A Texas Jury Can Pay a Family for Its Grief. A Minnesota Jury Can't, Because of Two Words Its Legislature Put in the Statute in 1951.

November 18, 2026 · David J.S. Madgett

In 1979 a fourteen-year-old on a motorcycle collided with a pickup in Key Allegro, Texas, and died a few hours later. His parents sued. The jury found they’d suffered no pecuniary loss at all, zero, and awarded his mother $102,500 for her mental anguish. The trial court threw the mental-anguish award out. In April 1983 the Supreme Court of Texas put it back. Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 250, 254 (Tex. 1983).

In December 1961, a Minnesota father whose nineteen-year-old daughter was killed got a $3,000 verdict, $1,739 of it left after the funeral bill. Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 348 (1961). The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed the measure was too stingy and widened it. Nobody even argued the trial judge was wrong to tell the jury it couldn’t pay him for his grief. Id. at 350.

That’s still the line between the two states. A Texas family can recover for its own grief. A Minnesota family recovers what the law calls “pecuniary loss”. The surprise, for me, was everything else: on punitive damages and on the dead person’s own suffering, Minnesota’s Legislature has spent forty years quietly closing the gap, and on caps, Texas built limits Minnesota doesn’t have. This is another round in my Minnesota-vs-Texas series, which started on the paycheck at /news/minnesota-vs-texas-wage-garnishment-571-922/.

Minnesota’s measure is written into the statute

Here’s Minnesota’s damages sentence as it reads today:

The recovery in the action is the amount the jury deems fair and just for all damages suffered by the decedent resulting from the injury prior to the decedent’s death and the pecuniary loss resulting from the death, and shall be for the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse and next of kin, proportionate to the pecuniary loss severally suffered by the death.

— Minn. Stat. § 573.02, subd. 1 (emphasis added)

“Pecuniary loss” isn’t a judge’s gloss here. The Legislature put it in the statute in 1951, and the Minnesota Supreme Court said the 1951 language “incorporates the pecuniary-loss standard expressed by this court in early decisions.” Fussner, 261 Minn. at 351. Read literally, that’s money: earnings, contributions, services.

Fussner is the case that stretched it. The court called the strict money-only test “unduly restrictive” and said “its meaning should be expanded to conform to present-day needs and experience.” Id. at 352. Then it told trial judges what to say:

The jurors should be told that where the evidence warrants recovery the survivor may be compensated not only for actual pecuniary loss of contributions and services but should be compensated as well for loss of advice, comfort, assistance, and protection which the jury might find to be of pecuniary value and which the survivor could reasonably have expected if the decedent had lived.

— Fussner, 261 Minn. at 359

Advice, comfort, assistance, and protection. Not grief. The same page drew the other fence: jurors shouldn’t be told that “loss of society and companionship which amounts to nothing more than a sentimental attachment should be compensable.” Id. Twenty-five years later Minnesota’s court of appeals read Fussner the way I do: “The supreme court agreed that grief and mental anguish should be excluded, but decided comfort should be an element of pecuniary loss”. Steinbrecher v. McLeod Coop. Power Ass’n, 392 N.W.2d 709, 714 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).

The statute still says “pecuniary loss” in 2026. I searched CourtListener for a Minnesota appellate decision since 2020 that changes the Fussner measure and found none, though that database has known gaps for Minnesota in those years.

Texas threw out the same rule, because its statute never said it

Texas had a pecuniary-loss rule too. The difference is who wrote it. The Texas Wrongful Death Act says only that “[t]he jury may award damages in an amount proportionate to the injury resulting from the death.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 71.010(a). The money-only limit came from the Supreme Court of Texas itself, in 1877. Sanchez, 651 S.W.2d at 252. So in 1983 the court took it back: “It is, therefore, logical for this court to now act in response to the needs of a modern society, and abolish the antiquated rule in favor of recovery of loss of society and mental anguish.” Id.

The court’s reason is one I’d quote to anybody: “If the rule is literally followed, the average child would have a negative worth.” Id. at 251. And its holding: “A parent’s recovery under the wrongful death statute includes the mental anguish suffered as a result of the child’s wrongful death.” Id. at 253.

