisual”.

Texas wrote that carve-back in 2019. H.B. 2730, 86th Leg., R.S., § 9 (Tex. 2019). Minnesota’s is from 2024. The statute books don’t say who copied whom or by what route. They do show the Texas words came first, by almost five years.

So Minnesota’s uniform act is uniform in its first three exemptions and Texan in some of the rest. That matters for § 554.18. When a Minnesota court looks to “states that enact it” for help reading clause (6) or paragraph (d), the state that wrote those exact words first isn’t a uniform-act state at all.

How did Texas end up with thirteen exemptions?

By cutting its own statute back. The original 2011 Act had three exemptions: government enforcement actions, commercial speech, and bodily-injury suits. H.B. 2973, 82d Leg., R.S., § 2 (Tex. 2011). In 2013 the Legislature added insurance. H.B. 2935, 83d Leg., R.S., § 3 (Tex. 2013). Then in 2019 it rewrote the list to twelve, adding employment suits over trade secrets and noncompetes, family law, the state consumer-protection act, medical peer review, evictions, attorney discipline, the public-employee whistleblower law, and fraud. H.B. 2730, § 9. In 2023 it added legal malpractice. H.B. 527, 88th Leg., R.S., § 1 (Tex. 2023). Thirteen.

My favorite is clause (11). Texas exempts “a legal action brought under Chapter 554, Government Code”, which is Texas’s law protecting public employees who report violations of law. In Minnesota, chapter 554 is the anti-SLAPP statute.

The 2019 bill did more than add exemptions. It narrowed what the Act protects. The old definition of a “matter of public concern” had included an issue related to “a good, product, or service in the marketplace”. The bill struck that, and struck “relates to” from the trigger, so a suit now has to be “based on or is in response to” protected expression. H.B. 2730, §§ 1, 3; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.005(b). It passed the House 143 to 1 and the Senate 31 to 0.

One 2019 exemption ties straight to a piece I wrote last week. Texas’s anti-SLAPP law doesn’t apply to a suit arising from an employment relationship that seeks “to enforce a non-disparagement agreement or a covenant not to compete”. § 27.010(a)(5)(B). In Texas the employer enforcing a noncompete doesn’t have to worry about an anti-SLAPP motion. In Minnesota there’s usually no noncompete left to enforce. That’s at /news/minnesota-vs-texas-noncompete-ban-vs-reformation-181-988/.

And Texas has done one thing Minnesota hasn’t. In 2019 it wrote that the Act “applies to a legal action against a victim or alleged victim of family violence or dating violence”, or of listed kidnapping, trafficking, sexual, and assaultive offenses, “based on or in response to a public or private communication.” § 27.010(c). The person who reports abuse and gets sued for defamation is covered, by name. Minnesota went at the same problem from the other side: its act doesn’t apply to a suit by a crime victim against the perpetrator. § 554.08(c)(4).

Minnesota hasn’t touched its act since it passed. Every section from § 554.07 through § 554.20 carries the same History line, “2024 c 123 art 18”, and nothing else.

How hard is it for the plaintiff to survive the motion?

Harder in Texas. That round goes to the speaker in Texas.

In both states the defendant goes first and shows the suit is about protected expression. Then the burden flips. In Minnesota, the court “shall dismiss with prejudice” if the plaintiff can’t establish “a prima facie case as to each essential element of the cause of action”, or if the defendant shows the claim fails under the ordinary rules for dismissal or summary judgment. Minn. Stat. § 554.13(a)(3). In Texas, the court can’t dismiss “if the party bringing the legal action establishes by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in question”, and it still must dismiss if the defendant “establishes an affirmative defense or other grounds on which the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.005(c), (d).

Texas’s phrase is “clear and specific evidence”, and the Texas courts of appeals couldn’t agree on one piece of what it meant, whether circumstantial evidence counts, until April 2015, when the Supreme Court of Texas took it up in In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579 (Tex. 2015). The facts are something. A Weatherford landowner had gas in his well water. He made a video of himself lighting gas escaping from a garden hose attached to his well (to get the effect, the opinion notes, he connected the hose to a vent on the well), shared it with the EPA and the media, and blamed the gas company that had drilled two wells about half a mile away. Id. at 584–85. The Railroad Commission concluded the company’s operations weren’t the source. Id. at 585. He and his wife sued the company; the company counterclaimed for defamation, business disparagement, and conspiracy; and he moved to dismiss under the Act. Id.

The Court put it dryly: “Clear and specific evidence is not a recognized evidentiary standard.” Id. at 589. The Legislature had written a standard nobody had defined. The Court refused to read it as a ban on circumstantial evidence, because “[t]hat the statute should create a greater obstacle for the plaintiff to get into the courthouse than to win its case seems nonsensical.” Id. But it held the standard means something: “mere notice pleading — that is, general allegations that merely recite the elements of a cause of action — will not suffice. Instead, a plaintiff must provide enough detail to show the factual basis for its claim.” Id. at 590–91. In a defamation case, it said, pleadings and evidence establishing the facts “of when, where, and what was said, the defamatory nature of the statements, and how they damaged the plaintiff should be sufficient to resist a TCPA motion to dismiss.” Id. at 591.