Three years later the court went further. Grieving family members don’t have to prove their mental anguish showed up as some physical symptom. “We hold, in a wrongful death cause of action, it is no longer necessary to prove that mental anguish is physically manifested.” Moore v. Lillebo, 722 S.W.2d 683, 686 (Tex. 1986). By then the court had already extended mental-anguish recovery to every family member the Act lists, not just parents of minor children. Id. at 684. And it wrote the jury instructions: mental anguish is “the emotional pain, torment, and suffering that the named plaintiff would, in reasonable probability, experience from the death of the family member”, and companionship and society are “the positive benefits flowing from the love, comfort, companionship, and society the named plaintiff would, in reasonable probability, experience if the decedent lived.” Id. at 688.

That’s two separate grief-shaped categories in Texas, on top of pecuniary loss. Minnesota has one word, “comfort”, tucked inside pecuniary loss.

The Minnesota Supreme Court looked at the same kind of move in 1982, on punitive damages, and said no. The statute’s “reference to ‘pecuniary loss’ is clear in its intent to preclude recovery of punitive damages”, and “any change in the recovery for wrongful death that is not permitted by fair interpretation of the statute is for the legislature to make.” Eisert v. Greenberg Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 314 N.W.2d 226, 228 (Minn. 1982). When the words are the Legislature’s, the court waits for the Legislature.

Then the Minnesota Legislature started moving

It moved fast on punitives. Eisert came down January 15, 1982. Seventeen months later the governor approved a bill “allowing award of punitive damages in actions for death by wrongful act”. 1983 Minn. Laws ch. 347 (approved June 14, 1983). Section 573.02, subd. 1 still ends with that sentence: “Punitive damages may be awarded as provided in section 549.20.”

It took forty more years to reach the dead person’s own suffering. Until 2023, Minnesota’s survival statute said a personal-injury cause of action “dies with the person of the party in whose favor it exists, except as provided in section 573.02.” The 2023 Legislature struck that and wrote that the claim “survives the death of any party in accordance with section 573.02.” 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 19, § 32. It added to the wrongful-death measure “all damages suffered by the decedent resulting from the injury prior to the decedent’s death”. Id. § 33. Both changes took effect the day after final enactment; the governor signed the bill May 19, 2023, and they apply “to causes of action pending on or commenced on or after that date.” Id. §§ 32–33. I walked through those amendments at /news/minnesota-survival-of-claims/, and the trustee who has to bring the claim at /news/minnesota-wrongful-death-trustee/.

If you learned that Minnesota bars punitive damages in a death case and can’t compensate the decedent’s own pain, you learned it right in 1982. It’s wrong today. Minnesota fixed the first in 1983 and the second in 2023.

Texas got to the second one by a different road. Its survival statute says a personal-injury cause of action “does not abate because of the death of the injured person”, and it “survives to and in favor of the heirs, legal representatives, and estate of the injured person.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 71.021(a)–(b). In a 2023 case out of an Amarillo pileup, the family sued for the economic losses, the decedent’s “conscious pain and suffering,” and the mental anguish and loss of companionship of his wife, three children, and parents. Gregory v. Chohan, No. 21-0017, slip op. at 7 (Tex. June 16, 2023) (plurality opinion).

Who gets the money, and who files the case

In Texas the action is “for the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse, children, and parents of the deceased”, and any of them may bring it for all of them. § 71.004(a)–(b). If none of them files within three calendar months after the death, the executor or administrator “shall bring and prosecute the action unless requested not to by all those individuals.” § 71.004(c). The jury divides the award “in shares as found by the jury in its verdict”. § 71.010(b).

Minnesota doesn’t let the family sue in its own name. A court appoints a trustee on the written petition of the spouse or one of the next of kin, and the trustee files a consent and oath and posts a bond before receiving any money. Minn. Stat. § 573.02, subd. 3. The recovery goes to “the surviving spouse and next of kin,” and the court, not the jury, “determines the proportionate pecuniary loss of the persons entitled to the recovery and orders distribution accordingly.” § 573.02, subd. 1. Funeral expenses come off the top. Id.

Punitive damages: Texas put them in its constitution

Texas’s constitution has made a killer answer in exemplary damages since February 15, 1876:

Every person, corporation, or company, that may commit a homicide, through wilful act, or omission, or gross neglect, shall be responsible, in exemplary damages, to the surviving husband, widow, heirs of his or her body, or such of them as there may be, without regard to any criminal proceeding that may or may not be had in relation to the homicide.

— Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 26

The Wrongful Death Act repeats it: “When the death is caused by the wilful act or omission or gross negligence of the defendant, exemplary as well as actual damages may be recovered.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 71.009. Then the Legislature fenced it. Exemplary damages need clear and convincing evidence of fraud, malice, or gross negligence, § 41.003(a), and a unanimous jury on liability and amount. § 41.003(d). And they’re capped at the greater of $200,000 or two times economic damages plus noneconomic damages up to $750,000. § 41.008(b). The cap comes off for listed felonies committed knowingly or intentionally, including murder, and for intoxication manslaughter whatever the mental state. § 41.008(c)(1), (15). Kill someone in conduct that’s intoxication manslaughter under the Penal Code, and there’s no lid.

Minnesota’s standard is “clear and convincing evidence that the acts of the defendant show deliberate disregard for the rights or safety of others.” Minn. Stat. § 549.20, subd. 1(a). There’s no dollar cap in § 549.20, but there’s a gate: “Upon commencement of a civil action, the complaint must not seek punitive damages.” § 549.191. You ask the judge first, with affidavits. I compared the two punitive systems in full at /news/minnesota-vs-texas-punitive-damages-cap-549-20/.

The catch on the Texas side: caps and a rational-basis check

Texas pays for grief. It also limits what a jury can do with it.

In a death case against a doctor or hospital, Texas caps “all damages, including exemplary damages,” at “$500,000 for each claimant,” in 1977 dollars indexed to the consumer price index, with medical and custodial care carved out. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.303(a)–(c). I covered that cap and how Texas got it past its own constitution at /news/minnesota-vs-texas-medical-malpractice-damages-cap/. And Texas limits recovery of medical expenses “to the amount actually paid or incurred by or on behalf of the claimant.” § 41.0105.

And in 2023 the Supreme Court of Texas threw out a death verdict that was mostly grief. The jury awarded about $16.8 million to a truck driver’s family, and noneconomic damages for six family members’ mental anguish and loss of companionship accounted for just over $15 million of it. Gregory, slip op. at 2. The lead opinion said “the plaintiff in a wrongful death case should be required to demonstrate a rational connection, grounded in the evidence, between the injuries suffered and the dollar amount awarded.” Id. at 3–4. The arguments to the jury “included references to the price of fighter jets, the value of artwork, and the number of miles driven” by the defendant’s trucks. Id. at 4. New trial, on that and on a separate jury-charge error: the trial court wouldn’t let the defendants designate another company, whose truck was in the pileup, as a responsible third party. Id. at 4–5.

Read the vote count before you quote that test. Only three justices signed on to it. Justice Bland wrote that “we neither need to adopt the plurality’s standard” for every case “nor reject such a standard”. Id. (Bland, J., concurring in part), slip op. at 2. Justice Devine, joined by Justice Boyd, called it “foreign to our jurisprudence”. Id. (Devine, J., concurring in the judgment), slip op. at 2. What all six who sat agreed on is narrower: this award couldn’t stand, because the number had to come from the evidence, not from fighter jets. Id. (Bland, J., concurring in part), slip op. at 2. Texas recognizes the grief. It wants a reason for the number.

Nothing in § 573.02 or § 549.20 puts a dollar cap on a Minnesota wrongful death award. The cap I found is for government: a municipality’s liability on a claim “for death by wrongful act or omission” arising on or after July 1, 2009, “shall not exceed” $500,000, with $1,500,000 for all claims from a single occurrence, and “[n]o award for damages on any such claim shall include punitive damages.” Minn. Stat. § 466.04, subd. 1(a)(3), (7), (b).