That’s the concession in this round. The landowner lost his motion. The company’s defamation claim against him went forward: the Court found some evidence his statements were factual rather than opinion, and held that accusing a gas producer of contaminating an aquifer was defamatory per se. Id. at 595–96. The Act isn’t a free pass for anything a defendant says about a company. It’s a demand that the company show its cards on day one.

Minnesota’s dismissal standard, § 554.13, doesn’t have the word “clear” or “specific” in it. How Minnesota’s court of appeals has read “prima facie case” so far is in my Minnesota piece at /news/minnesota-anti-slapp-upepa-554/. On the text alone, I read Minnesota’s bar as lower than Texas’s.

What does the plaintiff pay if the motion wins?

This is the biggest gap between the two statutes, and it’s four words long.

Minnesota’s fee award is mandatory: the court “shall award court costs, reasonable attorney fees, and reasonable litigation expenses related to the motion” to a moving party who prevails. Minn. Stat. § 554.16(1). Related to the motion.

Texas’s is mandatory too, and it’s bigger. If the court dismisses, it:

(1) shall award to the moving party court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in defending against the legal action; and

(2) may award to the moving party sanctions against the party who brought the legal action as the court determines sufficient to deter the party who brought the legal action from bringing similar actions described in this chapter.

— Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.009(a) (emphasis added)

Defending against the legal action. Not just the motion. And then sanctions on top, sized to deter. Minnesota has no sanctions provision anywhere in the act, and no damages remedy of any kind.

Texas used to be harsher still. The 2011 Act said the court “shall award” sanctions, along with costs, fees, “and other expenses … as justice and equity may require”. H.B. 2973, § 2. In 2019 the Legislature made sanctions discretionary and cut the “other expenses” language. H.B. 2730, § 8. It also limited fees on a dismissed compulsory counterclaim to cases where the counterclaim is “frivolous or solely intended for delay.” § 27.009(c).

Both states let a plaintiff who beats a bad motion recover fees, and here Minnesota is the more generous one. Texas says the court “may award” costs and fees if the motion was “frivolous or solely intended to delay”. § 27.009(b). Minnesota says the court “shall award” them to the plaintiff if it finds the motion “was frivolous or filed solely with intent to delay the proceeding.” § 554.16(2).

If you’re thinking about suing someone over something they said, the Minnesota fee shift alone is a reason to slow down. In Texas, it’s a reason to stop and call a lawyer before you file.

How fast does each court have to move?

Both states give the defendant 60 days from service to file the motion, and both let the court allow it later for good cause. Minn. Stat. § 554.09; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.003(b). Texas also lets the parties extend it by agreement. After that, the clocks part ways.

Texas puts a hard cap on the hearing. It’s supposed to be set within 60 days after the motion is served, and “in no event shall the hearing occur more than 90 days after service of the motion”, or 120 days if the court allows discovery. § 27.004(a), (c). The court then “must rule” within 30 days after the hearing. § 27.005(a). And if it doesn’t, “the motion is considered to have been denied by operation of law and the moving party may appeal.” § 27.008(a). A court that sits on it doesn’t stall the case. It hands the defendant an appeal. The Supreme Court of Texas described the whole thing as a summary process that runs “typically within 150 days following service.” Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 589.

Minnesota’s court “shall hear” the motion within 60 days after filing, unless it orders a later hearing to allow discovery or “for other good cause”, and “shall rule” within 60 days after the hearing. §§ 554.11(a), 554.14. There’s no outer limit on the good-cause delay, and the statute says nothing about what happens if the ruling never comes.

Texas’s clock has teeth. Minnesota’s has a schedule.

What happens to the rest of the lawsuit while the motion is pending?

Minnesota wins this round.

Filing the motion in Minnesota freezes “all other proceedings between the moving party and responding party, including discovery and a pending hearing or motion”. § 554.10(a)(1). Filing it in Texas suspends “all discovery in the legal action” until the court rules. § 27.003(c). Discovery is the expensive part, so the difference is smaller than it looks, but Minnesota’s stay reaches further on the day the motion is filed.

On appeal they line up. A Minnesota appeal stays “all proceedings between all parties in the action” until the appeal is over. § 554.10(c). A Texas appeal from a denial “also stays all other proceedings in the trial court pending resolution of that appeal.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(b). Both states give the defendant an immediate appeal from a denial. Minnesota’s moving party “may appeal as a matter of right” within 30 days. Minn. Stat. § 554.15. Texas lists the denial as an appealable interlocutory order, § 51.014(a)(12), and tells the appellate court it “shall expedite” the appeal. § 27.008(b). Texas added that appeal in 2013. Before that, the courts of appeals disagreed about whether one existed at all. Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 585 n.2.