Two years in Texas, three in Minnesota

Texas gives the family “two years after the day the cause of action accrues”, and a death claim accrues “on the death of the injured person.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003(b). Minnesota’s general rule is three years after the death, but no more than six years after the act or omission; a medical death claim gets three years from death but no later than § 541.076 allows; and an action for a death caused by “an intentional act constituting murder may be commenced at any time after the death of the decedent.” Minn. Stat. § 573.02, subd. 1. The rest of Minnesota’s clocks are at /news/minnesota-statutes-of-limitations-civil-claims/.

So who treats a grieving family better?

Texas, on what the family can ask for. Its juries can pay a parent, a spouse, or a child for their own mental anguish and for lost companionship, separately, with no proof of physical symptoms. Minnesota’s statute still measures the family’s loss in “pecuniary loss”, and grief stays out.

Minnesota, on what a jury can actually award and how long you have to ask. No statutory cap on a death award against a private defendant, doctors included; a year more to file; and, since 2023, the decedent’s own pre-death suffering inside the same lawsuit.

Texas will pay for the grief and then cap the check. Minnesota won’t pay for the grief, and won’t cap the check either.

Madgett Law, LLC

We handle Minnesota wrongful death matters under § 573.02, from the trustee’s appointment through the distribution hearing, including allocation fights among the next of kin. More on the injury cases we take is on our personal injury page. If someone in your family died because of another person’s conduct, the first step is procedural, and the clock started at the death. Send us a message.

Sources: Minn. Stat. § 573.02, subd. 1 (trustee’s action; limitations; measure of recovery including pre-death damages and pecuniary loss; distribution by the court; funeral expenses; punitive damages under § 549.20), subd. 3 (trustee appointment, oath, bond); § 573.01 (survival); § 549.20, subd. 1(a) (clear and convincing evidence of deliberate disregard); § 549.191 (complaint may not seek punitive damages); § 466.04, subd. 1(a)(3), (7), (b) (municipal limits; no punitive damages) (Minnesota Office of the Revisor of Statutes, 2026 Minnesota Statutes); 1983 Minn. Laws ch. 347, §§ 2, 4 (punitive damages in wrongful death; approved June 14, 1983); 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 19, §§ 32–34 (survival; pre-death damages; effective the day following final enactment; signed May 19, 2023). Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 26 (exemplary damages for homicide; Feb. 15, 1876); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003(b) (two years; accrual at death); § 41.003(a), (d) (clear and convincing evidence; unanimity); § 41.008(b), (c)(1), (15) (exemplary damages cap; felony exceptions); § 41.0105 (paid or incurred); § 71.004(a)–(c) (beneficiaries; who sues; executor after three months); § 71.009 (exemplary damages); § 71.010(a)–(b) (damages proportionate to the injury; division by the jury); § 71.021(a)–(b) (survival); § 74.303(a)–(c) (health care wrongful death and survival limit) (Texas Constitution and Statutes, Texas Legislative Council). Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 348, 350–52, 359, 113 N.W.2d 355 (1961); Eisert v. Greenberg Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 314 N.W.2d 226, 228 (Minn. 1982); Steinbrecher v. McLeod Coop. Power Ass’n, 392 N.W.2d 709, 714 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 250–54 (Tex. 1983); Moore v. Lillebo, 722 S.W.2d 683, 684, 686, 688 (Tex. 1986) (Caselaw Access Project). Gregory v. Chohan, No. 21-0017, slip op. at 2–5, 7 (Tex. June 16, 2023) (plurality opinion), reported at 670 S.W.3d 546; id. (Bland, J., concurring in part), slip op. at 2; id. (Devine, J., concurring in the judgment), slip op. at 2 (Supreme Court of Texas slip opinions, search.txcourts.gov). This article is general legal information about Minnesota law, with Texas law for comparison. It is not legal advice, reading it does not create an attorney–client relationship, and no outcome is promised or implied.

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