Neither statute gives the plaintiff a matching right. A plaintiff who loses the motion appeals the ordinary way.

So who protects the person who gets sued for speaking?

Texas, on the rounds that decide most cases.

Texas makes the plaintiff come forward with “clear and specific evidence” on every element, puts a hard clock on the court and turns silence into an appealable denial, and makes a plaintiff whose claims get dismissed pay the fees for defending against them, not just the motion, with sanctions possible on top. Minnesota freezes more of the case on the day the motion is filed, and it’s more willing to make a defendant pay for a frivolous motion. On exemptions, call it a draw with different shapes. Texas cut its own law back hard in 2019, but it protects abuse victims by name. Minnesota took employment, real-property, and federal claims off the table and shares several of Texas’s exemptions, in Texas’s own words.

The caveat runs the other way. A bigger fee award and a tougher standard also make the Texas motion a weapon. A defendant who files a weak one in Texas risks paying the plaintiff’s fees only if the court finds the motion frivolous or meant to delay, and even then the award is discretionary. I wrote about the tools for the other side of that fight, abuse of process and Rule 11, at /news/minnesota-abuse-of-process/ and /news/minnesota-rule-11-sanctions-549211-safe-harbor/, and the defamation elements both motions turn on at /news/minnesota-defamation-law-guide/.

Minnesota calls its statute uniform. In the places where it isn’t, it reads like Texas.

Madgett Law, LLC

Madgett Law, LLC handles speech-based disputes in Minnesota state and federal court on both sides of the caption: we evaluate demand letters before a complaint gets filed, bring and defend special motions for expedited relief within the 60-day window, and litigate the older privileges when the act doesn’t reach the claim. More on the kinds of cases we take is on our general litigation page. If you’ve been sued over something you said, posted, or reported to a government body, and the act applies, the 60 days started the day you were served. Send us a message.

Sources: Minn. Stat. § 554.07 (short title); § 554.08(b), (c)(1)–(12), (d)(1)–(2) (scope; exclusions; carve-back); § 554.09 (60 days; good cause); § 554.10(a)(1), (c) (stay on filing; stay on appeal); § 554.11(a) (hearing); § 554.13(a)(3) (dismissal standard); § 554.14 (ruling); § 554.15 (appeal of right, 30 days); § 554.16(1)–(2) (costs, fees, and expenses related to the motion); § 554.18 (uniformity); §§ 554.07–554.20 History lines (2024 c 123 art 18 only) (Minnesota Office of the Revisor of Statutes, 2026 Minnesota Statutes); Minn. Stat. 2022, § 554.01 History line (1994 c 566 s 1); 2024 Minn. Laws ch. 123, art. 18, §§ 1–17 (enactment; repeal of Minn. Stat. 2022, §§ 554.01–.06; effective the day following final enactment; signed May 24, 2024). Leiendecker v. Asian Women United of Minn., 895 N.W.2d 623, 631, 637–38 (Minn. 2017) (Caselaw Access Project). Uniform Public Expression Protection Act § 2(c)(1)–(3) & cmt. 10 (Unif. L. Comm’n 2020) (final act with comments, Uniform Law Commission). Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.001(7) (matter of public concern); § 27.003(b)–(c) (60 days; discovery suspended); § 27.004(a), (c) (hearing, 90- and 120-day limits); § 27.005(a)–(d) (ruling within 30 days; burden; clear and specific evidence; affirmative defense); § 27.008(a)–(b) (denial by operation of law; expedited appeal); § 27.009(a)–(c) (fees incurred in defending the legal action; sanctions; fees to responding party; compulsory counterclaims); § 27.010(a)(3), (4), (5)(B), (11), (12), (b), (c) (exemptions; carve-back; victims of family violence and listed offenses); § 51.014(a)(12), (b) (interlocutory appeal; stay of all proceedings); Tex. Gov’t Code ch. 554 (protection for reporting violations of law) (Texas Constitution and Statutes, Texas Legislative Council). H.B. 2973, 82d Leg., R.S., § 2 (Tex. 2011) (original ch. 27, including § 27.009(a) and § 27.010); H.B. 2935, 83d Leg., R.S., § 3 (Tex. 2013) (insurance exemption); H.B. 2730, 86th Leg., R.S., §§ 1, 3, 8, 9, 12 (Tex. 2019) (definitions; trigger; fees and sanctions; exemptions and carve-back; effective September 1, 2019; vote certificates); H.B. 527, 88th Leg., R.S., § 1 (Tex. 2023) (legal malpractice exemption) (enrolled bills, Texas Legislature Online). In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 584–86, 585 n.2, 589–91, 595–96 (Tex. 2015) (Caselaw Access Project). This article is general legal information about Minnesota law, with Texas law and the uniform act for comparison. It is not legal advice, reading it does not create an attorney–client relationship, and no outcome is promised or implied.

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